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In contemporary rights jurisprudence and theory, the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Federal Bill of Rights are most frequently conceptualized as bulwarks against
majoritarian abuses. From Brown v. Board of Education to Obergefell v.
Hodges and even District of Columbia v. Heller, federal rights are primarily
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understood as enforceable legal constraints on popular majorities (especially intrastate
majorities). Viewed through this lens, state constitutional rights are often dismissed
as fundamentally dysfunctional because they are too easily amended through
majoritarian political processes to constrain popular majorities. After all, what good
is a state constitutional right to marriage equality, for example, if it can be quickly
eliminated by a majority vote?
This article provides the first dedicated assessment of this perspective on state
constitutional rights by drawing on a largely neglected set of sources: the debates of all
known state constitutional conventions where state bills of rights were forged and
reformed (105 conventions from 1818 to 1984). These sources suggest that prevailing
critiques of state constitutional rights are misguided and limit our understanding of
American public law. Although the Federal Bill of Rights may function as an
important constraint on popular majorities, state bills of rights serve a diﬀerent
purpose. They were created primarily as a device for democratic majorities to control
wayward government oﬃcials and representatives. State bills of rights were not
designed to operate as higher law beyond the reach of legitimate democratic majorities.
To the contrary, they were built to function as higher law beyond the reach of
government, but always within the immediate reach of the people.
Excavating this perspective on state bills of rights not only places them in their
proper historical and theoretical context, but it also disentangles them from their
federal counterparts and enables more sophisticated inquiries into how constitutional
rights function within our federal system. These findings also have timely implications
for federal and state rights jurisprudence. With the Supreme Court now likely to
reevaluate the breadth of certain federal protections—perhaps in favor of giving state
courts more space to develop state constitutional rights—it is important that we have
clarity regarding the deep structure of state constitutional rights. My findings show
that despite well-intentioned exhortations from prominent judges and scholars, state
constitutional rights are not built to provide an alternative corpus of meaningful
counter-majoritarian protections—at least not in the same way as federal
constitutional rights.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1972, civil rights advocates and death penalty opponents won a huge
victory before the California Supreme Court.1 The Court ruled that capital

1 See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972) (holding that the death penalty, an
“impermissibly cruel” practice, violated the Declaration of Rights in the California Constitution),
invalidated by CAL. CONST. art. I, §27. On Anderson’s signiﬁcance, see Robert F. Williams, The Third
Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 213 (2003), describing how
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punishment violated the state’s bill of rights.2 The ruling ended the death
penalty in California and extended criminal protections far beyond the
Federal Bill of Rights. It was a signiﬁcant decision. But it was quickly undone.
Nine months later, in a statewide referendum, California voters amended
their bill of rights to reinstate the death penalty and prohibit future court
rulings rendering the death penalty unconstitutional.3
This narrative is now familiar and increasingly common.4 Almost every
election cycle, voters in states around the country decide on changes to their
state’s bills of rights.5 Voters have, for example, cut back protections for
criminal defendants,6 formalized privacy protections,7 banned same-sex
marriage,8 authorized public assistance for parochial schools,9
constitutionalized a right to hunt and ﬁsh,10 and enhanced gun and property
rights.11 This “amendomania” has caused state bills of rights to grow
dramatically in length, scope, and detail.12

Anderson triggered an “initial recognition that state courts could evade U.S. Supreme Court
decisions” that limited rights and expand individual protections under state bills of rights.
2 Anderson, 493 P.2d at 899.
3 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“All statutes of this State in eﬀect on February 17, 1972 . . .
relating to the death penalty are in full force and eﬀect . . . . The death penalty provided for under
those statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the inﬂiction of cruel or unusual
punishments within the meaning of Article 1, Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such oﬀenses
be deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution.”). Public outcry following the
Anderson ruling was swift, in part, because the ruling had the immediate eﬀect of transforming the
sentences of 107 current death-row inmates into life sentences, and two of those inmates were
Charles Manson and Sirhan Sirhan, who was convicted of the assassination of Robert Kennedy. See
State Supreme Court Bans Death Penalty: Life Terms Ordered for 107, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb.
19, 1972, at A1; Death Penalty Backed in California, 66–24, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1972, at 67.
4 See Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular Response, 76
ALB. L. REV. 2061, 2064 (2013) (noting that “voting on rights has become a regular feature of ”
state constitutionalism).
5 See JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 73-153 (2018) (providing deﬁnitive
survey of rights amendments).
6 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (adopted 1982); see also State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 322
n.1, 323-24 (Fla. 1983) (explaining that the 1982 amendment added language prohibiting Florida
courts from construing the exclusionary rule more broadly than “decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution”).
7 See MONT. CONST. art II, § 10 (adopted 1972) (“The right of individual privacy is essential
to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.”).
8 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted 2004), invalidated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
9 See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (permitting state provision of reasonable transportation for
school-aged children to and from any school in the state).
10 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26 (adopted 2003).
11 See KAN. CONST. bill of rts. § 4 (adopted 2010) (granting individuals the right to keep and
bear arms for defense, hunting and recreational use, and other lawful purposes).
12 See infra subsection I.B.2 (providing original data measuring this growth).
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Many scholars view the popular responsiveness of state constitutional
rights as a fundamental defect.13 Critiques take various forms, but they
generally rest on the assumption that, in certain key respects, state bills of
rights should function like the Federal Constitution. Speciﬁcally, as Justice
Robert Jackson declared in 1943, the “purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities . . . and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.”14 From this perspective, state
constitutional rights seem obviously defective. Rather than sitting beyond
ordinary politics, they are frequently the epicenter of political slugfests.15
Rather than ensconcing courts as their guardians, they displace courts
through unrelenting popular intervention and micromanagement.16 It is
understandable, therefore, that state bills of rights have been described as
“primitive”, “ineﬀective”, “ﬂabby”, and even “namby-pamby.”17
But these critiques have skipped a step. They fail to consider that state
constitutional rights may be designed with different priorities and objectives.
In this regard, scholars have long observed that state constitutions are
structured around a set of public fears regarding democracy that differ from
the assumptions underlying the Federal Constitution.18 Alan Tarr has argued,
13 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1695, 1701-02 (2010) (explaining that state constitutions are generally easier for the majority to
change and are thus more majoritarian); James M. Fisher, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct
Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 45 (1983) (describing
state constitutional jurisprudence as “result-oriented” and prone to majoritarianism); The
Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Essay, Gay Rights and American Constitutionalism, 56 DUKE L.J.
545, 570-80 (2006) (criticizing state constitutional rights for their ease and frequency of amendment
because “[m]aking distinctions among citizens based upon facets of their identity is not what
American constitutions do.” Rather, “[c]onstitutions should be articulations of fundamental law, not
second layers of positive law”).
14 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Justice Jackson continued:
“[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” Id.
15 See Chemerinsky, supra note 13.
16 See John Dinan, Foreword, Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional
Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983, 984 (2007) (“[S]tate amendments throughout American history
have been adopted in response to a wide variety of court decisions . . . .”); Mila Versteeg & Emily
Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 664 (2016) (describing increased
state constitutional detail as a “vehicle[] of democratic control over courts . . . .”). See generally
Miller, supra note 4.
17 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 184 (1985); see also G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 77-78 (1998) (describing Levy’s theory of state bills of
rights as one where “state guarantees reveal an inexperience and ineptitude in constitution making,
which was overcome by the time of the federal Constitution;” thus making state bills of rights
“primitive” predecessors of the Federal Bill of Rights).
18 Gordon Wood’s inﬂuential account, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969), is often credited with ﬁrst documenting and articulating a clear
disjunction between state and federal constitutional theory. See TARR, supra note 17, at 92 n.124. At
the core of Wood’s account is the idea that state constitutionalists had an evolving distrust of pure
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for example, that federal constitutional design is committed to the Madisonian
belief that self-interested majorities are a dominant threat to democracy.19 On
this view, “majority faction” is a concern because democratic processes enable
majorities to capture government for their own ends at the expense of
minorities and individual liberties.20 Under the Federal Constitution, judicial
review and a deeply entrenched constitutional text have come to play a key
role in counteracting the danger that Madison conceptualized.21
State constitutions, on the other hand, tend to orient around a diﬀerent
concern. State constitutionalism seems obsessed with the fear that
government will be captured, not by a self-serving democratic majority, but
by an elite minority.22 Indeed, state constitutions have various structural

representative government, which they viewed as easily captured by elites, and a corresponding trust
in popular majority rule as a necessary check on representative institutions. See, e.g., WOOD, supra,
at 127-96 (outlining and documenting early concerns about agency costs associated with elected
executives and legislatures and the role of popular accountability in counteracting agency costs).
Another inﬂuential account in this regard is DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR
CONTROL (1980). See id. at 75-84 (tracing how early American constitutional theory in the states
focused on “popular government” as a vehicle for addressing various agency concerns). For a more
recent account that ties these ideas together in an assessment of contemporary state
constitutionalism, see generally G. Alan Tarr, For the People: Direct Democracy in the State
Constitutional Tradition, in DEMOCRACY: HOW DIRECT? VIEWS FROM THE FOUNDING ERA AND
THE POLLING ERA 87 (Elliot Abrams ed. 2002).
19 See TARR, supra, note 17, at 78, 78 n.73 (1998) (noting that the state constitutional concern
with minority faction stands in “contrast with Federalist no. 10 [written by Madison], as well as
modern rights theory”); see also Tarr, supra note 18 (developing this contrast further).
20 In Federalist 10, Madison described this problem as “the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Penguin Books 1987).
21 Madison placed most hope in structural arrangements such as federalism, separation of
powers, and representative decision-making. See Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional
Theory of James Madison, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1514-15 (2002) (outlining Madison’s three
primary concerns regarding the constitutional government of the 1780s); Daryl J. Levinson,
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 667
(2011) (noting that Madison was skeptical of constitutional rights as countermajoritarian constraints
and that he favored separation of powers as a solution to majority faction). However, contemporary
rights theory is based on Madison’s conceptualization of majority tyranny, with judicial review as a
critical piece of the contemporary solution. See id. at 667 (noting that countermajoritarian
application of the Federal Bill of Rights is the product of “retrospective[] reinterpret[ation]”); infra
Section I.A (describing this approach).
22 See TARR, supra note 17, at 78-81 (discussing fears that “minority faction[s]” were the greatest
threat to government). This fear is proliﬁc in state convention debates. See REPORT OF THE
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA. 1850, at 683 (Ind. Hist. Collections Reprint 1935)
(1850) [hereinafter IND. 1850] (“It is a notorious fact . . . that hitherto the agents of corporations
have been able . . . to carry through the Legislature almost any measure which their principals
deemed of suﬃcient importance to expend money enough to carry.”) (statement of Morris of
Washington); 2 DEBATES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917–1918,
at 947 (1918) (“We have found that in our legislative bodies these organized human selfish forces were
very powerful and, indeed, at times were able to thwart the will and judgment of the majority.”).
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features that reﬂect skepticism of representative government.23 That
skepticism is, of course, layered, nuanced, and contextual. It includes generic
concerns about government accountability, as well as deeper cynicism about
the eﬃcacy of representative government. But if there is a single thread that
connects state constitutions across jurisdictions and time, it is a populist fear
that government is prone towards capture and recalcitrance.24
All of this suggests that there is good reason to investigate state bills of
rights on their own terms rather than assuming that they ﬁt the federal mold.
To that end, this Article analyzes prevailing critiques of state bills of rights
by situating them in the context of the convention debates where those rights
were forged, reformed, and operationalized. To do this, I collected and
reviewed all known convention debates where state bills of rights were
discussed (105 conventions from 1818 to 1984).25 This dataset includes debates
from every decade during that period and at least one record from all but six
states.26 Based on this review, I ﬁnd that prevailing accounts of state
constitutional rights are misguided and fundamentally misunderstand their
structure and design.
My core claim is that although the Federal Bill of Rights may operate as
a bulwark against abusive majorities, state bills of rights grew from the belief
that extra precautions are necessary to prevent government oﬃcials from
using their political power to thwart or oppress democratic majorities. This
approach emphasizes that representative government creates opportunities
and incentives for oﬃcials to pursue their own private interests at the expense
of the people. Importantly, it also views direct popular intervention as a
necessary antidote for government recalcitrance. On this view, a bill of rights
is an “ordinance of the people”—a dynamic set of substantive instructions and
limitations on government that is adopted and jealously maintained by the
people themselves.27 To be sure, certain foundational rights (like political
23 The most obvious are the initiative and referendum. See DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN
LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 3-4 (1989) (discussing citizens’ ability to
propose and vote on ordinances). Others include recall and the divided executive.
24 See Tarr, supra note 18, at 87, 89-90 (noting the belief “that the primary danger facing
republican government is minority . . . rather than majority faction”); Mila Versteeg & Emily
Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1646 (2014)
(highlighting the general desire to, and mechanisms implemented to, limit discretion at the
legislative, executive, and judicial levels); Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 16, at 659 (2016)
(“[C]onstitutional drafters chose speciﬁcity over entrenchment as a means to constrain the exercise
of political power.”).
25 Appendix A lists the conventions.
26 Appendices B and C illustrate the temporal and geographic distributions of the dataset.
27 See Wesley W. Horton, Annotated Debates of the 1818 Constitutional Convention, 65 CONN.
BAR J. 3, 17 (1991) [hereinafter Conn. 1818] (describing the Connecticut bill of rights as an “ordinance
of the people” because “it could not be improper to settle certain points—the people were possessed
of certain rights, to abridge the power of the legislature, and enlarge the power of the executive or
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equality within the electorate) necessarily ﬂow from this approach, but its
deﬁning feature is to establish the bill of rights as an active instrument of
popular control over government rather than an enduring and magisterial
enumeration of the “great rights of mankind.”28 This is why state bills of
rights almost universally begin with the right of the people to alter or reform
government.29 It is also why, in many states, the bill of rights has ballooned
to include long, detailed provisions that are clearly responsive to particular
government failures.30
This alternative approach to constitutional rights is evident from two
pervasive themes in the convention debates. First, delegates explicitly articulated
this perspective.31 Although discussion over adopting the Federal Bill of Rights
was resolved by at least 1791, states continued to debate whether it was necessary
and useful to separately enumerate rights in state constitutions. Delegates raised
various issues in this regard, but the dominant perspective was that a bill of rights
is important because legislatures and officials cannot be trusted.32 The debates
reflect remarkably little support for the idea that constitutional rights should
operate as entrenched, intergenerational constraints on democratic processes.33
judiciary” and noting further that “[s]ome of the states had made such regulations, and conﬁned their
legislatures within such limits, as to prevent the enacting of any law on certain subjects”).
28 James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution: [8 June 1789], in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 196, 198 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979).
29 See VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § III (“[A] majority of the community hath an
indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish [the government].”).
These provisions are ubiquitous in current state bills of rights. See Steven Gow Calabresi, James
Lindgren, Hannah M. Begley, Kathryn L. Dore & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights under State
Constitutions in 2018: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in a Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 49, 133 (2018) (identifying that, as of 2018, forty-nine states have provisions).
30 For example, Michigan has a 350-word section in its bill of rights addressing human embryo
and embryonic stem-cell research. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 27. It was adopted by initiative in
response to speciﬁc legislative opposition on the issue. See DINAN, supra note 5, at 245 (“Voters
in . . . Michigan in 2008 approved similarly phrased amendments . . . .”).
31 See V PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 3264 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1868) [hereinafter N.Y. 1867–68] (“The
theory of our action so far, has been that we cannot trust the Legislature, because from various causes
the Legislature would often disregard what was required . . . and therefore, it is necessary to provide
for this in the organic law.”).
32 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1844, at 170 (N.J. Writers’ Project of the Works Projects Admin. 1942) [hereinafter N.J. 1844] (“How
dark are the evils that unbridled legislation has inﬂicted on the community. We are called upon . . .
to guard all the avenues by which the people’s rights may be invaded. By adopting the declaration
of rights, we will circumscribe the action of the legislature . . . .”).
33 I REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION STATE OF VIRGINIA 63 (1906) [hereinafter I VA. 1901–02] (“I do not believe that the
people of any generation have the right to fetter the hands of their posterity. It is against common
right; it is against the essential principles of free government; it is against all modern ideas of
civilization; and it is against the express letter of our Bill of Rights, which says that the people have
the inalienable and indefeasible right at any time to alter or change their Constitution.”).
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Indeed, as a delegate to New York’s 1821 convention characteristically explained:
“It is not . . . because I am afraid of the people, that I would provide these checks[;]
[i]t is because I fear that the representatives of the people will not be faithful to
their trust.”34 Thus, in contrast to the federal model, delegates frequently
expressed their understanding that the principal purpose of a state bill of rights is
to “explicitly . . . state . . . that these powers are inherent in the people, and to say
emphatically to the Legislature that they are simply the agents of the people.”35
Second, and perhaps most importantly, delegates have practiced this
approach continuously through the decades. The debates reveal that delegates
used their bills of rights primarily to respond to actual, perceived, and
anticipated failures of representative government to deliver on popular
preferences.36 This happened in a variety of ways. Sometimes, delegates
pursued reform to constitutional rights because the legislature was subject to
undue inﬂuence by private interests.37 Other times, delegates reformed rights
in response to concerns that the legislative process was ill-suited to a
particular issue because logrolling and compromise diluted popular policy
priorities.38 In still other instances, rights reform responded to noncompliance by executive oﬃcials and local governments.39 And in many
instances, delegates used rights amendments to override court rulings that
blocked popular policies.40 These changes covered issues from imprisonment
for debt, racial exclusion, worker’s rights, gender equality, environmental
rights, and many more. The debates demonstrate that the state approach to
constitutional rights is not a relic of the founding. It has remained an active
part of the state constitutional tradition.
At this point, a few important qualifications and clarifications are proper.
First, I do not claim that the state approach to constitutional rights is
normatively preferable to the federal approach. Indeed, my findings show that,
although state constitutional rights have sometimes empowered admirable
popular campaigns to undo an oppressive status quo, they have also facilitated
popular prejudices, hate, self-interest, and even secession. The state approach
34 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821,
ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEWYORK 59 (Albany, E & E. Hosford 1821) [hereinafter N.Y. 1821].
35 THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1835–36, at 287 (Harold M. Dorr
ed., 1940) [hereinafter MICH. 1835–36].
36 See infra Part III (tracing this practice through various issues over time).
37 See infra subsection III.A.1 (describing antebellum eﬀorts to limit inﬂuence of private
corporations).
38 See infra subsection III.A.3 (describing racial exclusion provisions as products of concerns
about logrolling).
39 See infra subsection III.A.2 (describing state governments’ failures regarding imprisonment
for debt).
40 See infra subsections III.C.1–2 (describing workers’ rights amendments as responsive to
court decisions).
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surely has grave normative costs. My claim, however, is that, for better or
worse, state bills of rights have never purported to function the way that the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Bill of Rights now operate. Whatever
their failures, state bills of rights represent an intentional alternative approach
to constitutional rights. Simply ignoring that approach because it does not fit
the federal mold risks dangerously oversimplifying American public law.
Indeed, one of the important implications of my findings is that Americans
live under two very different kinds of constitutional rights that often point in
opposite directions because they perform different functions. Recognizing this
duality highlights the unique significance of federal rights and opens more
fruitful lines of inquiry regarding the effectiveness of state constitutional
rights and their normative justifications.
Additionally, I do not mean to suggest that all states have had identical
experiences with the design and practice of constitutional rights. Diﬀerences
between states exist. That said, my review of the debates reveals a remarkable
degree of convergence regarding certain core issues. My claim is that, as
compared to the federal model, the states generally converge on an approach
that prioritizes rights as instruments of popular control over government
rather than entrenched counter-majoritarian constraints.
Finally, my primary focus in this Article is to articulate and substantiate
the states’ distinct approach to constitutional rights. I plan to explore the
implications of my findings as part of a long-term research agenda.
However, I conclude this Article by teasing a few important implications.
For one thing, by highlighting the distinctive features of state
constitutional rights, my findings lay the groundwork for more
sophisticated inquiries into how constitutional rights function within our
federal system as a whole and help move us past truisms about the nature
and function of constitutional rights writ large.
Relatedly, my ﬁndings are especially important at a moment when the
Supreme Court seems likely to reevaluate the scope of certain federal rights.
Justices past and present have expressed sympathy for “judicial rights
federalism”—the idea that state and federal courts share a joint and equivalent
responsibility for advancing rights under their respective constitutions.41 But
the Supreme Court should be skeptical of arguments suggesting that state
constitutional rights can operate as local substitutes or fail-safes for federal
rights. Although the texts of state and federal rights can be similar, state
constitutional rights were built to empower rather than constrain state
majorities. In other words, state constitutional rights are not like-kind
substitutes for federal rights; if anything, they are designed to pull in the
opposite direction. This has important implications for the construction of
41

See infra Section IV.C (discussing the implications for federal rights jurisprudence).
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federal rights. Stated plainly, narrowing federal rights leaves aﬀected
intrastate minorities without any equivalent protections under state
constitutional law. My ﬁndings bring this structural reality into sharp relief.
My ﬁndings also destabilize how many state courts interpret state bills of
rights. State courts tend to borrow standards of review grounded in the
federal Constitution’s counter-majoritarian framework. My ﬁndings provide
a sound basis for state courts to reconsider those standards.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores how conventional
critiques of state bills of rights are incomplete and succeed only in showing
that state bills of rights do not function like their federal cousin. Part II places
early state bills of rights in their original historical and political context and
argues that they were originally crafted as instruments of popular control over
government. Part III presents evidence showing that the states have
maintained and practiced this approach to constitutional rights. Part IV
concludes by oﬀering a more authentic and accurate assessment of
contemporary state constitutional rights and exploring a few preliminary
implications for state and federal rights jurisprudence.
I. MISUNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In this Part, I argue that state constitutional rights are misunderstood
because critics assess them through a narrow rights framework derived from
our experience under the federal Constitution. I ﬁrst deﬁne the parameters
of that framework. I then argue that existing critiques are mostly correct in
their descriptions of how state constitutional rights function, but they skip
over the possibility that state constitutional rights serve a diﬀerent purpose.
I conclude with a brief account of how existing state constitutional rights
scholarship has failed to respond to these critiques because it too tends to
approach state constitutional rights through the federal framework.
A. Rights as Bulwarks Against Popular Majorities
Since at least Brown v. Board of Education,42 American constitutional
consciousness has prioritized the idea that constitutional rights exist to erect
much-needed constraints on popular majorities.43 Indeed, Akhil Amar has
argued that “in the shadow” of Brown,44 the “dominant approach” to the
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over
the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L. J. 1049, 1060 (2009) (“[B]ecause Brown has become the crown
jewel of the United States Reports, every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself.”).
44 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 3 (1998); see also id. at 3-4 (“Living in the shadow of
Brown v. Board of Education and the second Reconstruction of the 1960s, many lawyers embrace a tradition
42
43
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Federal Bill of Rights focusses “exclusively on . . . [the] protection of
minority against majority.”45 Supreme Court Justices have likewise asserted
that the “salient purpose” of a bill of rights is to “protect minorities . . . from
the passions or fears of political majorities.”46 Leading legal theorists have
observed that in American political culture fear of overbearing majorities is
so endemic that “judicially patrolled constraints on legislative decisions has
become more or less axiomatic.”47 Most recently, Maggie Blackhawk has
argued that Brown remains the “normative lodestar against which to evaluate
constitutional theory, values, and design.”48
Madison planted the seeds of this perspective at the founding. In
Federalist 10 as well as his speech to the ﬁrst Congress introducing the Federal
Bill of Rights, Madison argued that the need for enumerated rights came
primarily from the dangers posed by self-interested democratic majorities.49
According to Madison,
The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be leveled against that quarter
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest
prerogative of power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or
legislative departments of government, but in the body of the people,
operating by the majority against the minority.50

To be sure, Madison did not have a full appreciation for how the
Fourteenth Amendment and judicial review might expand and actualize the
counter-majoritarian function of federal rights.51 But he surely thought that
constraining political majorities was a critical function of the Bill of Rights.
Jumping (far) ahead to the civil rights revolution of the twentieth century,
American constitutional scholars had “a ﬁxation on rights as the ideal solution

that views state governments as the quintessential threat to individual and minority rights, and federal
officials—especially federal courts—as the special guardians of those rights.” (footnote omitted)).
45 AMAR, supra note 44, at xiii.
46 William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 26 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991).
47 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346, 1395 (2006).
48 Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1792 (2019).
49 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“By a faction I understand a number of
citizens . . . who are . . . adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.”); see also Madison, supra note 28, at 207 (arguing it would be necessary
to add a declaration of the rights of the people into the Constitution).
50 Madison, supra note 28, at 204.
51 51 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 499 (1997) (“While it is doubtful that the Framers entertained a very sophisticated
conception of judicial review, had they appreciated the countermajoritarian possibilities inherent in
the institution, they probably would have thought it a terriﬁc idea.”) (citation omitted). But see
Levinson, supra note 21, at 667 (“Madison drew the general lesson that countermajoritarian rights
would be an exercise in futility.”).
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to minority subordination.”52 The civil rights revolution, with Brown as its
ﬂagship, conﬁrmed for constitutional theorists much of what Madison had
prophesied at the founding.53 Democratic majorities, especially intrastate
majorities, were the greatest threat to political minorities and individual
liberty. But even more importantly, the rights revolution brought federal
courts to the fore as the guardians of individual rights.54 With the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Warren Court greatly expanded federal judicial review to strike down state
and local laws that targeted minorities or infringed core personal freedoms.55
This “ushered in an era” where constitutional rights were expected to address
a particular problem (overbearing majorities) in a particular way (judicial
enforcement of rights as side-constraints on majoritarian politics).56
The essential characteristics of this approach are important to note. First,
it embraces courts as referees between political majorities and disfavored
minorities and individuals. Courts are expected to independently ascertain the
nature and scope of a right and decide whether popular policies impermissibly
infringe it. Second, it assumes that constitutional rights and court rulings are
supreme and entrenched beyond the immediate reach of majoritarian political
processes. Court-enforced rights operate as “trumps” that invalidate otherwise
legitimate actions by democratic majorities.57 Third, this perspective on rights
Blackhawk, supra note 48, at 1846.
Another factor that elevated the minority-protecting rationale to prominence was the
Court’s Lochner jurisprudence, which ostensibly sought to enforce federal rights as constraints on
state governments. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court’s Two Constitutions: A First Look at the
“Reverse Polarity” Cases, 82 U. PITT. L. REV. 273, 340-46 (discussing Footnote Four of United States
v. Carolene Products Co.). As the Court undid Lochner but sought to expand protection for civil
liberties, scholars needed a “theoretical rationale” for this transformation that could disentangle the
Court’s civil liberties jurisprudence from Lochner. See Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A
History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 238 (2004) (arguing that judicial
activism came before ﬁnding a rationale for it). The protection of “insular minorities” as described
in Carolene Products provided the framework and accelerated the importance of framing rights as
minority protections. See id. at 238 (“[I]t took a few years for Carolene Products to emerge as the clear
symbol of the political process, minority protection argument.”).
54 See M ARY A NN G LENDON, R IGHTS T ALK 4-5 (1991) (describing the history of the
rights revolution).
55 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148 (1980) (“During the Warren era,
the Supreme Court was quite adventurous in expanding the set of suspect classiﬁcations beyond the
core case of race.”).
56 Blackhawk, supra note 48, at 1846. Conventional accounts of rights in the United States
mostly begin with Supreme Court cases from the twentieth century. See, e.g., Robert A. Rutland,
How the Constitution Protects Our Rights: A Look at the Seminal Years, in HOW DOES THE
CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 1, 12 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A Schambra eds., 1985)
(“Not until the Fourteenth Amendment spread its broad umbrella [through incorporation] did the
Bill of Rights assume the guardianship role its authors intended.”).
57 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977); see also Gordon v. Lance, 403
U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (“[T]he Bill of Rights removes entire areas of legislation from the concept of
majoritarian supremacy.”).
52
53
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is animated by the Madisonian belief that self-interested majorities (especially
intrastate majorities) present the greatest danger to free government.58 This
fear is, of course, well founded based on the paradigm cases of slavery, Jim
Crow, and their entrenched systemic effects.59
This perspective still dominates constitutional theory, rights
jurisprudence, and popular political discourse. Disputes about rights and the
appropriate balance of government power continue to be framed by analogy
to this paradigm. Even the Roberts Court, which has been critical of laws
favoring racial minorities, has “set at naught the outcomes reached by
majoritarian processes” in favor of rights asserted by groups seeking to evade
democratic regulation.60
To be sure, this perspective on rights has come with normative and
empirical criticism. The most prominent normative critique is Alexander
Bickel’s formulation of the tension between judicial review and democratic
legitimacy.61 Bickel’s “countermajoritarian diﬃculty” spawned tomes of
literature dedicated to harmonizing or explaining entrenched constitutional
rights, judicial review, and democratic governance.62 In response, some
theorists posit that rights should be understood as “precommit[ments]”
designed to ensure that people remain true to their better judgment during
periods of shortsightedness.63 Other theorists argue that independent judicial
review is essential to self-governance because it protects the equal
participation and value of all citizens, the core of democratic ideals.64 Still
another branch of empirical literature contends that the Supreme Court does
not actually perform a countermajoritarian role. The countermajoritarian
critique is misplaced, they claim, because the Supreme Court tends to make
decisions that approximate majoritarian preferences.65
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison); see also TARR, supra note 17, at 78 n.73.
See, e.g., K-Sue Park, The History Wars and Property Law: Conquest and Slavery as Foundational
to the Field, 131 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (expounding the systemic eﬀects of slavery on
contemporary property law); Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell & Maya Sen, The Political Legacy
of American Slavery, 78 J. POL. 621 (2016) (exploring how political attitudes and aﬃliations are
systemically aﬀected by the institution of slavery).
60 Hellman, supra note 53, at 341-42, 346 (identifying District of Columbia v. Heller and
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission as examples).
61 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1962).
62 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Diﬃculty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 341 (1998).
63 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 94 (rev. ed. 1984).
64 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 17 (1996) (positing a “constitutional
conception of democracy” that considers all individuals equally).
65 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 282-83 (1957) (defending the Court as a democratic institution); Mark A.
Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35,
70-72 (1993) (explaining the Court’s constitutional decisions generally track majority public sentiment).
58
59
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Of course, the American constitutional tradition oﬀers other ways to
understand rights. Even Madison maintained that constitutional rights
should not only protect against majority tyranny but also “guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers.”66 My point is not that this perspective
on rights is entirely absent or unimportant; it is surely baked into even the
Federal Bill of Rights.67 Rather, my point is that contemporary rights theory
and jurisprudence continues to brush past this perspective in favor of the idea
that rights ﬁnd their essential purpose in the fear that unchecked majorities
will run amuck and exploit or target disfavored individuals and minorities.
B. “Amendomania” and the Dysfunction Critiques
It is through this framework that state constitutional rights are most often
found wanting—and for good reason. State constitutional rights do not meet
the framework’s criteria, especially when compared to their federal counterparts.
Critiques take various forms, but they can be organized into three groups: the
entrenchment critique, the direct-democracy critique, and the underenforcement critique. As I explain below, all three critiques offer incomplete
assessments of state constitutional rights because they fail to consider that states
have designed and deployed constitutional rights to work differently.
1. The Entrenchment Critique
Entrenchment critics argue that state constitutional rights are
dysfunctional because, as a normative matter, constitutionalism necessarily
includes judicially enforceable legal constraints on majorities.68 These
constraints might reﬂect political morality or pre-commitments by the people
themselves.69 In either case, constitutional democracy requires some
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 58, at 321.
See AMAR, supra note 44, at xiii (arguing that before Reconstruction and incorporation the
Federal Bill of Rights was “more majoritarian than counter” and “centrally concerned with controlling
the ‘agency costs’ created by the specialization of labor inherent in a representative government”).
68 See Wilkinson, supra note 13, at 571 (describing the variety of subjects covered by majoritarian
amendments); Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1701 (describing the use of state constitutional
amendments to override state court decisions); Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State
Constitutional Law, 59 KAN. L. REV. 687, 690-91 (2011) (reciting this critique and exploring its limits);
Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power,
Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1475 (1987) (describing how
majoritarian amendment processes problematize judicial protection of minorities); James M. Fischer,
Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTING
CONST. L. Q. 43, 47 (1983) (“It is the relative ease by which state constitutions can be amended by a
temporary majority that poses a challenge to state constitutional jurisprudence . . . .”).
69 These critics build on constitutional theorists such as Ronald Dworkin and Jon Elster, who
have oﬀered normative justiﬁcations for entrenched constitutional rights that courts enforce as
constraints on majorities. See DWORKIN, supra note 64, at 17 (arguing that countermajoritarian
66
67
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institution to monitor self-interested majoritarian politics. Scholars within
this camp identify with the notion that state constitutional rights are
dysfunctional because they are “one statewide initiative away from being
changed by a majority vote.”70 The main concern by this group is that state
constitutional rights have failed the essential purpose of a constitutional right
because they are insuﬃciently insulated from extant majorities.71
The obvious strength of this critique is its description of how state
constitutional rights function. State constitutions are easy to amend, and
amendment processes prioritize popular majoritarian decisionmaking.72
Moreover, state electorates actively amend their bills of rights.73 State bills of
rights have become increasingly fluid and detailed through an array of popular
changes. Between 1968 and 2016, there were more than 330 rights amendments,
causing state bills of rights to balloon in length, scope, and detail.74 Using
Virginia’s archetypal 1776 Declaration of Rights as a baseline, the number of
words in state bills of rights has grown from 379 to an average of 1,216,75 an
increase of more than 220%. The average number of topics covered has
increased by 43%, and the average level of detail per topic has increased by
116%.76 Contemporary state bills of rights now include many statute-like

judicial review is essential for political equality, which is essential to democracy); DWORKIN, supra
note 57, at xi (describing rights as judicially enforceable “trumps” that can—and should—lawfully
invalidate democratic outputs because of their connection to political equality and democracy);
ELSTER, supra note 63, at 94 (analogizing rights to pre-commitments).
70 Sutton, supra note 68, at 690-91 (exploring this critique).
71 See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1702 (describing state constitutions as more majoritarian).
72 Eighteen states allow amendments by citizen initiative to some degree, and most states allow
legislatures to propose amendments subject to a simple-majority ratifying referendum. COUNCIL
OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 8 tbl.l.4, 10 tbl.1.5 (2019 ed.).
73 See Miller supra note 4, at 2063-64 (discussing amendments preempting or reacting to
judicial decisions).
74 From 1968 until 2017 the BOOK OF THE STATES reported annual amendment data by
constitutional article, including amendments made to state “bills of rights.” This information was
usually reported in Table B. To calculate this number (330), I tabulated these entries reported in
Table B. The number is even greater (548) if I include amendments related to election and suﬀrage,
which are rights issues under the Supreme Courts federal jurisprudence.
75 To calculate this, I created an original database that includes Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of
Rights as well the texts of all bills of rights from all ﬁfty state constitutions as of August 13, 2020.
As others have done, see Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 16, at 662 n.11, I used the “tm” package in R
software to calculate word counts. To obtain a more appropriate count for comparison across
constitutions, I eliminated common stop words and “stemmed” the corpus to limit double-counting
derivatives. Id. at 662 n.12.
76 To calculate topics, I follow Versteeg and Zackin and used R to calculate unique words as a
proxy for topics. Id. at 622 n.12. To measure detail, I divided the total number of words by the
number of unique words (topics). Id. at 662. These measures are imperfect, but they provide a
recognized method for comparing texts.
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provisions addressing economic equality,77 the right to hunt and fish,78
environmental rights,79 privacy,80 healthcare insurance,81 the rights of crime
victims,82 public access to government records,83 stem cell research and human
cloning,84 and, in Alabama and Tennessee, a right of public access to certain
navigable waters.85 Unlike the Federal Bill of Rights, where the text has
remained relatively generic, stable, and insulated from popular interventions,
state bills of rights are a “beehive” of popular political activity. Moreover, the
states have no qualms about using constitutional amendment to undo or modify
unpopular judicial decisions enforcing rights.86 If the sine qua non of effective
constitutional rights is their ability to sustain judicially enforceable constraints
on majorities, state constitutional rights are surely a failure.
Perhaps most importantly for the entrenchment critics, impassioned
popular majorities often amend bills of rights to target rather than protect
political minorities.87 The wave of pre-Obergefell marriage amendments is a
recent example. Earlier examples include a wave of “English-only”
amendments during the 1920s that were intended to “promote true
Americanism,” followed by another wave beginning in the 1980s.88 During
segregation, state constitutions were amended to include literacy

77 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. pmbl. (seeking to “eliminate poverty and inequality” and pursue
economic justice).
78 See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26 (granting the right to hunt and trap ﬁsh and game “subject
only to reasonable restrictions”).
79 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (providing the rights to “clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment”).
80 See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. I, § 10 (noting the need to protect individual rights to privacy
given its centrality to “the well-being of a free society”).
81 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.04 (creating a right for individuals, employers, or
healthcare providers to decline participation in healthcare programs).
82 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (providing rights to crime victims, including the right
to timely disposition of cases, the right to be heard, and protection from the accused).
83 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a) (providing the right to review or duplicate public
records made in connection with any public body, oﬃcer, or employee’s oﬃcial business).
84 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 27 (outlining the state’s requirements for stem cell research
and treatments).
85 ALA. CONST. art I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 29.
86 See Dinan, supra note 16, at 984 (addressing the adoption of state amendments in response
to a wide variety of court decisions).
87 See KENNETH MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 154-55 (2009) (arguing
that direct democracy’s most consequential impact has been to limit the expansion of rights in a
number of states).
88 See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27 (amended 1920) (“The English language is hereby declared
to be the oﬃcial language of this state . . . .”); see also NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONS OF 1866, 1871 &
1875 AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE PEOPLE SEPTEMBER 21, 1920, at 17
(1920) (explaining that the purpose of the amendment is to “promote true Americanism”).
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requirements for voting,89 prohibit interracial marriages,90 and mandate
segregated schools,91 among other things.92 Before the Civil War, state bills
of rights were used to explicitly recognize the rights of slaveholders over
enslaved people.93 In other words, tyranny of the majority has been a real and
explicit phenomenon under state bills of rights. If an essential attribute of
constitutional rights is their ability to constrain or at least temper abusive
majorities, state constitutional rights frequently fail.
2. The Direct-Democracy Critique
The direct democracy critics take a slightly diﬀerent approach. They too
recognize the need for rights to protect against majority tyranny, but they
emphasize that state constitutional rights are ﬂawed, not simply because they
are subject to change by majoritarian institutions, but because initiatives and
referenda are especially bad processes for deciding rights.94 These critics
argue that by reducing a constitutional right to each voter’s secret ballot,
direct democracy facilitates the aggregation of prejudice without any of the
purifying beneﬁts of deliberation and transparency that attend representative
decisionmaking. Thus, state constitutional rights are defective because they
exist in a poorly designed constitutional universe where voters secretly decide
on their scope and application.95
89 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. 12, § 244 (“[E]very elector shall . . . be able to read any
section of the constitution of this State; or he shall be able to understand the same when read to
him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof.”). For a discussion of this provisions, see Williams
v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
90 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. 14, § 263 (“The marriage of a white person with a negro
or mulatto, or person who shall have one-eighth or more of negro blood, shall be unlawful and void.”).
91 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, art XIV, § 256 (“Separate schools shall be provided for white and
colored children, and no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school of the other race.”).
92 On the various changes made to southern state constitutions during segregation, see
generally PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH 189-225 (2017).
93 See, e.g., KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 3 (“The right of property is before and higher than
any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave, and its increase, is
the same, and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever.”).
94 See DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS 1-2 (2013)
(explaining that when the majority prefers the infringement of political rights, direct democracy
initiatives limit such rights for minorities); Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote,
41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245-46 (1997) (arguing that the majority uses direct democracy to deprive
political minorities of civil rights); Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not “Republican
Government”?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 165 (1989) (noting that the founders most supportive
of democratic institutions relied on representative rather that direct democracy).
95 Derrick A. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV.
1, 13-15 (1978) (arguing that referenda place racial minorities in unique danger because direct
democracy is not mediated by public-regarding inﬂuences and instead is “carried out in the privacy
of the voting booth” which makes the referendum the “most eﬀective facilitator of that bias,
discrimination, and prejudice which has marred American Democracy from its earliest day”); Julian
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1553 (1990) (“While public
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This critique also has strength in its description of state constitutional
rights practice. As noted above, state electorates amend their bills of rights
regularly. Such amendments often target minorities or disfavored individuals.
And, in every state except Delaware, all amendments must be ratiﬁed by a
statewide referendum.96 Moreover, at least sixteen states allow for
constitutional amendment by initiative, which allows voters to place
amendments on the ballot without any representative deliberation or
discussion.97 These processes seem ill-suited to mitigating bias and selfinterest, and instead seem structured to empower instant majorities without
any of the prophylactics that might accompany representative lawmaking. If
tempering impassioned democratic majorities is an essential aspect of
constitutional rights, state rights operate in a constitutional universe that
undermines them.
3. The Under-Enforcement Critique
A final group of critics emphasize the historical underenforcement of state
constitutional rights by state courts. Specifically, they note that prior to the
twentieth century, state courts hardly entertained constitutional rights
litigation and certainly did not expand constitutional protections.98 These
critics emphasize that this is especially troubling because after the Supreme
Court’s 1833 decision in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, which held that the
Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states,99 state constitutional rights
were the only source of constitutional protection for individuals and

proclamations of racist attitudes have lost their respectability, prejudice continues to receive an
airing in the privacy of the voting booth.”).
96 See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 72, at 8 tbl.1.4, 10 tbl.1.5, 11 tbl.1.6.
97 Id.; see also Jonathan L. Marshﬁeld, Improving Amendment, 69 ARK. L. REV. 477, 480 n.15
(2016) (explaining that although Illinois and Massachusetts have the constitutional initiative, they
both impose signiﬁcant limitations on the initiative, which in Massachusetts includes the
legislature’s authority to review and amend proposed initiatives).
98 See Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The
Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 132, 133, 150 (1977); Donald S.
Lutz, Political Participation in Eighteenth Century America, in TOWARD A USEABLE PAST 31 (Paul
Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991) (“[C]ourts did not actively protect these rights in any
substantive sense.”); Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie & John Kincaid, State High Courts, State
Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 16 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 141, 142 (1986) (tallying the increase in rights-aﬃrming state court decisions through
the mid-twentieth century); John Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism, 61 J. ST. GOV’T. 163, 167 (1988); G. Alan Tarr, The Past and
Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS 63, 69 (1994) (“[S]tate supreme courts did not
develop a body of civil liberties law prior to the 1930s. The new judicial federalism thus represents
not a return to the past but an unprecedented exercise of state judicial power.”).
99 32 (7 Pet.) U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833).
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minorities.100 While some state courts sought to vindicate state constitutional
rights during the 1970s and 80s, state courts generally exhibit little interest in
acting as guardians of rights.101 Such critics infer from the lack of judicial
enforcement that state constitutional rights are fundamentally dysfunctional.102
Here again the strength of this critique is its description of how state
constitutional rights have performed. State courts do not usually oﬀer much
independent solicitude for parties invoking state constitutional rights.103
Despite tomes of academic literature urging state courts to develop
independent state rights jurisprudence, most state courts simply “lockstep”
their analysis with whatever the Supreme Court has said about the relevant
issue. This occurs most frequently regarding state constitutional rights with
direct federal analogs, but state courts have also tied unique state provisions
to seemingly unrelated federal rights jurisprudence.104 There are some
important outliers, to be sure.105 And there have been periods when state
courts worked to create space for independent state constitutional rights, but
state courts have generally resigned themselves to acting as surrogates for
federal law without much interest in imposing independent constraints on
state majorities through constitutional rights.106 If judicial solicitude for
rights litigation and the expansion of rights is an essential criterion of
constitutional rights, state bills of rights fail again.
C. Existing Responses
Legal scholarship has done very little to address these critiques. In fact,
its framing of state constitutional rights has generally contributed to their
100 See Rutland, supra note 56, at 12 (arguing that before incorporation of the Fourteenth
Amendment “almost all the civil liberties of individuals were denied to citizens”).
101 See Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent State
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 783 (2010) (independent state court enforcement of
state rights is “today more an aspiration than a practice”).
102 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
766, 780-81 (1992) (criticizing state constitutions as dysfunctional because there is “a lack of language
in which participants in the legal system can debate the meaning of the state constitution” in part
because of the absence of meaningful state constitutional precedent over time—“the lack of decisions
alone retards the development of state constitutional law and discourse”).
103 See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 102 (2006) (arguing
that state courts have been inconsistent in affirming constitutional rights and are likely to remain so).
104 Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints,
40 J. LEGIS. 39, 41 (2014) (lamenting that courts tie state constitutional provisions prohibiting
special legislation to equal protection analysis).
105 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 119-27
(2009) (surveying cases where state courts developed independent state rights jurisprudence to
expand constitutional protections in areas such as criminal procedure, education equality, free speech).
106 See id. at 113-19 (discussing the New Judicial Federalism movement, which died down by
the 1990s).
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vitality. To appreciate this, it is necessary to understand how this ﬁeld of
scholarship has developed.
Most state constitutional rights scholarship has its roots in the late 1970s
when civil rights advocates feared that the Burger Court would roll back
federal rights.107 Responding to this concern, Justice Brennan wrote a series
of dissents and law review articles prodding state supreme courts to rely on
their own constitutions to continue expanding rights.108 Framed in this way,
state constitutional rights were viewed as a like-kind substitute for federal
constitutional rights: they oﬀered an alternative legal basis for courts to
invalidate the outputs of majoritarian political processes.109
Energized by Justice Brennan’s conception of “judicial federalism,”
scholars explored legal arguments, theories, and evidence that might support
independent state court expansion of rights.110 A variety of approaches and
criticisms emerged from this endeavor.111 State constitutional positivists, for
example, focused on how state courts might rely on “unique state sources” of
text, history, and structure to justify divergence from federal precedent.112
Pragmatists focused on empowering state courts to interpret rights as best to
solve state-speciﬁc problems.113 Even constitutional universalists emphasized
that state courts should engage in independent normative analysis to enrich
a shared judicial discourse regarding liberty.114
This movement had early success; especially in criminal procedure and
the death penalty.115 Various state courts eagerly departed from rightslimiting federal precedent and expanded protections for inmates and criminal
defendants.116 This was celebrated by the legal academy as an important
development and an advancement for rights.117 But that was not the end of
107 See id. at 115 (discussing how the Burger Court’s anticipated retraction from the Warren
Court’s activism led litigants to look elsewhere than federal court).
108 Id. at 121.
109 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
110 See WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 121-27 (surveying various movements by scholars like
Justice Linde after Brennan’s article).
111 See Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
719, 750-59 (2012) (summarizing various approaches state courts might take to expand rights and the
critiques of each approach).
112 Id. at 751-52; see also Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1993) (describing “the central premise” of this movement as identifying
“unique state sources” to legitimate independent state constitutional interpretation).
113 Long, supra note 111, at 758-59.
114 Id. at 752-56.
115 WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 119-20.
116 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 MISS.
L.J. 223, 227 n.14 (1984) (providing examples of state court cases that created broader protections
for criminal defendants).
117 WILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 125.
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the story. There was a subsequent wave of responsive state constitutional
amendments.118 From Massachusetts and Connecticut to California and
Florida, state electorates quickly rolled back judicially enhanced criminal
procedure protections and reinstated the death penalty.119
Remarkably, although this phenomenon is now endemic, legal scholars
have not seriously engaged with its jurisprudential signiﬁcance.120 Indeed,
because this scholarship was born from the hope that state constitutions
might provide an alternative corpus of counter-majoritarian protections, most
of it either implicitly adopts some version of the critiques described above,121
or begrudgingly acknowledges that state constitutional rights are vulnerable
to ﬂexible amendment rules.122 And state judges, who have been trained to
assume that a bill of rights must operate as an entrenched constraint on

Wilkes, supra note 116, at 233.
Id. at 234.
There are exceptions. See, e.g., Conor O’Mahony, If a Constitution Is Easy to Amend, Can
Judges Be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and Proposition 8, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 192
(2014) (engaging with the idea that state constitutional rights might be interpreted diﬀerently under
state constitutions because state constitutions are easier to amend); Joseph Blocher, Reverse
Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 358 (2011) (discussing public views
of state constitutions which may contribute to such developments); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1453 (1999) (examining
conditions contributing to “robust interpretations of constitutional rights”).
121 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, State Courts and Republican Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
951, 957-58 (2001) (arguing that state constitutions should be understood as constrained by principles
of “republican” government, which might include a prohibition on “putting the rights of a distinctive
minority to the vote of a popular majority”).
122 See Robert F. Williams, Rights, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 7, 11 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (observing that a state constitutional
amendment can be ratiﬁed or a new constitution adopted by “a mere majority vote of the electorate,”
which is a feature that is fundamental to state constitution making). To be fair, a few functional
theories of state constitutions imply a unique jurisprudential approach to state amendment practice.
James Gardner, for example, has oﬀered a complex theory explaining how state constitutions
contribute to promoting liberty within the federal system. See generally JAMES A. GARDNER,
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 98-100 (2005) [hereinafter GARDNER, INTERPRETING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. For Gardner, the protection of “rights is not something that the
architecture of federalism assigns exclusively to the national level; it is, on the contrary, a shared
function, to be pursued simultaneously at both levels through the identiﬁcation and active policing
of such rights.” James A. Gardner, Justice Brennan and the Foundations of Human Rights Federalism, 77
OHIO ST. L.J. 355, 380 (2016). Gardner has emphasized that states use frequent amendment to
reﬂect the people’s degree of trust in state and federal government over time. GARDNER,
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 27-28, 178-79. Because many of these
amendments have addressed state constitutional rights, Gardner seems to implicitly describe state
constitutional rights amendments as part of popular eﬀorts to constrain state government. Id. at 2728. However, Gardner discounts these amendments for purposes of rights jurisprudence. See id. at
179 (describing the interpretation of state constitutions as making sense of “a kind of palimpsest,
bearing witness in its many tangled and possibly self-contradictory provisions to the course by which
the people’s constitutional thought has evolved”). Instead, he views state courts as commissioned to
engage in their own parallel assessment of rights by reference to other polestars. Id. at 180-82.
118
119
120
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majorities, continue to relay myths about their bills of rights.123 The existing
perspective seems to be that if rights are too easy to amend, that is an
“amendment problem” with negative consequences for rights, but it does not
indicate anything about the nature of constitutional rights. As I argue below,
this assumption reﬂects a fundamental misunderstanding of state
constitutional rights, which prize above all else direct popular intervention in
government.124 Frequent amendment is not a free-standing feature of state
constitutions with no textual or normative connection to state bills of rights.
To the contrary, it is the product of the text and explicit normative
commitments of state bills of rights.
To be sure, a few political scientists have focused on unique attributes of
state bills of rights.125 Alan Tarr has argued that early state bills of rights
reﬂected a deep trust in republican theories of government such that they did
not portend to enumerate legally enforceable rights.126 Building on this point,
John Dinan argues that states initially looked to legislatures to protect rights
rather than courts.127 On this view, state constitutional rights sit in the
background as guiding principles for the electorate to use when evaluating
oﬃcials and the legislature.128 Dinan’s account is surely correct, but not
necessarily exclusive. It leaves open the possibility that state electorates also
took certain issues into their own hands through constitutional amendment.
Indeed, Marc Kruman has argued that the earliest state constitutionalists
deeply distrusted republican government regarding religious freedom and
establishment.129 Rather than leave those issues to legislative regulation, they
went to great lengths to regulate them directly through state bills of rights.

123 See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 54 (Conn. 2015) (citing federal precedent for the
proposition that “the very purpose of a [b]ill of [r]ights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy”). State courts have sometimes come close to piecing together
the deep structure of state constitutional rights. See Gondelman v. Commonwealth, 554 A.2d 896,
904 (Pa. 1989) (rejecting argument that constitutional provision was unconstitutional because it
violated bill of rights because “[i]t is absurd to suggest that the rights enumerated in Article I were
intended to restrain the power of the people themselves”).
124 Part of this misunderstanding might be blamed on what Akhil Amar has called
“clausebound” myopia in studying constitutional rights. AMAR, supra note 44, at xi-xii, xv. Amar has
argued that this has limited our understanding of the Federal Bill of Rights. See id. It has likely done
the same (or worse) for state bills of rights, which only make sense when viewed holistically across
their text and time.
125 Key works include TARR, supra note, 17, at 17-18; JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S
LIBERTIES 1 (1998); MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY & LIBERTY 41-49 (1997); and
EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES 2-3 (2013).
126 See, e.g., TARR, supra note 17, at 76-82 (exploring how state bills of rights are tied to an
alternative conception of constitutional democracy).
127 DINAN, supra note 125, at 1-2.
128 Id. at 2-6.
129 See KRUMAN, supra note 125, at 41-49.
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Finally, in an important recent book, Emily Zackin has explored how state
constitutional rights provide a tool for “frustrated outsiders” to circumvent
existing power structures and advance change in the areas of education, labor,
and environmental rights.130 Zackin’s book is an important advancement in
this area because she speciﬁcally engages with the idea that constitutional
rights may serve an important purpose even if they are not deeply
entrenched.131 However, Zackin is mostly concerned with demonstrating that
the dominant political science explanation for constitutional entrenchment,
which cynically posits that rights exist to entrench the status quo in favor of
elites, is an incomplete explanation for how and why state constitutions
change.132 Zackin does not explore state constitutional rights from a
jurisprudential perspective.133
This work by political scientists has shed new and important light on state
constitutional rights and laid the groundwork for understanding state
constitutional rights on their own terms rather than through the existing
federal frames. My project here adds to this emerging perspective on state
constitutions. What has been generally missing is a dedicated and systematic
study of how state constitution makers have conceptualized and
operationalized bills of rights over time with an eye towards implications for
constitutional rights jurisprudence. This is especially unfortunate because
records from state constitutional conventions capture regular deliberations
about state constitutional rights from almost every state and from every
decade for the period 1818–1984.
This is my focus here. I oﬀer the ﬁrst dedicated assessment of the 105
state constitutional conventions where state bills of rights were forged and
reformed from 1818–1984. There have been 233 state constitutional

ZACKIN, supra note 125, at 55, 59.
Id. at 65.
Id.
In other work, Zackin has argued that state constitutional design more generally (not just
rights, and perhaps at the expense of rights) represents a model that prizes ﬂexibility and popular
responsiveness as a means for allowing political outsiders to overcome elites and undo the status
quo. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 16, at 660 (“While speciﬁc and ﬂexible constitutions reduce
some of the agency costs associated with highly entrenched constitutions, they introduce others.
Perhaps most troublingly, they are vulnerable to the very actors they purport to control. . . . Where
constitutional systems respond readily to majoritarian pressures minority rights can be easily
violated.” (citation omitted)). For a helpful and insightful discussion of Zackin’s important theory,
see G. Alan Tarr, Explaining State Constitutional Changes, 3 REVISTA DE INVESTIGAÇÕES
CONSTITUCIONAIS [J. CONST. INVESTIGATIONS] 9, May/Aug. 2016, at 16, explaining that “[a]n
alternative understanding . . . views constitutional change as originating with groups that ﬁnd
themselves stymied by the ordinary political processes in the states and therefore execute an ‘end
run’ around those processes by appealing directly to the people.”
130
131
132
133
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conventions from 1776–2020.134 Of those, records exist for 114 conventions.135
With the help of the Marvin & Virginia Schmid Law Library at the
University of Nebraska College of Law, I collected and reviewed those
debates. My review revealed 9 conventions that did not meaningfully address
state bills of rights. Thus, the dataset includes 105 state conventions.136 The
temporal and geographical distributions of the dataset are illustrated in
Appendices B and C.137
II. CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
State bills of rights do not look like the Federal Bill of Rights. They
contain many structural maxims, and they tend to blend vague statements of
political principle with hyper-speciﬁc rights guarantees.138 And, of course,
they are amended frequently. Thus, it is easy to deride them as dysfunctional.
However, if we approach them on their own terms and in context, they reﬂect
a coherent and alternative approach to constitutional rights that explains their
distinctive qualities. Speciﬁcally, state bills of rights were designed to
facilitate popular control over wayward government oﬃcials and policy. This
forgotten conception of state bills of rights is apparent from their historical
context, the plain language of early texts, and the convention debates where
early texts were forged.
134 JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 7, 8-9 tbl.1-1 (2006).
135 Id. at 27 tbl.1-2, 28. My collection and review relies on Dinan’s authoritative lists of known

conventions and convention debates.
136 See sources cited infra Appendix A (cataloguing the dataset of state constitutional
convention debates).
137 See sources cited infra Appendices B and C. Although these debates provide important
insight into how the states have conceptualized and operationalized constitutional rights over time,
they surely have limitations. I address some of those in Section IV.A, infra, but a critical concern
relates to formal and informal restrictions on enfranchisement for election of delegates. Although
some states have a history of expanding the electorate for purposes of constitutional reform, and
recent scholarship has celebrated state constitutional conventions for being more politically inclusive
than ordinary political institutions, most conventions have excluded large segments of society from
participating as electors and/or delegates. See KRUMAN, supra note 125, at 27 (“Conference delegates
also sought to make the convention more representative by making it much larger than the
assembly.”); ZACKIN, supra note 125, at 59 (celebrating state conventions as process for including
political outsiders). The details and signiﬁcance of this have been underexplored by scholars; it is a
theme I intend to pursue in future work. For present purposes, however, it is important to
acknowledge that the convention debates are surely limited by signiﬁcant deﬁcits in representation
and voice. Moreover, these limitations create an internal tension for the state conception of rights
that I advance here. While I argue that state constitutional rights are best understood as prioritizing
majoritarian decisionmaking to reduce agency costs, states have not historically embraced
meaningful political equality in the processes they use to deﬁne and monitor rights.
138 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights.”); id. art. I, § 28 (providing a detailed scheme of rights for crime victims that
regulates exactly how and when crime victims may gain access to information regarding criminal
prosecution that is more than 2,000 words).
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A. Historical Context
State Bills of Rights were inextricably linked to the revolution.139 As
Gordon Wood has observed, the revolutionary movement was concerned not
only with winning independence from Great Britain, but with establishing
new governments in the colonies that would be “ﬁxed on genuine principles”
of popular sovereignty.140 This was, of course, a complicated endeavor.
Revolutionary Americans had a clear commitment to popular sovereignty, but
they had no useful precedent for how to operationalize a government where
all power was “vested in and derived from the people.”141 On the one hand, it
was quickly obvious to early state constitutionalists that the people could not
govern themselves en masse.142 They would have to select representatives and
appoint leaders. On the other hand, by 1776, state constitutionalists were
deeply suspicious of government oﬃcials because of the belief that the
attainment of power by a few political elites was likely to lead to the
oppression of the majority of society.143
The fear of tyranny by elites came from lived experience under British
government and Whig political theory. English Whigs were deeply suspicious
of the Crown and executive authorities. They believed that King George III
had slowly manipulated and circumvented popular representation in
Parliament by using various forms of “borough-mongering” and royal
“patronage” to manipulate members of parliament.144 Thus, by the middle of
the eighteenth century, Whigs understood the Crown to be “tearing up the
[British] constitution by the roots” and “bribing its way into tyranny.”145 For
Whigs, this conﬁrmed their general belief that the greatest danger to liberty
came from rulers who were “separated from the rest of the community.”146

139 See TARR, supra note 17, at 60 (“Prior to independence, some colonies viewed the framing
of constitutions as a mechanism for promoting a dissolution of ties with Great Britain.”). My
historical account here in Section II.A draws primarily from these authoritative works: WOOD, supra
note 18; WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1980); KRUMAN,
BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY, supra note 125; LUTZ, supra note 18; CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ,
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS (2008). For an important and insightful review of Kruman’s work, see
generally G. Alan Tarr, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary
America, by Mark W. Kruman, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 865 (1997) (book review).
140 WOOD, supra note 18, at 128-29.
141 TARR, supra note 17, at 69.
142 See WOOD, supra note 18, at 164 (noting that increasing state populations made it more
diﬃcult for all of the inhabitants to meet in only one assembly).
143 See id. at 144-48; id. at 148 (“Americans in 1776 were resolved to destroy the capacity of their
rulers ever again to put together such structures of domination or to determine the ranks of the
social order.”).
144 Id. at 33.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 22.
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The structure of power in the American colonies further reinforced Whig
ideas. By 1776, Americans “knew only too well how society was organized by
intricate and personal ties to men of power.”147 British governors built “webs
of inﬂuence that could match those in eﬀect in England.”148 Empowered and
inspired by the Crown, governors appointed loyalists to important positions
and leverage provincial power for their own beneﬁt.149 To be sure, not all
governors were alike, but by 1776, Americans generally perceived them as
corrupt, “coarse and brutal.”150
Americans were especially troubled by the governors’ eﬀectiveness in
subverting the entire community for their own beneﬁt.151 Governors were
deft at circumventing and capturing legislative assemblies, which ostensibly
represented local community interests.152 Governors used various tactics, but
it was common to manipulate representatives by appointing them (or close
family members) to well-paid positions.153 Governors would also grant
lucrative licenses or government contracts in exchange for favorable votes.154
Id. at 146.
Id. at 145. On the patronage and appointment powers of governors, see EVARTS BOUTELL
GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA 11317 (N.Y., Longmans, Green, & Co. 1898). These tactics were especially eﬀective in the colonies where
social hierarchy was weak but ambition strong. It was easy for governors to prey on the “smallest
and most insigniﬁcant Americans” by oﬀering “any little distinction in title or name.” WOOD, supra
note 18, at 147.
149 WOOD, supra note 18, at 157. See also GREENE, supra note 148, at 114 (noting that “traﬃc in
oﬃces” was how governors used their appointment powers).
150 See Louis E. Lambert, The Executive Article, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 185 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960); id. at 185-86 (describing how state
governors operated in 1776); WOOD, supra note 18, at 146 (explaining how Massachusetts Governor
Thomas Hutchinson “grasped the most important offices into his own hands . . . [in] a gigantic
pattern of conspiracy”); Jere R. Daniell, Politics in New Hampshire Under Governor Benning
Wentworth, 1741–1767, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 76, 105 (1966) (discussing interference by Governor
Wentworth and his friends in local elections in an attempt to “prevent the weakening of their
authority”). See generally James S. Leamon, Governor Fletcher’s Recall, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 527, 528
(1963) (detailing citizens’ resentment of Governor Fletcher and their attempts to stymie his efforts
for government reorganization).
151 See WOOD, supra note 18, at 146 (“Americans had watched ‘with amazement, a numerous
and powerful party, formed under the direction of a Governor . . . .’”); id. at 157-58 (“[S]o infecting
and so incompatible with the public liberty or the representation of the people was magisterial power
believed to be that the Americans felt compelled to isolate their legislatures from any sort of
executive interference or impingement . . . .”).
152 See Lambert, supra note 150, at 186 (noting that the governor attempted to coax colonial
assemblies to authorize expenses for “projects devised in England for imperial purposes”); GREENE,
supra note 148, at 157-59 (detailing the governor’s ability to exert the “power of dispensing patronage”
over the assembly).
153 GREENE, supra note 148, at 158 (describing how the governor appointed allies as sheriﬀs,
law enforcement, or mayors).
154 See id. at 158 (explaining how the Maryland assembly checked the abuse of power by the
governor by banning individuals who received government contracts from serving in the assembly);
WOOD, supra note 18, at 157 (“The chief magistracy . . . oﬀer[ed] them opportunities for proﬁts
147
148
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And, because governors controlled the timing and frequency of legislative
elections, they would postpone elections while the assembly suited their
interests, or call elections when it did not.155
Consequently, early constitutionalists had a growing distrust of even their
own elected legislative representatives.156 If governors were dangerous
because of their power to corrupt, legislators were dangerous because of their
susceptibility to corruption.157 This fueled apprehension regarding
representative democracy. Although representation was the most practical
way for the people to “express their voice in the making of law and the
management of government,”158 representation necessarily separated the
people from their rulers, produced a cohort of political elites, and thereby
increased the likelihood that “government might escape the control of its
creators.”159 Ultimately, early state constitutionalists concluded that
representation “was a necessary evil” to be handled with great caution.160 It
had to be carefully structured and monitored. Most importantly, it had to be
subject to frequent and direct popular participation.161
It is important to recognize that this perspective on representation stood
in stark contrast to the ideas that eventually dominated federal constitutional
design. Madison, for example, insisted that “majority faction” was the greatest
danger to republican government and that direct democracy was too easily

through the dispensing of government contracts and public money, thereby buying their support for
the government.”); ELLEN E. BRENNAN, PLURAL OFFICE-HOLDING IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–
1780, at 86-87 (1945) (explaining how allies of the governor, who were installed to allow the governor
to exercise control of the legislature, were dismissed); Intelligence Extraordinary, BOS. GAZETTE,
May 4, 1767, at 3 (“Commissions are shamefully prostituted to obtain an Assembly that shall be
subservient to [the governor’s] Designs.”).
155 GREENE, supra note 148, at 154 (“Governor Reynolds of Georgia was charged with having
dissolved an assembly . . . in order to prevent an inconvenient inquiry into the conduct of one of
his favorites.”).
156 WOOD, supra note 18, at 165 (“In constituting their representative bodies, Americans urged
themselves, they must ‘view well the defects in other governments, . . . and learn by these
examples.’”); see also id. at 328 (“Out of just such exhortations to civil disobedience and such
pervasive mistrust of the representational process was the conception of the constituent convention
essentially formed.”).
157 Id. at 147 (noting Americans’ realization that tyrants need not exert control over everyone—
instead, they needed only to corrupt a select few with suﬃcient power to inﬂuence others).
158 Id. at 164.
159 KRUMAN, supra note 125, at 41.
160 WOOD, supra note 18, at 363.
161 Id. at 164-73 (describing various institutional safeguards in early state constitutions
designed to ensure that representation in legislatures was “in miniature an exact portrait” of their
constituents). Safegaurds included various early forms of direct democracy such as annual elections,
id. at 166, greatly expanded lower houses, id. at 167, and strict controls on legislative process, id. at
169-70. But see id. at 173-81 (describing the parallel concept of “virtual representation” that
complicated early American understandings of democracy and popular sovereignty).
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manipulated by self-interested majorities.162 Representative democracy,
according to Madison, harmonized popular sovereignty with necessary
limitations on majority rule by ensuring that popular preferences would be
mediated through wise and discerning representatives who would consider a
plurality of public interests and priorities.163
In contrast, state constitutionalists believed the greatest danger came
from the opportunities and incentives for corruption created by
representation.164 Moreover, state constitutionalists viewed democratic
majorities as the ultimate bulwark against this tyranny.165 The core idea was
that “the multitude collectively always are true in intention to the interest of
the public, because it is their own. They are the public.”166 Thus, where
Madison hoped that popular preferences would be ﬁltered through
representation, state constitutionalists hoped that government would “be in
miniature an exact portrait of the people at large.”167 Government “should
think, feel, reason, and act like” the people.168 To be sure, state
constitutionalists knew the dangers of mob rule and the failures of ancient
direct democracies. They were convinced, however, that the risks created by
distancing representatives from the people were greater than the risks posed
by facilitating direct popular involvement in government.169

See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 49, 51, 53, 63 (James Madison).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (possibly authored by Alexander Hamilton rather than James
Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be,
ﬁrst to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of the society . . . .”); see also MILLER, supra note 87, at 19-21.
164 To be sure, early state constitutionalists celebrated representation compared to heredity
right, and they were committed to strong legislative authority to protect liberty. WOOD, supra note
18, at 162-64. But this was not because of a Madisonian faith in the purifying eﬀects of representative
democracy. To the contrary, “[t]he real importance of legislatures came from their being the
constitutional repository of the democratic element of the society, in other words, the people
themselves.” Id. at 163.
165 Id. at 164 (describing early state constitutionalists’ beliefs that popular democracy was
necessary to protect from oppressive government).
166 Id. (quoting John Witherspoon).
167 Id. at 165.
168 Id. State constitutionalists recognized that their theory could not work if individuals acted
solely in their own self-interest. Id. at 22. By liberty, they did not mean absolute individual liberty;
they just meant living under a government that was truly subject to the people—as a collective
pursing the commonweal. Id. at 23.
169 The size of legislative bodies is a good example of contrasting perspectives on
representation. Where Madison disliked large legislative bodies because they were prone towards
mob-like rule, state constitutionalists preferred larger assemblies because they made corruption by
elites more diﬃcult. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison); WOOD, supra note 18, at 167 (“An
ample Representation in every Republick . . . constitutes the most powerful Protection of Freedom,
the strongest Bulwark against the Attacks of Despotism . . . .” (quoting an unnamed South Carolina
resident from 1778)).
162
163
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It was within this context that the first state constitutions and bills of rights
were created.170 They were part of a broader project to establish new
governments based on popular sovereignty and were responsive to the lived
abuses of executive power and a growing clarity about the dangers of
representative government. Early state constitutionalists were guided by the
idea that tyranny came mostly from well-connected elites who were masterful
at wielding power to capture government.171 They were also firmly committed
to direct popular involvement in government as the best antidote.172 This context
is crucial for understanding state bills of rights, which can read like a jumbled
compilation of vague political principles, statutory-like regulation, and obscure
constitutional limitations. In truth, they represent the product of popular efforts
over more than two centuries to control, guide, and correct government.
B. Earliest Texts
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, which was adopted on June 12, 1776, was
the first state constitution to separately enumerate rights.173 During the
remainder of the eighteenth century, the states collectively adopted sixteen
bills of rights, and virtually all state constitutions since then have included bills
of rights.174 When read on their own terms rather than through the lens of
modern Fourteenth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence, these texts
suggest an alternative approach to constitutional rights that views them as an
active and dynamic instrument for maintaining popular control over
government. This alternative approach is evident from three pervasive themes
in early state bills of rights, and it explains why state bills of rights emphasize
vague political principles alongside specific and obscure rights guarantees.
First, early state bills of rights were dominated by provisions that
emphasized the strict agency of government oﬃcials. Indeed, almost every
state bill of rights adopted before 1800 includes some explicit declaration that

170 Political scientists and historians debate when Americans ﬁrst appreciated the legal
signiﬁcance of written constitutions and enumerated rights as higher law enforceable against
government (especially legislatures). KRUMAN, supra note 125, at 40-49 (describing the debate). This
debate is largely inconsequential for my purposes because all agree that early state bills of rights
capture the core commitments of state constitutional design and, at the very least, forecast where
state constitutional theory arrived. See, e.g., KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 28 (“To guard against
transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare, that . . . all laws . . . contrary
to this Constitution, shall be void.”); see also LUTZ, supra note 18, at 66-68 (arguing that although
early state bills of rights were not understood as higher law, they were recognized as such after 1789).
171 See supra notes 139–161 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
173 TARR, supra note 17, at 75.
174 Id. at 75 n.57.
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government oﬃcials are mere “servants” or “trustees” of the people.175 The
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, for example, provides that “[a]ll power
residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several
magistrates and oﬃcers of government, vested with authority, whether
legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at
all times accountable to them.”176 To realize this commitment, many states
also constitutionalized the right to “petition the Legislature[] for the redress
of grievances,”177 and several states even constitutionalized the right of the
people to “instruct” representatives.178 If there is one clear theme that
pervades early state bills of rights, it is the constant aﬃrmation that all
political power resides in the people and that oﬃcials must be “amendable”
to popular preferences.179
Second, state bills of rights emphasized that self-interested oﬃcials are a
primary threat to liberty. They captured the Whig belief that oﬃcials are
prone to thwart democratic outputs when their personal interests do not align
with the people’s interests. Thus, the Massachusetts Declaration states that
“[i]n order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming
oppressors, the people have a right . . . to cause their public oﬃcers to return
to private life . . . .”180 The Virginia Declaration of Rights states that
representatives should “be restrained from oppression, by feeling and
participating the burdens of the people.”181 And the Maryland Declaration
similarly provided that “a long continuance in the ﬁrst executive
departments . . . is dangerous to liberty” and therefore “a rotation . . . in
those departments[] is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.”182
Early bills of rights also reveal a sophisticated understanding of how
destructive political power might become gradually entrenched. Various bills

175 See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RTS. Of 1776, §§ 1, 5, 6; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 16;
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 2; KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 2; MD. CONST. of 1776, §§ I, IV;
MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, art. V; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. I, § VIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776,
§ 1; PA. CONST. of 1776, § IV; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 1; VT. CONST. of 1777, pt. 1, art. V; VT.
CONST. of 1786 ch. 1, § VI; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. 1, § 6; VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § II.
176 MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, art. V.
177 MD. CONST. of 1776, § XI.
178 VT. CONST. of 1777, pt. 1, art. XVIII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, art. XIX; N.H. CONST.
of 1784, pt. 1, art. I, § XXXII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XVIII.
179 VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § 2 (“[A]ll power is . . . derived from[] the people
[and] Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and [are] at all times amendable to them.”).
180 MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, art. VIII. The Vermont Declaration similarly states that
“[t]hose who are employed in the legislative and executive Business of the State may be restrained
from Oppression, the People have a right . . . to reduce their public Oﬃcers to a Private
Station . . . .” VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. 7 (1786).
181 VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § V.
182 MD. CONST. Of 1776, § XXXI. Similarly, the Maryland Declaration provided that “no
person ought to hold, at the same time, more than one oﬃce.” Id. § XXXII.
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of rights declare that “[a] frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles
of the constitution” is “absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of
liberty, and to maintain a free government.”183 It is clear from the plain
language of these early texts that recalcitrant government oﬃcials were core
objects of their regulation.
Third, and most importantly, state bills of rights emphasize that popular
involvement in government is the best protector of liberty and the best
antidote to wayward government officials. This idea is pervasive in early state
bills of rights, which constitutionalize various guarantees that empower the
people to directly monitor, control, and even re-create government as
necessary to protect against recalcitrant officials.184 To a large extent, these
provisions reflect the traditional republican belief that the key to preserving
and perpetuating liberty was free, rigorous, and open electoral and legislative
processes. What is often missed, however, is that early state bills of rights went
beyond the traditional institutions associated with republican theory when
describing the people’s role in protecting rights from recalcitrant government.
At the core of early bills of rights was a near universal provision declaring
that the people have an inherent right (indeed, an obligation) to go beyond
existing institutions and make their own corrections to government.185 The
Virginia Declaration, for example, provided that “when any government shall
be found inadequate or contrary” to “the common beneﬁt, protection and
security[] of the people . . . a majority of the community hath an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it[] in such
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.”186 The
Delaware Declaration similarly stated that “whenever the ends of government

183 MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, art. XVIII; see also VT. CONST. of 1777, pt. 1, art. XVIII
(including a similar provision).
184 See MD. CONST. of 1776, § V (“[T]he right in the people to participate in the Legislature
is the best security of liberty, and the foundation of all free government; for this purpose, elections
ought to be free . . . .”); DEL. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § 6 (same); MD. CONST. of 1776,
§ IX (constitutionalizing legislative meeting as open and published public meetings with the
implication being that it allows public monitoring); N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 6 (same); VT. CONST.
of 1777, pt. 1, arts. VII, VIII (same). Some constitutions also included provisions for legislative
immunity, including N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1 art. I, § XXX; and MD. CONST. of 1776, § VIII;
VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. 1, § 14. Finally, many states included provisions for free examination of
public oﬃcials in the press, evidenced in PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7; DEL. CONST. of 1792,
art. I, § 5, which provides that citizens shall be able to freely examine public oﬃcials in the press;
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, §§ 7, 8; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 19, same; and PA. CONST.
of 1790, art. IX, § 7, same.
185 These provisions—the ﬁrst of which was drafted for the Virginia Declaration of Rights and
then incorporated by Jeﬀerson into the Declaration of Independence—institutionalized the Lockean
right to revolution. JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 60 (1992).
186 VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § III.
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are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered . . . the people may,
and of right ought to establish, a new, or reform the old government.”187
These provisions overtly expanded popular oversight to include not only
active participation in existing government, but also the reform and even
recreation of government itself.188 Indeed, several bills of rights asserted that
“the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is
absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.”189
Instead, because “all power is inherent in the people” and government was
“instituted for their peace, safety and happiness,” the people had “at all times
an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their
government, in such manner as they may think proper.” 190 Most importantly,
these provisions found concrete application as Americans formalized
procedures for popular amendment of constitutional text.191 As this
happened, it quickly became clear that popular involvement in constitutional
reform (especially reform of the bill of rights) was a potent and venerable
strategy for controlling and guiding government.192
Indeed, the notion that the people could use the text of their bill of rights
to constrain and guide government on issues of popular concern was not lost
on even the earliest drafters of state rights. After sketching general principles,
DEL. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § 5.
For discussions of the revolutionary nature of these provisions, see JOURNAL OF THE
CONVENTION ASSEMBLED TO FRAME A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
29-30 (Providence, Knowles, Anthony & Co., 1859) [hereinafter R.I. 1842], and PROCEEDINGS OF
THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1861, at 710 (George H. Reese ed., Va. State Libr. 1965)
[hereinafter VA. 1861] (secession convention) (describing these provisions as a distinctly “American
principle” that “overthrew . . . ideas of divine right of legitimacy”).
189 TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 2; see also N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. I, § X
(including a similar provision); MD. CONST. of 1776, § IV (same).
190 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 2.
191 Rhode Islands’ 1842 bill of rights makes this understanding explicit: “[T]he basis of our
political systems is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that
the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole
people, is sacredly obligatory upon all.” R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 1 (incorporating a quote from
George Washington); see also R.I. 1842, supra note 188, at 41; PATRICK T. CONLEY & ROBERT G.
FLANDERS, JR., THE RHODE ISLAND STATE CONSTITUTION 53-55 (2011). On Jefferson’s connection
between the alter-and-abolish provisions and formal amendment, see VILE, supra note 185, at 60.
192 As I explain below, this point surfaced early in conventions. See Conn. 1818, supra note 27,
at 10-12 (“The people have the right to . . . form a Constitution” to “conﬁne the powers of the
legislature within certain limits,” and “it is a just and wise principle, that the majority shall rule the
minority . . . .”); REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1850–51, at 334 (Columbus, S. Medary
1851) [hereinafter OHIO 1850–51] (“[W]hy is it that in practice a majority can make a government
and law to bind a minority?”); 9 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA [1837], at 12-25 (Harrisburg, Packer, Barrett & Park 1838)
[hereinafter 9 PA. 1837] (emphasizing that the Bill of Rights represented the people’s limitations on
government and thus it was proper location for speciﬁc proposals to limit legislative power, such as
provisions addressing divorce).
187
188
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all eighteenth-century bills of rights went on to articulate detailed limitations
on government regarding issues of contemporary interest. These included
highly speciﬁc limitations on executive authority regarding criminal
prosecution and imprisonment, prohibitions on commercial monopolies,193
the elimination of “title[s] of nobility, or hereditary honours,”194 and
Tennessee’s unique guarantee that all citizens have an “inherent right[]” to
“an equal participation of the free navigation of the Mississippi” River.195
Perhaps the best example is how early bills of rights addressed freedom of
religion and church–state issues. Scarred by a variety of diﬀerent
entanglements between church and state, revolutionary Americans were
extremely sensitive to these issues.196 This is not to say there was agreement
on how to resolve these issues. But there seems to have been growing
consensus that government should not be left to its own devices.197 Thus,
Marc Kruman has observed that “when framers dealt with what they regarded
as the most important of rights, they deﬁned carefully the limits of
government authority.”198 These provisions take a variety of diﬀerent and
sometimes conﬂicting substantive approaches.199 What they have in common,
however, is a sophisticated understanding of how the text of the bill of rights
could be used to control distrusted government oﬃcials by providing clear
and detailed limitations.200
C. Early Convention Debates
Although the states quickly solidiﬁed the norm of enumerating
constitutional rights, early convention debates included serious discussion of
whether a bill of rights was proper and how it should function.201 These
MD. CONST. of 1776, § XXXIX; N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XXIII.
MD. CONST. of 1776, § XL.
TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 29.
See Conn. 1818, supra note 27, 30 (“Look at Massachusetts, where the legislature has
interfered, and you ﬁnd nothing but constant petitioning—the same is the case in England, where
they have an established religion . . . .”).
197 See, e.g., id. at 18 (delegate arguing that it might be imprudent to address various issues in
the bill of rights but “[a]s to religion, he would decide that question”).
198 KRUMAN, supra note 125, at 49.
199 See id. at 41-49 (describing the various constitutional approaches states took in protecting
religious liberty).
200 See THE DEBATES AND JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF MAINE 1819–‘20, at 108 (Augusta, Maine Farmers’ Almanac Press 1894) [hereinafter ME. 1819–20]
(suggesting that the legislature cannot be trusted with power to regulate religion); cf. DINAN, supra note
134, at 191 (suggesting that eighteenth-century religion clauses came from fear of “popular majorities”).
201 See, e.g., N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 139, 168-70 (depicting a discussion between delegates
about the principles declared in the bill of rights); 3 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 374 (Boston, White & Potter 1853) [hereinafter 3
193
194
195
196
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debates have been largely neglected in the study of American constitutional
rights, but they provide important evidence regarding the states’ own
conception of constitutional rights.202 In this Section, I argue that state bills
of rights were designed to enhance majoritarian control over government
rather than protect against abusive majorities. I ﬁrst consider the debates
addressing the propriety of including a bill of rights and then the debates
discussing the proper function of a bill of rights.
1. “Declaratory Acts of the People”—Enumerating Rights to
Protect Popular Majorities
Early conventions included robust discussions of whether a constitution
should include enumerated rights. Those debates varied, but they most often
centered on rebutting the traditional republican belief that explicit rights
were unnecessary because the people were fully represented in the legislature,
which had replaced the hegemonic monarch and thereby alleviated the
people’s need for a bill of rights.203 They also addressed the natural rights
objection that enumerating rights implies that the constitution is the source
of rights.204 In answering these arguments, proponents made several

MASS. 1853] (noting that delegates entertained serious discussion of need for a bill of rights as late as
1821 but also noting that by 1851 it was “above question” that state constitutions should contain bills
of rights). Even later, new states often addressed the issue when framing inaugural constitutions. See
THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1857, at 101 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926) [hereinafter OR. 1857] (discussing
adding a committee on a bill of rights); THE RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1910, at 758-60 (John S. Goff ed., 1991) [hereinafter ARIZ. 1910].
202 They occurred decades after Madison’s 1789 congressional speech criticizing state
constitutional rights and casting the Federal Bill of Rights as an important check on majority
tyranny. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing Madison’s 1789 speech). The earliest
recorded state debate is from Connecticut in 1818. See infra Appendix A.
203 Drawing on the English origins of bills of rights, republican objectors argued that
enumerated rights were inconsistent with popular sovereignty and democratic representation. Under
English law, the people relied on bills of rights to formalize concessions from the sovereign monarch.
N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 172. According to republican thought, this conception of enumerated
rights was anathema to the states because the people alone were sovereign, and they were embodied
by regularly elected legislatures. Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 19. This meant that, unlike a monarch,
state legislatures would inherently guard the people’s rights, and it would be improper and
unnecessary for a constitution to purport limits on the people themselves by limiting the legislature.
See id. at 18-19 (“[T]he legislature can[‘]t destroy the liberties of the people; that can[‘]t be, they are
elected by them . . . this is the great means by which the people hold their rights . . . ?”); ME. 1819–
20, supra note 200, at 106 (“While the frequency and purity of elections continues, I feel no
apprehension for the security of the liberties of our county.”).
204 See, e.g., N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 171-72 (“[A] bill of rights is the mere repetition of the
fundamental rights of this people . . . .”). For a representative discussion of other objections, see
N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 139-40, which raises objections such as abstract propositions which “will
only serve to confuse the minds of the members.”
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important clariﬁcations regarding the design and purpose of state
constitutional rights.
First, proponents emphasized that the republican faith in representation
was naïve. Enumerated rights were important even in a republic, they argued,
because government oﬃcials were likely to thwart majorities and abuse power
for their own gain.205 They emphasized that representation was not a panacea
for institutionalizing popular sovereignty, but rather came with its own risks
and threats.206 Proponents of state constitutional rights emphasized that they
were intended to counteract inevitable government recalcitrance and
corruption.207 Thus, a delegate to New York’s 1821 convention colorfully
analogized state constitutional rights to placing “a bridle in the mouths of
those agents who would overleap their duties.”208
Relatedly, proponents emphasized that enumerated rights were proper
even in a republic because state constitutional rights were wholly diﬀerent
from their English cousins. Where English declarations reﬂected selfimposed concessions from the sovereign monarch to its subjects,209 state bills
of rights reﬂected an aﬃrmative act of sovereign power by the people to

205 See N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 170 (“How dark are the evils that unbridled legislation has
inﬂicted upon the community.”); N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 59 (“If it is taken for granted, that the
representatives of the people are always immaculate—if their hears are always pure, and their
judgments unerring, whence does it happen that we are now assembled? Why have we appointed a
committee to establish a bill of rights to stand as landmarks to them and our rulers, and to guard
against usurpation and encroachment upon the liberties of the people?”).
206 See OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 333 (explaining that the provision requiring recurrence
to “ﬁrst principles” reﬂected the notion that government invariably grew towards corruption and
away from people).
207 See N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 170 (describing the duty to “guard all the avenues by which
the people’s rights may be invaded”); N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 171 (“What are your bills of rights?
They are declaratory acts of the people, that the legislature shall not encroach upon their rights . . . .”).
208 N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 60. See also N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 171 (rights are
“landmarks . . . to prevent the Legislature from” overstepping). The Kentucky Convention opined
that “[w]hatever [the bill of rights] proclaims as the popular will—that constitutes the terms of the
association—that sets out, limits, defines the powers which the people propose to delegate in their
political association, and defines the various restraints against the abuse of delegated power.” REPORT
OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 1849, at 811 (Frankfort, Kentucky, A.G. Hodges & Co.
1849) [hereinafter KY. 1849]; see also id. at 812 (“I am disposed to place . . . every . . . right which I
hold dear, upon the justice of the people . . . .”). This position was later rejected in favor of an obscure
and anomalous provision stating that rights to slaves are not subject to majority rule. See id. at 814
(recounting votes in favor of the provision and noting “[s]o the section was adopted”); KY. CONST.
of 1850, art. XIII, § 2 (“[A]bsolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a Republic, not even in the largest majority.”); id. § 3 (“The right of property is
before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave,
and its increase, is the same, and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any Property whatever.”).
209 See N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 170 (“Despots grant only bills of privileges, not declarations
of rights. Such is the magna charta. There, power resides in the despot: here, in the people.”).

2022]

America’s Misunderstood Constitutional Rights

889

subordinate and control government.210 In other words, proponents agreed
that a bill of rights was unnecessary in a republic if its purpose was to
constrain the sovereign.211 They argued instead that a bill of rights was
critically important if the people were to realize and perpetuate their
sovereignty over government.
In view of this understanding of constitutional rights, it is not surprising
that the debates reflect minimal support for Madison’s notion that enumerated
rights are primarily to protect against abuses by the “body of the people.”212
To the contrary, proponents mostly described bills of rights as “declaratory
acts of the people” designed to control nonresponsive government.213 Indeed,
the debates reaffirm trust in popular majorities while emphasizing the need to
protect against officials who invariably thwart majorities for their own gain.214
Popular majorities were the solution to, not the source of, tyranny. They were
the active subject of constitutional enforcement, not the object of regulation.
As one delegate explained: “It is not . . . because I am afraid of the people,
that I would provide these checks. It is because I fear that the representatives

210 Id. at 170-71 (displaying the view that the power resides in the people). This was also the
response to natural rights objections. Proponents emphasized that a bill of rights was a non-exclusive
list of rights crafted in response to concerns about recalcitrant government and not for the purpose of
enumerating all powers and protections held by the people themselves. 9 PA. 1837, supra note 192, at 6.
211 N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 59 (“It is not . . . because I am afraid of the people, that I would
provide these checks.”).
212 See THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTION 51-52 (Washington, John T. Towers 1850) [hereinafter CAL. 1849] (noting
that a constitution is important for “protection of minorities and the well-being of the mass—
majorities can protect themselves”); id. at 53 (“This Convention is not called upon to tell the people
what they shall do, but what they shall not do. By the adoption of the Constitution, formed by their
delegates, imposing certain restrictions upon them, they make it there act.”); N.Y. 1821, supra note
34, at 172 (describing the bill of rights as “restricting the power of the legislature”); FRAGMENTS
OF THE DEBATES OF THE IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1844 AND 1846, at 37
(Benjamin F. Shambaugh ed., 1900) [hereinafter IOWA 1844] (“A constitution was intended to be
binding upon a majority as well as a minority.”); Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 57 (discussing the ways
in which the judiciary can prevent the majority from exerting undue inﬂuence).
213 N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 171.
214 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION, OF 1829–30, at 28
(Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830) (statement by nondelegate representing nonpropertied
citizens who were unrepresented: “[A]ll history demonstrates that the many have oftener been the
victims than the oppressors. Cunning has proved an over-match for strength.”); N.Y. 1821, supra note
34, at 60 (“[H]ere I would recur to the primary principle of a republican government, that the will
of the majority should govern . . . .”); Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 12 (“[I]t is a just and wise
principle, that the majority shall rule the minority . . . .”). For an extreme debate regarding the
extent to which majorities provide unassailable political legitimacy, see KY. 1849, supra note 208, at
812 (argument of pro-slavery delegate that the institution of slavery is subject to the will of popular
majorities: “I am disposed to place that institution, as well as every other right which I hold dear,
upon the justice of the people; I am willing to rest it there; for whenever the people cease to be just,
whenever they cease to be virtuous, all our rights and liberties must cease to exist.”).
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of the people will not be faithful to their trust.”215 Various delegates at different
conventions similarly described the bill of rights as providing “landmarks” to
“our rulers” that “guard against usurpation and encroachment.”216 The core
concern that motivated state bills of rights was not the fear of inappropriate
action by democratic majorities, but the fear that government might thwart
those majorities.217
To be sure, the debates include orations to natural and “inalienable” rights.
It cannot be denied that many delegates (especially in the eighteenth century)
presumed that certain rights were extra-legal and beyond the reach of any just
government. But the debates reflect the pragmatic understanding that those
rights are ultimately dependent on democratic majorities for their preservation
and enforcement.218 Indeed, delegates repeatedly argued that if the people lost
sight of liberty or abandoned virtue, republican government was necessarily

N.Y. 1821, supra note 34, at 59.
Id. at 59; see also N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 139; Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 22; CAL. 1849,
supra note 212, at 52 (noting that bill of rights is “the message of the people to their servants” and
that “government is subservient to the Constitution, and the ministers of that government are the
servants of the people”); OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 326 (arguing that including right of people
to “petition” legislatures was “absurd” because legislators were the people’s “servants”); id. at 466
(suggesting that the bill of rights should be explicit about the people’s right to abolish government);
MICH. 1835–36, supra note 35, at 287 (stating that purpose of bill of rights was to “explicitly . . .
state . . . that these powers are inherent in the people, and to say emphatically to the Legislature
that they are simply the agents of the people”).
217 I VA. 1901–02, supra note 33, at 63 (“I do not believe that the people of any generation have
the right to fetter the hands of their posterity. It is against common right; it is against the essential
principles of free government; it is against all modern ideas of civilization; and it is against the
express letter of our Bill of Rights, which says that the people have the inalienable and indefeasible
right at any time to alter or change their Constitution.”). For a contrary assessment, see ADAMS,
supra note 139, at 145, stating that “[t]he state bills of rights were based on the conviction that in
cases of conﬂicting interest, the life, liberty, and property of the individual should have precedence
over the will of the majority.” As support for this position, Adams’s references delegates from an
eighteenth-century town in Massachusetts, who understood the bill of rights to reﬂect the terms of
a social contract between citizens and government that included certain “inalienable” rights. Id.
Adams’s account is surely correct in that eighteenth-century Americans believed certain rights to be
natural and beyond the reach of any just government, but the convention debates reveal much more
nuisance and pragmatism regarding the relationship between the bill of rights, natural law, and
popular sovereignty. See, e.g., K.Y. 1849, supra note 208, at 812 (responding to a claim that certain
rights are extra-legal and cannot be infringed even by a majority that “whenever the people cease to
be just, whenever they cease to be virtuous, all our rights and liberties must cease to exist”)
(statement by pro-slavery delegate in opposition to proposal that would enshrine slavery as an
inalienable property right). Speciﬁcally, they reveal that state constitutionalists chose to empower
democratic majorities rather than government or political minorities as the ultimate guardians of
rights. See, e.g., Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 18.
218 See Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 18 (arguing that it was impossible for “a committee to make
a Constitution which would stand for a moment with a people either corrupted or who had not
intelligence to discern, or preserve their freedom”).
215
216
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doomed.219 While this might seem hyperbolic and fatalistic, it reflects a deep
faith in majoritarianism and a deep distrust of government as the enforcer of
rights (even natural rights) against genuine and lawful majorities.220
2. “An Ordinance of the People”—Implementing Popular
Oversight through the Bill of Rights
The early debates also reveal a sophisticated understanding of how a bill
of rights might operate as a popular accountability device. Delegates quickly
recognized and confronted the implications of using the bill of rights in this
way. Two themes from the debates are important.
First, a recurring issue in the debates was the concern that the bill of rights
might balloon into a code of statutes if it was the locus of popular eﬀorts to
control government.221 This concern took various forms, but the dominant
idea was that it would be impractical and unwise for the people to
micromanage government through detailed constitutional text.222 This idea
was often dovetailed with the notion that the bill of rights should be limited
to an expression of fundamental liberties.223
Whatever the merits of this position, it generally lost out to the notion that
the bill of rights should include sufficient details necessary to effectuate popular
preferences and control government on behalf of the people.224 As a New Jersey
delegate explained, “We are called upon . . . to guard all the avenues by which
the people’s rights may be invaded. By adopting the declaration of rights, we
will circumscribe the action of the legislature . . . as well as proclaim those great
and fundamental truths which lie at the foundation of civil liberty.”225 Indeed,
delegates in many early conventions proposed various detailed (and sometimes

219 VA. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 17 (“That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can
be preserved to any people but by a ﬁrm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance,[] and virtue,
and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”).
220 Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 12 (“The people have the right to [create a constitution], and
if they have, no man will prevent them: They can form a Constitution legitimately; it is a just and
wise principle, that the majority shall rule the minority.”).
221 Id. at 17-19. See also JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF
DELEGATES, CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 470 (Boston, Daily
Advertiser 1853) (“[W]e cannot undertake to limit every exercise of its discretion.”); CAL. 1849, supra
note 212, at 33 (objecting that bill of rights contained “legislative enactments”); id. at 41 (showing a
majority of the convention rejected this objection).
222 See, e.g., Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 19 (“[T]he legislature must act agreeably to
circumstances, which are very liable to change; instructions or ﬁxed regulations, would serve only
to embarrass the legislature.”).
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 170 (demonstrating the desire to protect individual liberties
through the adoption of a declaration of rights that includes the detail necessary to constrain government).
225 Id.
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unusual) provisions in response to perceived government failures.226 Delegates
also understood that vague constitutional language may be less effective
because government could “ignorantly or corruptly” construe that language in
its favor.227 Thus, there was an early understanding that a state bill of rights
could properly function as a detailed “ordinance of the people” designed to
“regulate” and “confine” government.228
Second, by at least 1842, delegates expressed a clear understanding that
formal amendment of constitutional text was an important mechanism by
which popular majorities might realize the bill of rights’ core commitment to
controlling government oﬃcials. Indeed, the debates reveal that the Dorr
Rebellion in Rhode Island sent shockwaves through state conventions and
forced delegates to look for ways to institutionalize the people’s right to alter
or abolish government.229 In 1842, Rhode Island delegates debated the near226 E.g., N.Y. 1867–68, supra note 31, at 3264 (“The theory of our action so far, has been that
we cannot trust the Legislature, because from various causes the Legislature would often disregard
what was required . . . and therefore, it is necessary to provide for this in the organic law.”); R.I.
1842, supra note 188, at 35 (discussing ﬁshing rights); COLLECTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE
HISTORICAL LIBRARY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 869-70 (Arthur Charles Cole
ed., 1919) [hereinafter ILL. 1847] (prohibition on dueling); id. at 871 (prohibition on interracial
marriage). The 1853 Massachusetts convention includes a good example. Delegates debated changes
to the writ of habeas corpus. One delegate recounted the courts’ failure to strictly apply the statute
setting grounds for habeas relief as a basis for including a more detailed habeas provision in the bill
of rights that would force courts to comply. The delegate opined: “I . . . wish to have the matter
deﬁnitely stated in our Bill of Rights, so that there may be no doubt or diﬃcultly in regard to it
hereafter.” 3 MASS. 1853, supra note 201, at 378-79. Underlying this was a concern for due process
for fugitive enslaved people. Id.
227 OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 556; see also id. (opposing a vague provision because “[i]t
gives too great a license to the judiciary. . . . The judges can mould it and apply it as they see
proper. . . . They become in eﬀect a council of censors.”).
228 Conn. 1818, supra note 27, at 17-18. This is not to say that academics and elites endorsed this
position. Justice Story famously criticized state bills of rights for containing too much detail. See
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 44,
§ 1854, at 715 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (preferring the high-level preambulatory language
of the Constitution to “volumes of . . . aphorisms”); see also Amasa M. Eaton, Recent State
Constitutions, 6 HARV. L. REV. 109, 121 (1892) (observing disapprovingly that “the theory underlying
[state constitutions is] that the agents of the people, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are
not to be trusted; so that it is necessary to enter into the most minute particulars as to what they
shall not do”).
229 See, e.g., IOWA 1844, supra note 212, at 34-37 (linking the Dorr Rebellion to inadequate
formal amendment rules); ILL. 1847, supra note 226, at 846-53 (discussing the Dorr Rebellion, the
bill of rights, and amendment rules); OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 479 (discussing amendment
and abolition); DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 97-99
(1923) [hereinafter MD. 1867] (discussing the Dorr Rebellion and the right-to-abolish provision as
reﬂecting the majority’s inalienable right to formal amendment); 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION TO REVISE THE STATE CONSTITUTION 143
(Annapolis, William M’Neir 1851) (debating the provision); see also JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON,
A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 548 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 4th ed. 1887)
(connecting Shays’ Rebellion and formal amendment).
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universal provision guaranteeing the people the right to “alter, reform or
totally change [government], whenever their safety or happiness requires.”230
Delegates were concerned that this provision might sanction similar violent
uprisings in the future and formalize a disregard for the rule of law.231 There
was, however, a recognition that the principle of popular sovereignty
empowered the people to conform government to popular preferences.232 To
reconcile these concerns, the Rhode Island convention adopted a bill-ofrights provision that declared: “the basis of our political systems is the right
of the people to make and alter their Constitutions of government; but that
the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all.”233 This
language, originally penned by George Washington, masterfully captured
how state bills of rights are connected to formal amendment procedures and
popular sovereignty.234
III. STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
As explained above, conventional accounts of constitutional rights tend to
begin with groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions in the early twentieth
century that first applied the Federal Bill of Rights against the states. These
accounts usually suggest that constitutional rights were inconsequential before
the Supreme Court developed them as meaningful constraints on majoritarian
abuses. By focusing primarily on federal court opinions and a particular
conception of constitutional rights, these accounts have missed an important
alternative narrative. In this Section, I present findings from my review of all
known state constitutional convention debates regarding state bills of rights.
This largely neglected evidence presents a striking alternative account. Far
from lying dormant and ineffectual, state bills of rights have long been at the
epicenter of efforts to realign government with popular preferences. Indeed,
the debates are littered with rigorous discussion about how to amend bills of
rights to correct for recalcitrant officials and institutions.235

R.I. 1842, supra note 188, at 28.
See id. at 29-31 (debating the potential repercussions of including the provision).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 41; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 1.
See R.I. 1842, supra note 188, at 41 (suggesting Washington’s attribution).
See, e.g., IOWA 1844, supra note 212, at 159-62 (discussing various unusual rights provisions).
For a high-level discussion of how state constitutions (not rights per se) have evolved to function as
“instruments of government rather than merely frameworks for government,” see WILLIAMS, supra
note 105, at 20-25 which describes important work in this regard by Christian G. Fritz, John Dinan,
Stephen M. Griﬃn, and G. Alan Tarr.
230
231
232
233
234
235
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Of course, this picture is not always pretty. In some instances, these eﬀorts
reﬂect admirable popular campaigns to undo an oppressive status quo.236 In
other instances, they illustrate the repressive power of popular majorities. I
explore these important normative and interpretive implications in the next
Section. Here, I focus on demonstrating that the states have actively
maintained an alternative approach to constitutional rights that celebrates
them as a mechanism for enhancing popular control over government.237
A. Antebellum Rights Issues
Scholars frequently describe the antebellum period as void of meaningful
state constitutional rights because state courts rarely expounded or enforced
them.238 But court opinions are an inherently incomplete source of state
constitutional rights activity. State constitutional rights were built around
popular mechanisms of accountability and enforcement. Constitutional
conventions present a more likely and appropriate forum for evidence of rights
engagement. Indeed, there were ninety conventions before 1861,239 and all
conventions for which records have survived include serious discussion of state
bills of rights.240 Those debates challenge traditional critiques and reveal a
distinctive and long-standing approach to constitutional rights as instruments
of popular control over government. I focus on three especially common issues
that illustrate how the states engaged with constitutional rights.
1. Corporate Privilege and State Bills of Rights
The rise of private corporations was one of the most signiﬁcant issues
during the antebellum period.241 The issue had many strands, but it
manifested most signiﬁcantly in early state infrastructure projects (such as
canals, turnpikes, and railroads). Although those projects were ostensibly
236 See, e.g., infra subsection III.A.2 (discussing imprisonment for debt); ZACKIN, supra note
125, at 55 (common-school movement); DINAN, supra note 134, at 67-68, 321 n.23 (suﬀrage).
237 These are by no means the only examples. Because popular discontent with government
was often the basis for reform to rights, the debates reﬂect an eclectic array of proposals responsive
to idiosyncratic government failures.
238 Kincaid, supra note 98, at 167. The power of judicial review was well established in state
constitutional law by at least 1837. See DINAN, supra note 125, at 15 (“[J]udicial review was well
entrenched.”). There are a few discredited studies suggesting that state courts have a tradition of
independently enforcing state constitutional rights. See Tarr, supra note 18, at 162-63 (listing studies
and explaining errors). The authoritative study of state supreme court caseloads from 1870 to 1970
found that almost all cases before 1935 involved “ordinary commercial disputes.” Kagan et al., supra
note 98, at 132-33, 150.
239 See DINAN, supra note 134, at 8, tbl.1-1.
240 There are thirty-two conventions in my dataset from before 1861.
241 See Tarr, supra note 18, at 109-13 (reviewing debates over the roles of the public and private
sectors in nineteenth century economic growth).
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intended to boost economic development by encouraging construction, it was
common for private corporations to lobby state legislatures for a variety of
special privileges in exchange for construction.242 State legislatures generally
succumbed, adopting schemes that “blurred public and private lines.”243
States would, for example, ﬁnance private corporations by issuing large
amounts of public debt and using the proceeds to buy stock in corporations.244
Although some of these schemes produced beneﬁcial outcomes, this period
was marked by corruption in favor of private ﬁrms and self-serving
oﬃcials.245 When the ﬁnancial crisis of 1839 left many states with exorbitant
debts and unrealized development, voters were incensed.246
Much has been written about how voters subsequently adopted detailed
structural reforms that limited public ﬁnance, instituted general
incorporation, and required uniform taxation.247 What has been largely
missed, however, is that state electorates understood these issues to be at the
core of their bills of rights.248 The capture of government by an elite group of
private ﬁrms at the expense of the public was anathema to the state
conception of constitutional rights.249 Indeed, antebellum conventions
considered various constitutional rights amendments designed to better align
government with popular preferences and interests regarding corporations.250
The so-called “Jacksonian Equality Provisions” are a good example. Many
early state constitutions included provisions declaring that “all men . . . are
equal, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public
Id.
Richard Briﬀault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 911 (2003); see also John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and
Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211, 241-42
(2005) (expanding on the intertwined nature of nineteenth-century states and businesses).
244 See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Popular Regulation? State Constitutional Amendment and the
Administrate State, 8 BELMONT L. REV. 342, 353-54 (2021). Legislatures also used special-incorporation
statutes to reduce competition for privileged corporations and ensure favorable regulatory and tax
treatment. TARR, supra note 17, at 112; see also Wallis, supra note 243, at 232-33, 245-47.
245 See Briﬀault, supra note 243, at 911 (“[T]his era of state-supported infrastructure ﬁnance
was marked by waste, overbuilding, and mismanagement.”).
246 See id. (detailing the “disastrous consequences of the states’ extensive investments in and
assistance to private ﬁrms in the 1820s and 1830s”).
247 See, e.g., id. at 910-11 (describing “public purpose” requirements that constrain state
investment in private works).
248 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, 1846, 541 (Albany, Evening
Atlas 1846) [hereinafter N.Y. 1846] (complaining that the legislature was “omnipotent”).
249 See, e.g., OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 335 (criticizing the bill-of-rights committee
because it “failed to secure us against that system of perpetual succession, now growing up under
our acts of incorporation”); N.Y. 1846, supra note 248, at 541 (debating the power aﬀorded to
corporations by the legislature).
250 See, e.g., 3 MASS. 1853, supra note 201, at 465 (rights amendment to allow wrongful death
actions against common carriers).
242
243
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emoluments or privileges from the community . . . .”251 Although these
provisions were initially crafted in response to royal favoritism, delegates
repurposed them following the ﬁnancial crisis of 1837 to address concerns
about corporate privilege and inﬂuence.252 Speciﬁcally, delegates redesigned
the provisions to prevent legislatures from granting monopolies or limitedlicenses to private parties.253 The idea was to prevent the legislature from
privileging a select few with state-created advantages over competitors.
Delegates in Indiana (1851) and Iowa (1857) succeeded in amending their bills
of rights in this way.254 Several other states amended existing provisions to
adapt them to concerns regarding corporations,255 and various new states
included these provisions in their bills of rights for similar reasons.256
Many contemporary courts and commentators have equated these
provisions with the Fourteenth Amendment’s minority-oriented equal
protection provision.257 However, the debates reveal that these provisions are
better understood as the “antithesis” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
protection clause.258 To be sure, the provisions include notions of equality,259
but they were not concerned with protecting individuals or “disfavored

KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, §1; see also VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1776, § 4.
OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 335; Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1207 (1985).
253 TARR, supra note 17, at 111 n.76.
254 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 1385-86, 1391-93; 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION; OF THE STATE OF IOWA 101, 200 (Davenport, Luse, Lane & Co. 1857) [hereinafter
1 IOWA 1857].
255 TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I, § 22 (monopoly provision); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art.
XIII, §§ 1–5.
256 See OR. 1857, supra note 201, at 317 (including provision, eliminating reference to nobility,
and prohibiting “exclusive privileges”); KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. 12, § 236. Various conventions
considered but rejected these provisions. E.g., N.J. 1844, supra note 32, 159-60; THE [WISCONSIN]
CONVENTION OF 1846, 372-76 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1919). Delegates debated these clauses again
after the ﬁnancial crisis of 1873. A STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION HELD IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, 1877, at 95 (Atlanta, Const.
Publ’g Co. 1877) [hereinafter GA. 1877]; OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
IN THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890,
TO ADOPT, AMEND OR CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 470-71
(Frankfort, Kentucky, E. Polk Johnson, 1890) [hereinafter KY. 1890].
257 See Williams, supra note 252, at 1208 n.94 (listing cases); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund
Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 972 (Or. 1982) (expressing what the standard should be for statutes that classify
on the basis of gender in the context of Oregon’s provision in its bill of rights declaring: “No law
shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the
same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens”).
258 Hewitt, 653 P.2d at 975.
259 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 1394 (describing provision as relating to “equal rights” in the
sense that “there shall be no exclusive monopolies—no privileges granted to one man which shall
not, under the same circumstances, belong to all men”).
251
252
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groups” from discrimination by abusive majorities.260 Rather, they were
concerned with ensuring that democratic majorities were not thwarted by
corrupt state government and powerful elites.261 The provisions were about
enhancing democratic accountability by limiting capture and removing
incentives for corruption.262 They were intended to protect democratic
majorities from recalcitrant government; not to protect disfavored groups or
individuals from regulation by the majority.263
Eminent domain reform provides another compelling example. Most
antebellum bills of rights included a general protection against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. But these vague
provisions were often ineﬀective in protecting citizens from powerful private
ﬁrms.264 Through legislation and judicial complicity, state government deeply
eroded property protections in favor of corporations.265 In many instances,
corporations were able to take private property without providing any
compensation or obtaining any pre-approval. After the 1837 economic crisis,
eminent domain became a popular issue, and many delegates sought to
reform state bills of rights to provide better protection from the “corrupt” use
of eminent domain.266
Central to reform eﬀorts was the concern that state government had
strayed from the public interest in favor of private corporations. Delegates
260 Id.; see also Williams, supra note 252, at 1208; Hewitt, 653 P.2d at 975 (describing how a
constitutional provision was adopted with the concern of special privileges for the select few).
261 The main concern was the granting of exclusive or limited licenses that beneﬁted a select
few without regard for the whole community. See IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 1393 (describing
provision as “destroy[ing] the monopoly principle”); id. at 1395 (describing state-grated monopolies
as “anti-republican”); id. (describing special legislation granting exclusive licenses for ferries as
“bur[d]ens to be imposed upon the many for the beneﬁt of the few”); N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 311
(describing “prerogative rights or exclusive privileges” as “contrary to all ideas of a republican
government”); ILL. 1847, supra note 226, at 300 (“[I]ncorporations, clothed with exclusive powers
and privileges, are contrary to the spirit . . . of republican institutions; oppressive to the best
interests of the people at large . . . .”).
262 OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 335 (“There are special privileges, special honors, special
emoluments, enjoyed in the State of Ohio, that are in violation of the great and fundamental principles
that lay at the foundation of our government.”). On corporations, special privileges, and
capture/corruption during this period, see L. RAY GUNN, THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY 112-14 (1988).
263 OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 335.
264 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 353-60.
265 Many states extended eminent domain to private ﬁrms. E.g., N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at
159-60; IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 355. States also allowed private ﬁrms to take property without
upfront compensation. Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,
11 ENV’T L. 1, 26-27 (1980). Property owners were then required to petition a state-managed fund
or seek redress in court. N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 160, 416. States also required property valuations
be oﬀset by any increase in value created by the new infrastructure, which enabled ﬁrms to take
property and provide “no compensation whatever.” IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 358.
266 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 160-61; see also N.Y. 1846, supra note 248, at 541 (eminent domain
is “robbery”); IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 353 (eminent domain is “oppression”).
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believed that corporations, with the assistance of state legislatures and courts,
had hijacked the power of eminent domain for their own proﬁts.267 They
portrayed this abuse of eminent domain as a form of despotism because it
subordinated the people to corporations and self-serving oﬃcials.268 This, of
course, struck at the core of state bills of rights.
Tellingly, reform proposals sought to redeem eminent domain by
formalizing direct popular oversight and correcting speciﬁc government
failures through detailed constitutional language. In California and New
York, for example, delegates proposed that property evaluations be
determined by a jury or an independent commission, and that a jury of freeholders preside over attempts to convert private roads to public use.269 In
Indiana, delegates proposed up-front evaluations by a jury of fellow property
owners before any taking could occur.270 These proposals aimed to return the
power of eminent domain to the public by subjecting eminent domain to
popular oversight through juries and other bodies that were presumably more
independent of corporations than existing state government.271
Opposition to these proposals is perhaps even more revealing of how
delegates understood state bills of rights. The core objection to reform was
that the bills of rights should not be amended to allow a minority to stop
improvements that would beneﬁt the aggregate community.272 The idea was
that the bill of rights would be inverted if it were used to thwart popular
majorities in favor of a few property owners.273 Thus, a New Jersey delegate
opposed eminent domain reform because “manifest injury might accrue to
the public” if the bill of rights thwarted popular infrastructure projects.274 An
Indiana delegate similarly argued that eminent domain reform would be
“anti-democratic” because it would allow a small group of “troublesome

267 12 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA [1837], at 201 (Harrisburg, Packer, Barrett & Park 1839) (“The legislature are now
habitually giving to these companies, power to take real estate for their purposes.”); IND. 1850,
supra note 22, at 423 (“[C]orporate bodies ought to be placed upon precisely the same footing . . .
as an individual . . . .”).
268 N.Y. 1846, supra note 248, at 541-42.
269 CAL. 1849, supra note 212, at 41; N.Y. 1846, supra note 248, at 7, 538.
270 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 353. New Jersey delegates likewise proposed upfront payment
valued by an independent commission. N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 416.
271 N.Y. 1867–68, supra note 31, at 3248 (noting that commissions were captured by railroads
making it necessary to ensure valuations by local jury). There were references to natural law
principles. OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 194. But natural law was not the focus of the argument.
The debates were about the practical workings of government and corporate inﬂuence.
272 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 415-16.
273 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 353-59.
274 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 416.
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customers[] demanding an exorbitant price for their land” to halt popular
“works of public improvement.”275
The structure of these debates show that delegates viewed bills of rights
as mechanisms for enhancing popular control over government. Those who
favored reform viewed existing government as corrupt and they sought to
amend the bill of rights to bypass existing oﬃcials and shift the power of
eminent domain back to popular control. Opponents contested the
conclusion that government was corrupt and insisted that the bill of rights
would be inverted if a small group of property owners could thwart popular
infrastructure projects. In either case, the core issue was how to best mold the
bill of rights to realize and protect majoritarian preferences.
2. Imprisonment for Debt
Another pressing issue during the antebellum period was the ongoing
practice in many states of allowing creditors to maintain actions for
imprisonment of defaulting debtors.276 Imprisonment for debt was an English
common law writ adopted by the colonies.277 In its most basic form, a creditor
could obtain a writ for the arrest of a debtor based solely on the creditor’s
sworn statement.278 The sheriﬀ would then arrest the debtor, and if the court
upheld the creditor’s claim, the debtor remained in prison until the debt was
paid.279 While in prison, the debtor was traditionally responsible for
providing his own food and clothing.280
During the initial stage of colonization, legislatures were sympathetic to
debtors and adopted a variety of measures designed to entice newcomers and
limit imprisonment.281 However, as local capital grew and local lenders
expanded in inﬂuence, creditors increasingly pursued imprisonment.282
Historians have sparred over the true scope and nature of debtors’ prisons in
the early 1800s, but a few themes are clear.

275 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 353-54.
276 See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA
MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 18 (2002). This was an important

3-5 (1974); BRUCE H.
issue in the states
notwithstanding ongoing national eﬀorts to institute a bankruptcy system. Christopher D.
Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 18-22 (2016).
277 COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 3-4, 249.
278 Technically, this was an attachment, where the debtor’s body was attached and held until
the debt was paid (the writ of capias ad respondendum). Id. at 4-5.
279 Id. at 5.
280 Hampson, supra note 276, at 17-18. These conditions varied, including between lower-class,
upper-class, and wealthy debtors. See id. at 17.
281 COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 249.
282 See Hampson, supra note 276, at 15-16 (explaining incentive structures that made
imprisonment attractive to creditors).

900

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 853

First, by the 1830s there was a broad popular campaign against
imprisonment for debt, especially for petty debts.283 The movement was
buoyed by prison reform societies that monitored and reported on
circumstances and conditions in debtors’ prisons.284 Those organizations
often highlighted dismal conditions and barbaric circumstances surrounding
some arrests.285 One illustrative account from 1822 reported that a Boston
woman was arrested at her home and taken from her two children (who were
under the age of three) for a debt of $3.60.286 These stories garnered popular
outcry and facilitated an abolitionist movement that was based on
“humanitarian, practical, and moral considerations.”287
Second, the travesties of debtor’s prison disproportionately aﬀected the
poor and vulnerable.288 As Peter Coleman explained, “Beyond family and
friends, most of whom were in like impoverished circumstances, no
community of interests protected [poor debtors] from the creditor, sheriﬀ, or
bailiﬀ.”289 To be sure, the wealthy and inﬂuential were pursued by creditors,
but they were often able to dodge service and secure preferential treatment
(like house arrest).290 Most imprisoned debtors were working class tradesman
who served out their debt in abhorrent conditions.
Third, state legislatures were “ﬁckle” or even obstructionist regarding
reform.291 Despite growing popular pressure, many legislatures moved slowly
and some even regressed.292 The revolutionary constitutions of Pennsylvania
and North Carolina, for example, included general provisions (not in a bill of
rights) against imprisonment for debt, but government in both states
continued to imprison debtors.293 In 1815, the South Carolina legislature
banned imprisonment for debt, but then reinstituted it in 1823.294 Rhode
Island’s legislature resisted reform for decades despite frequent popular
COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 255-56.
Hampson, supra note 276, at 18.
See JOHN BACH MCMASTER, THE ACQUISITION OF POLITICAL SOCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS 63-64 (1903) (describing an 1816 report to New York legislature that counted
729 prisoners owing less than $25 who would have starved to death but for Humane Society and a
report from Society for Relief of the Distressed on imprisoned debtors in Boston).
286 Id. at 64.
287 COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 255; see also id. at 255-56 (“Whether real or supposed, these
humanitarian, practical, and moral considerations gradually made the debtors’ prison a political issue
. . . [that] developed in two fairly well-deﬁned stages.”); id. at 249-68 (providing an account of how
these factors drove the movement toward abolition).
288 Id. at 266.
289 Id. at 267.
290 Hampson, supra note 276, at 16-17
291 Id. at 21-22.
292 See id.; COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 25; MCMASTER, supra note 285, at 64 (describing
New York legislature’s response to popular opposition as reluctant).
293 COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 256.
294 Hampson, supra note 276, at 22 n.157.
283
284
285
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appeals, only to abolish and then reinstate imprisonment for petty debts.295
In New Jersey, the practice survived into the 1840s in part because sheriﬀs
and constables received signiﬁcant ransoms for arresting debtors.296
In view of these circumstances, it should be no surprise that imprisonment
for debt was an important issue in several antebellum conventions. Delegates
in several states were eager to ﬁnally align government with popular
sentiment and protect against any further slippage or capture that might
reinstate imprisonment for debt. Moreover, the debates emphasize that a
principal basis for abolition was popular concern about mistreatment of the
poor by government and creditors.297
Nowhere was this more apparent than in New Jersey’s 1844 convention.298
Two years before the convention, the legislature adopted a statute abolishing
imprisonment for debt, but there was an almost immediate repeal attempt.299
Public sentiment, however, remained strongly in favor of abolition.300 Thus,
an amendment to the bill of rights was proposed that prohibited
imprisonment for debt with only a few narrow exceptions.301
The principal objection to the proposal was that the issue should be left
to the legislature and not included in the bill of rights.302 This position was
soundly rebutted by various delegates who emphasized the legislature’s
unreliable commitment to strong and clear popular support for abolition.303
Indeed, one delegate explained that the provision should be “engrafted on the
Constitution” precisely because “Legislative bodies sometimes disregard the
popular will, and very frequently mistake it.”304 He also explained that “when
COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 89-90.
See id. at 138 (noting that this practice continued even to the detriment of the state economy).
See N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 165 (“[T]he spirit of humanity . . . protects honest poverty
from the felon’s doom.”); DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION [1845], at 97 (Austin, Texas, J.W.
Cruger 1846) [hereinafter TEX. 1845] (“[T]he experience of the present age has clearly decided the
impolicy and barbarity of imprisonment for debt.”); OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 470 (describing
abolition as the “voice of humanity” and “humane” treatment for “unfortunate debtor”); 3 MASS.
1853, supra note 201, at 405 (“The humanity of the age is against imprisonment for debt . . . .”); id.
(“It would be slander on the aborigines of this country to call [imprisonment for debt] a savage
custom . . . .”); id. at 408-09 (referring to imprisonment for debt as “barbarism” and advocating
support for abolition).
298 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 162-68, 418-21.
299 COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 139.
300 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 164-65, 420-21; see also TEX. 1845, supra note 297, at 97 (noting
agreement on abolition); OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 469 (noting a large majority supported
abolition because of force of public opinion).
301 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 163-68 (introducing and discussing the merits of the amendment).
302 Id. at 418-19.
303 Id. at 164. Ohio and South Carolina both adopted bill-of-rights provisions abolishing
imprisonment notwithstanding that their legislatures had already adopted similar statutes.
Hampson, supra note 276, at 22 n.156.
304 N.J. 1844, supra note 32, at 165.
295
296
297
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the voice of New Jersey [is] heard on this subject . . . [l]et us not leave [it] to
the caprice of legislation . . . .”305 The amendment was ultimately approved
by eighty-eight percent of the voting delegates and ratiﬁed by voters.306
Ultimately, the use of state bills of rights to abolish imprisonment for debt
is an important example of how state constitutional rights are designed to
function. Through constitutional conventions, popular majorities demanded
reform to their bills of rights to realign government with majoritarian
preferences. This issue also illustrates how state bills of rights can
institutionalize minority protections even though they are designed to enable
majorities. Poor debtors were a small minority at the time,307 but popular
majorities took up their cause and used the bill of rights to ensure that
government and creditors conformed to popular morality regarding
treatment of the poor. Indeed, contrary to an oft-repeated falsehood, there
was no federal ban on imprisonment for debt at any time during the
nineteenth century.308 Instead, state bills of rights carried the weight on this
progressive reform, and they did so largely because of their responsiveness to
popular opinion and their design as a bypass around state government.
3. Racial Exclusion Provisions and Colonization Programs
Much has been written about how antebellum state constitutions
institutionalized slavery and disfranchised African Americans.309 There is
another horrific but lesser-known chapter in state constitutional history that
illustrates the state approach to constitutional rights. Beginning in the 1820s,
convention delegates in several “free” states proposed provisions prohibiting
African Americans from entering or settling.310 At the same time, delegates at
certain conventions sought to constitutionalize authority for a program to
“colonize” free African Americans to Africa because they were “dangerous to

Id. at 164.
Id. at 421 (ﬁnal vote 40–5).
Statistics on this issue vary. Edwin T. Randall, Imprisonment for Debt in America: Fact and
Fiction, 39 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 89, 100 (1952) (describing previous writers’ failures to
accurately analyze the material and data in the Boston Prison Discipline Society).
308 Hampson, supra note 276, at 19.
309 See, e.g., HERRON, supra note 92 (contrasting antebellum Southern state constitutions with
their post-war counterparts); DANA ELIZABETH WEINER, RACE AND RIGHTS (2013) (recounting
antebellum anti-slavery eﬀorts by activists in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio).
310 Conventions that debated antebellum racial exclusion provisions include 9 PA. 1837, supra
note 192, at 199-202; IOWA 1844, supra note 212, at 155-56; 1 IOWA 1857, supra note 254, at 129-39;
ILL. 1847, supra note 226, at 201-02; CAL. 1849, supra note 212, at 48-50; IND. 1850, supra note 22, at
438-62; OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 598-604; and OR. 1857, supra note 201, at 361-62. See
generally Jac C. Heckelman & John Dinan, Don’t You Be My Neighbor: Support for Racial-Exclusion
Constitutional Provisions in Mid-19th Century Indiana and Illinois, 49 AM. POL. RSCH. 504 (2021)
(analyzing antebellum racial exclusion provisions in Indiana and Illinois).
305
306
307
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the peace and safety of the country.”311 Delegates advanced myriad prejudicelaced reasons in support of these provisions.312 For present purposes, the
debates reveal three critical factors that drove consideration of these provisions.
First, delegates understood popular support for outlawing slavery to be
inseparable from popular support for racial exclusion and colonization.
Delegates were hideously clear that although they opposed slavery, they also
opposed the mere presence of African Americans.313 The two positions were
connected because outlawing slavery would create incentives for free slaves
to migrate to the state and for out-of-state slaveholders to release unwanted
slaves there.314 Thus, in states with a constitutional provision outlawing
slavery, there was a special urgency to likewise constitutionalize racial
exclusion. Delegates feared that in the absence of an exclusion provision, the
constitution would outlaw slavery, but the legislature would separately
evaluate the exclusion issue. This was problematic because a slavery ban
without exclusion was the least desirable scenario.315 Delegates therefore
sought to constitutionalize exclusion to ensure that the government did not
unbundle the issues.
Second, and relatedly, strong regional differences in several states created
a distrust of legislative process regarding exclusion policy. In Indiana, Ohio,
and Illinois, southern counties emphasized that although northern counties
generally supported exclusion, those counties were removed from the effects
of African American migration and did not have the same immediate
interests at stake as their southern counterparts.316 This created concern that
the legislature might fail to pass exclusion laws even though a strong
majority believed that exclusion was best for the state. As a delegate in
Illinois explained,

311 EMMA LOU THORNBROUGH, THE NEGRO IN INDIANA 73-75 (1957); see also OHIO 1850–
51, supra note 192, at 337 (considering a colonization proposal).
312 See, e.g., OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 337 (“Ohio [is] a state for white men.”).
313 CAL. 1849, supra note 212, at 48 (“If the people of this Territory are to be free against the
curse of slavery, let them also be free from the herds of slaves who are to be set at liberty within its
borders.”); id. at 140 (“I voted in favor of the clause [outlawing slavery]. I think it equally important
that we should exclude the African race . . . .”); id. at 137 (“No population that could be brought
within the limits of our Territory could be more repugnant to the feelings of the people, or injurious
to prosperity of the community, than free negros.”); id. at 138 (“I found no man in my district who
did not approve of [the exclusion provision] . . . .”).
314 See id. at 138 (“I have been informed by gentlemen that they have received letters from the
States, stating that in a short time from this hundreds of negroes would be brought here for the
purpose of being liberated after they have worked a short time in the gold mines.”).
315 See id. at 138 (“The evil [of allowing in free blacks] would be greater than that of slavery itself.”).
316 IND. 1850, supra note 22, at 438-62; OHIO 1850–51, supra note 192, at 337 (describing how
“[t]he presence of the blacks was a nuisance” and how “the people of [southern Ohio] would submit
to no tax more cheerfully than that by which they might get rid of this nuisance”); ILL. 1847, supra
note 226, at 231.
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If the question should be left to the legislature, it would become the subject
of barter and exchange in adjusting the various interests of the State.
Gentlemen representing counties where the evil did not exist, would readily
exchange their votes for or against the black laws . . . for the purpose of
securing some favorite measure of his [sic] constituents. It would at once
hoist the ﬂood-gates of corruption, and from the fountain of power would
our country be overwhelmed.317

Thus, delegates sought to constitutionalize exclusion to bypass the
legislative process and ensure a tighter alignment between majoritarian
preferences and policy.
Third, the debates are clear that racial exclusion provisions were
protectionist acts of “power and prejudice” by popular majorities.318 White
majorities believed that their own preservation and well-being would be best
served by excluding African Americans.319 It is important to recognize,
however, that these provisions were also perfectly consistent with state
conceptions of constitutional rights. Delegates rightly perceived that the
electorate favored exclusion and that government was at risk of not realizing
that preference. This triggered the use of state constitutional text to better
align government with popular preferences. Antebellum racial exclusion
provisions are a jarring example of how state constitutional design can be used
to target rather than protect political minorities (or, more properly in this
case, disenfranchised citizens).
B. Secession, Reconstruction, and Disfranchisement
The Civil War period is not associated with meaningful state constitutional
rights protection—especially in the South. But the convention debates from
this era reveal that state bills of rights were often at the core of arguments
justifying and rejecting secession. They were also at the center of post-Civil
War power struggles between the federal government and southern states
regarding the rights of African Americans. By framing secession,
Reconstruction, and disfranchisement through the lens of state bills of rights,
the debates provide an important and unique perspective on state constitutional
317 ILL. 1847, supra note 226, at 231. The ability of state legislators to negotiate in this way might
alternately be viewed as a virtue of representative lawmaking, but such an ability only further
conﬁrms state constitutionalism’s commitment to more direct popular control.
318 Jerome B. Meites, The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention and Persons of Color, 108 J. ILL.
STATE HIST. SOC’Y 266, 284 (2015).
319 CAL. 1849, supra note 212, at 138 (“Do you suppose the white population of this country will
permit these negroes to compete with them in working the [gold] mines? Sir, you will see the most
fearful collisions that have ever been presented in any country. . . . It is [our] duty . . . to provide
against these collisions.”).

2022]

America’s Misunderstood Constitutional Rights

905

rights.320 In short, they demonstrate in dramatic fashion that state
constitutional rights are structured around popular control over government.
1. State Bills of Rights as the Epicenter of Eﬀorts to
Control State Government
During the lead up to the Civil War, eleven states held conventions
related to secession.321 In those conventions, delegates frequently
referenced provisions in state bills of rights that memorialized popular
sovereignty and the right of the people to reform, alter, or abolish
government.322 In seceding states, delegates used these provisions to argue
that the people of each state had a right to withdraw from the union and
reconstitute themselves.323 They described the federal government’s
anticipated abolition of slavery as subverting popular sovereignty, and as
just grounds for reforming government.324 The people, they argued, had
never given the federal government authority to determine the slavery
issue, and, therefore, the federal government was attempting to
commandeer sovereignty from the people in violation of the state
constitution’s core commitment to popular control.325
But delegates also used state bills of rights to justify remaining in the
Union. Missouri’s experience is illustrative. In February of 1861, Missourians
elected a large majority of pro-Union delegates to a convention.326 The
320 Much scholarship looks at these issues in the opposite direction: studying convention
arguments to assess the legality and nature of secession itself. Roman J. Hoyos, Peaceful Revolution
and Popular Sovereignty, in SIGNPOSTS 241 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds., 2013).
That literature is vast, nuanced, and signiﬁcant. My focus here is more limited and modest. I’m
interested in understanding why state bills of rights were so frequently invoked in debates regarding
secession, and what this reveals about the deep structure of state constitutional rights.
321 See John Dinan, Explaining the Prevalence of State Constitutional Conventions in the 19th and
20th Centuries, J. POL’Y HIST. (forthcoming) (manuscript tbl.3) (on ﬁle with author) (listing the
following secession conventions: Alabama 1861, Arkansas 1861, Florida 1861, Georgia 1861, Louisiana
1861, Mississippi 1861, Missouri 1861–1863, North Carolina 1861–1862, South Carolina 1860–1861,
Texas 1861, Virginia 1861).
322 See, e.g., VA. 1861, supra note 188, at 711 (referencing provision in Virginia Declaration of Rights).
323 See THE HISTORY AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF ALABAMA
[1861], at 283 (Montgomery, White, Peister & Co. 1861) [hereinafter ALA. 1861]; VA. 1861, supra note
188, at 711; I PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
[1868], at 270 (Charleston, S.C., Denny & Perry 1868) [hereinafter I S.C. 1868] (describing how
members of the 1861 convention relied on a clause in the state bill of rights guaranteeing the people
“the right, at all times, to modify their form of government” to justify secession).
324 VA. 1861, supra note 188, at 711-13.
325 See ALA. 1861, supra note 323, at 286 (“We are sent to protect, not so much property, as
white supremacy . . . against . . . the danger of Abolition rule.”); VA. 1861, supra note 188, at 712
(describing Lincoln’s attempt to block secession as “a usurpation of authority not granted [the federal
government] by the Constitution”).
326 SWITZLER’S ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF MISSOURI, FROM 1541 TO 1877, at 323 (Saint
Louis, C.R. Barnes 1879) [hereinafter MISSOURI HISTORY] (reporting the context and results of
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convention quickly adopted a resolution against secession.327 It then
adjourned with plans to reconvene in December.328 However, after it
adjourned, the governor and legislature took aggressive steps towards
secession.329 This prompted the convention to reconvene and declare that “in
opposition to the known wishes of the people,” the “Governor and other high
oﬃcers of State” had “formed a conspiracy to dissolve the connexion of
Missouri with the Federal Government” and attempted “to establish a
military despotism over the people.”330 The convention then adopted a
resolution that immediately vacated the legislature and governorship and
voided statutes adopted in furtherance of secession.331
As authority for these measures, the convention relied exclusively on the
state bill of rights, speciﬁcally the provisions stating that “all political power
is vested in and derived from the people” and that the people “have the
inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the internal government . . .
and of altering and abolishing their Constitution and form of Government,
whenever it may be necessary to their safety and happiness.”332 The
convention concluded that the bill of rights warranted the vacation of existing
government oﬃcials on behalf of the people in order to restore control to the
people through the convention.333
State bills of rights were also at the center of Reconstruction
conventions.334 After the war, confederate states held conventions to undo
the election). JOURNAL AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MISSOURI STATE CONVENTION, HELD AT
JEFFERSON CITY AND ST. LOUIS, MARCH, 1861, at 15 (St. Louis, George Knapp & Co. 1861)
[hereinafter MO. MAR. 1861] (“[T]he people that elected us have given . . . a majority of 80,000
[against secession].”).
327 MISSOURI HISTORY, supra note 326, at 327; see also MO. Mar. 1861, supra note 326, at 15
(describing a delegate’s reluctance to entertain a pro-Confederacy envoy from Georgia because “the
people that have elected us” already voted by a majority of 80,000 against secession).
328 MISSOURI HISTORY, supra note 326, at 324.
329 Id. at 314-15, 332.
330 JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI STATE CONVENTION, HELD AT JEFFERSON CITY, JULY
1861, at 10 (St. Louis, George Knapp & Co. 1861) [hereinafter MO. JULY 1861].
331 Id. at 10-11, 20.
332 Id. at 10.
333 Id. at 30.
334 There were at least twenty-three Reconstruction conventions. See Dinan, supra note 321,
tbl.3. The Reconstruction conventions in my dataset are DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION WHICH ASSEMBLED AT LITTLE ROCK JANUARY 7TH, 1868 (Little Rock, J.G. Price
1868); DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA [1864] (New Orleans, W.R. Fish 1864); THE
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND [1864]
(Annapolis, Richard P Bayly 1864); JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, AUGUST 1865 (Jackson, Miss.,
W.M. Yerger 1865); THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA [1867] (Richmond, Oﬀ. of the New Nation 1868) [hereinafter VA.
1867]; I S.C. 1868, supra note 323.
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secession and regain admission into the union.335 These conventions
ostensibly embodied the people of each state, but they were really the work
of Congressional agents who “brought the South into compliance with the
nation.”336 In doing this, Reconstruction delegates in all states except
Tennessee amended state bills of rights to include “federal supremacy”
provisions. These provisions conspicuously qualiﬁed existing rights by
declaring the supremacy of the federal government and stating that the
people could not “alter or abolish” state government in any manner that would
violate federal law.337 The new provisions were intended to clarify that
although state government was responsible to its people, “the machinery of
state government must conform to [a] superior power and move in harmony
with the General Government.”338
Subsequently, southern democrats regained control of state governments
across the south and held conventions to disfranchise African Americans and
undo the work of the Reconstruction conventions. These conventions almost
universally removed federal supremacy provisions so that southern bills of
rights sounded only in popular sovereignty without mention of federal
constraints.339 They also reinstated an unqualiﬁed right of the people to alter
or abolish government.340 Those changes were intended to reassert that the
people of each state “have the sole and exclusive right to govern [themselves]
in everything which aﬀects [them] as a state, and which is not delegated in
the constitution of the United States to the federal government.”341
The reform of state bills of rights through these seismic transitions
illustrates that their deep structure is to operate as instruments of popular
control over government. During secession, bills of rights were leveraged by
delegates in seceding states as a basis for realizing the people’s desire to leave
the union. And, in Missouri at the beginning of the Civil War, delegates used
the same bill-of-rights provisions as a basis for vacating rogue, secessionist
335 See HERRON, supra note 92, at 121-23 (describing how these Reconstruction conventions
served to formally reunite the southern states with the Union as well as to ally southern states with
one another in alliance against the federal government).
336 Id. at 123; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA [1901], at 1755 (1901) [hereinafter ALA. 1901] (explaining that the ﬁrst
Reconstruction constitution was “framed by aliens” and the second Reconstruction constitution was
framed under the fear that “Congress would interfere”).
337 Some were sperate provisions immediately after the traditional Lockean popular
sovereignty provisions. Others were incorporated into existing popular sovereignty provisions. ARK.
CONST. of 1968, art. 1, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 33; I S.C. 1868, supra note 323, at 270.
338 VA. 1867, supra note 334, at 266; see also I VA. 1901–02, supra note 33, at 313 (commenting
on 1867 provision).
339 HERRON, supra note 92, app. B.
340 Id.
341 GA. 1877, supra note 256, at 98; see also I VA. 1901–02, supra note 33, at 313 (discussing the
importance of states’ rights).
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government oﬃcials.342 Similarly, during Reconstruction, federal supremacy
provisions were intended to emphasize the boundaries of popular control over
state government. The removal of federal supremacy provisions during
disenfranchisement served only to conﬁrm and illustrate that state bills of
rights remained oriented around popular control of government to whatever
extent permissible under federal law.
2. Rights Reform During Reconstruction and Disenfranchisement
It might be argued that the above debates about federal supremacy were
not about constitutional rights per se but were about the general idea of
popular sovereignty within a federal system. On the one hand, this is
precisely the point. The debates reveal that state bills of rights are
fundamentally oriented around popular control over government and not the
lasting entrenchment of any particular right. On the other hand, it is also true
that delegates liberally revised speciﬁc constitutional rights during these
transitions, and the whipsaw nature of these reforms illustrate the ﬂuidity of
state constitutional rights and their responsiveness to popular preferences.343
Reforms regarding equal protection oﬀer a compelling example. Most
state constitutions do not contain an equal protection clause like the
Fourteenth Amendment (even today).344 However, during the latter part of
Reconstruction (1867–1870), several southern conventions added language to
their bills of rights that eﬀectively incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equality guarantee.345 Those provisions coincided with the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and were intended to “establish the civil and political
equality and capacity of the races.”346 Moreover, there was a clear
understanding by delegates that these provisions were championed by
national leaders to assert inﬂuence over state constitutional development.347

See MO. JULY 1861, supra note 330, at 10.
There were sixteen Redemption and Disenfranchisement conventions. See Dinan, supra note
321, tbl.3. My dataset includes the following: ALA. 1901, supra note 336; GA. 1877, supra note 256; MD.
1867, supra note 229; DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 (Isidor
Loeb & Floyd C. Shoemaker eds., 1938); DEBATES IN THE TEXAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1875 (Seth Shepard McKay ed., 1930) [hereinafter TEX. 1875]; Va. 1901–02, supra note 33.
344 Williams, supra note 252, at 1208.
345 See TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 21; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2 (“[N]o laws shall . . .
deny to any person . . . the equal protection of its law.”); LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. I, art. 13; ALA.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2; VA. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 20.
346 VA. 1867, supra note 334, at 227.
347 Id. at 227. Virginia’s 1867 convention is the only Reconstruction convention adopting an
equal-protection clause for which we have debates.
342
343
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During disfranchisement, every southern state except Arkansas removed
Reconstruction-era equal protection provisions.348 These changes were part
of the broader project to eliminate federal inﬂuence on state constitutional
design and disenfranchise African Americans.349 Because Reconstruction
conventions had directed state constitutions away from popular preferences
in favor of national policy regarding race, delegates were eager to restore state
constitutions to “the people” as much as possible.350 In many southern states
this meant removing provisions designed to protect racial minorities so that
white majorities could deploy various strategies to subvert African American
voting rights.351
The result of these popular (and to be clear, white supremacist) movements
was the elimination of minority-oriented equal protection guarantees and the
corresponding introduction of various measures that segregated and
disfranchised African Americans.352 For example, states adopted rights
provisions allowing for a poll tax and provisions that reintroduced the crime
of treason against the state.353 Southern states also removed provisions
explicitly abolishing slavery.354 While these reforms capture a disturbing
period in America’s history, they also illustrate the deep structure of state bills
of rights, which elevates popular control over government above entrenched
legal rights. For better and worse, state constitutional rights are structured to
be tightly aligned with popular preferences.
C. Progressive Era Rights Issues
The Progressive movement arose in the late nineteenth century as America
experienced dramatic industrialization and urbanization.355 The politics of this
period were complex, but a dominant theme was popular frustration with
348 Removal occurred in: TEX. CONST. of 1875, GA. CONST. of 1877, ALA. CONST. of 1901,
VA. CONST. of 1902, LA. CONST. of 1879. My dataset includes debates for Texas, Georgia,
Alabama, and Virginia.
349 See, e.g., ALA. 1901, supra note 336, at 1755-56 (illustrating an eﬀort at the convention to
regain state control).
350 See, e.g., II REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION STATE OF VIRGINIA 3050 (1906) [hereinafter II VA. 1901–02] (describing white
majorities as rejecting national race policy).
351 See, e.g., I VA. 1901–02, supra note 33, at 149-51; see also id. at 160 (“The greatest crime that
ever was perpetrated was the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment.”); id. at 3050 (connecting
language of equal protection provision to right of suﬀrage for African Americans). States sometimes
formalized these rights in articles outside the bill of rights. But they were debated as rights issues
and often assigned to the committee on the bill of rights.
352 HERRON, supra note 92, at 194.
353 Id. at 164-65 (treason); TEX. 1875, supra note 343, at 177 (suggesting the poll tax “had been
intended as a blow at the negroes”).
354 See, e.g., AL. 1901, supra note 336, at 1755-56.
355 TARR, supra note 17, at 150; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1960).
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existing democratic institutions.356 Many Americans believed that government
was unresponsive (or even hostile) to the people and that corporations and
political elites had captured government.357 Progressives sought to restore
government to popular control and address economic inequality for the white
working class.358 Progressives pursued various structural reforms, but they also
gravitated towards state bills of rights to undermine special interests and realign government with popular preferences.359
Here, I focus on debates regarding worker-protection rights and the rights
of workers to unionize. I focus on these issues because they powerfully
illustrate the state conception of constitutional rights and because they
introduce an important development. In many instances, delegates pursued
these rights not only to correct legislative and executive failures but also
because courts had extended traditional constitutional rights (especially
property rights and due process) to block popular reforms. Delegates sought
to realign government with majoritarian preferences by constitutionalizing
new rights that would undo judicial roadblocks. They were, quite explicitly,
reasserting popular control over constitutional rights while subordinating
judicial review.360
1. Workers’ Rights
Between 1870 and 1890, America’s industrial production and labor force
grew dramatically.361 This growth was often unregulated and produced many

MILLER, supra note 87, at 23.
Id. at 28.
TARR, supra note 17, at 150.
See, e.g., KY. 1890, supra note 256, at 452 (“Railroads and other corporations have forgotten
their duty to the people, and need the restraining hand of the law upon them.”); id. at 443-554
(detailing 100+ pages of rigorous debate regarding myriad rights proposals). Some reforms began
earlier but were reinvigorated by Progressives. Various states, for example, debated and adopted
provisions banning imprisonment for debt. ARIZ. 1910, supra note 201, at 664-67. States also targeted
corporations by prohibiting special privileges or monopolies. Id. at 659-60; KY. 1890, supra note 256,
at 452. Eminent domain was also debated. ARIZ. 1910 supra note 201, at 661-64, 894-95; I DAKOTA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION [1885] 291 (1907). The Progressive Era also involved idiosyncratic
rights responsive to particular government failures. In 1910, for example, California
constitutionalized a right to hunt-and-ﬁsh on public lands and prohibited the sale of public lands
without reserving public-use rights. CAL. CONST. art I, § 25. The amendment was triggered by
government’s complicity in corporate plundering of public lands for private development—
especially the sale and closure of public ﬁshing streams. DINAN, supra note 5, at 104.
360 These reforms remained meaningful notwithstanding Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). See ZACKIN, supra note 125, at 134-38 (discussing how these reforms remained meaningful
notwithstanding Lochner); id. at 123-33 (describing how these reforms represented assertions of
popular control over constitutional rights).
361 See generally Joseph H. Davis, An Annual Index of U.S. Industrial Production, 1790–1915, 119
Q.J. ECON. 1177 (2004) (detailing industrial production growth during this period); Joshua L.
356
357
358
359
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new concerns regarding worker safety and exploitation.362 It also spawned a
large class of wealthy and inﬂuential corporations and industrialists who
resisted regulation. Thus, by 1890, there was growing popular concern about
workers’ rights as well as elite capture of state government.363
In this context, reformers looked to state bills of rights to help align state
policy with popular demands for regulation and equity. Reforms included the
right to a “mechanic’s lien,” maximum-hour and minimum-wage provisions,
various worker-safety requirements, and worker-compensation guarantees,
among others. Several states also included provisions in their bills of rights
declaring a general commitment to workers’ rights.364
The convention debates where these rights were forged are striking
because proponents of these reforms were explicit in their use of state
constitutional rights to realign government with popular preferences. These
provisions were unabashedly not about limiting majoritarian politics. To the
contrary, they were deﬁant eﬀorts to realize majoritarian preferences in the
face of powerful special interests and elites who had rendered state
government non-responsive. These debates are especially revealing because
they make clear that in crafting these new rights, some delegates were
reacting to non-responsive legislatures,365 but many were explicitly overriding
judicial decisions construing existing constitutional rights to prohibit popular
legislative reforms.366 In this way, delegates were bulldozing through existing
state government institutions, including judicial review, to reassert popular
control over government policy. These debates and reforms thus reﬂect the
Rosenbloom, The Extent of the Labor Market in the United States, 1870–1914, 22 SOC. SCI. HIST. 287
(1998) (exploring the nature and scope of the labor market in the United States during this period).
362 See TARR, supra note 17, at 115 (describing regulatory challenges that accompanied economic
growth at end of nineteenth century); Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999, CDC (June 11,
1999), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4822a1.htm [https://perma.cc/Y3E6MDG3] (in Allegheny County 526 workers died of “work accidents” in one year). Working
conditions were notoriously poor and dangerous. STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW 167
(2018) (estimating 61 workers per 100,000 employees died in work-related accidents).
363 See TARR, supra note 17, at 115-17 (discussing concerns about corporate capture—especially
by railroads—and worker safety issues during the period after the Civil War); id. at 150-52
(discussing similar themes in context of progressive era); see, e.g., David R. Berman, State Legislators
and Their Constituents: Regulating Arizona Railroads in the Progressive Era, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 812, 814
(1990) (describing these issues in Arizona and the west).
364 Reconstruction conventions in North Carolina and Maryland modified their bills of rights
to include a right for “all men” to “the enjoyment of the proceeds of their own labor” (Maryland) and
the “fruits of their own labor” (North Carolina). MD. DECLARATION OF RTS. of 1864, art. I; N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1. During the Progressive Era, Wyoming and Utah added similar provisions.
WY. CONST. of 1889 art. I, § 22; UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. XVI, § 1 (“The rights of labor shall have
just protection through laws calculated to promote the industrial welfare of the State.”).
365 E.g., I DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS [1869] 269-71 (Springfield, E.L. Merritt & Brother 1870) [hereinafter I ILL. 1869].
366 See, e.g., II PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
THE STATE OF OHIO [1912] 1412-13, 1417 (1913) [hereinafter II OHIO 1912].
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full embodiment of state constitutional rights as a mechanism for enhancing
popular control over government.
The debates regarding the right to a mechanic’s lien and compensation
for work-related injuries are illustrative. The push for a right to a mechanic’s
lien was fundamentally about equity and bargaining power for low-level
workers.367 By the 1880s, construction dealings had evolved to include
subcontractors for delivery of materials and labor.368 Under existing lien law,
unpaid workers and suppliers could obtain a lien on improved property only
if the property owner had not paid the contractor.369 As a result, many subcontractors (mostly low-level workers and suppliers) were the victims of
fraud and “collusion” by “thieving contractors and scoundrelly owners, who
connive to swindle the workman out of his wages.”370
Despite the clear need for reform, state government failed to meet
popular demands for change. The 1889 Idaho debates, for example, reveal that
delegates were unwilling to leave this issue to legislative discretion.371 Instead,
the convention adopted a provision declaring that the legislature “shall
provide” laborers with liens “on the subject matter of their labor.”372 In
California, proponents were frustrated by both legislative inaction and
judicial roadblocks.373 Delegates complained that the legislature had
repeatedly failed to ﬁx the existing lien law despite constant pleas from the
public.374 Delegates also noted that “on account of the construction put upon

367 Mechanic’s lien debates include I DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 84, 104, 220 (Sacramento, J.D.
Young 1880); III DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1393-94, 1417-19 (Sacramento, J.D. Young 1881) [hereinafter III CAL. 1878];
II PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889, at
1389-91 (1912) [hereinafter II Idaho 1889]; and II OHIO 1912, supra note 366, at 1412. On equity and
bargaining power, see III CAL. 1878, supra, at 1417; II OHIO 1912, supra note 366, at 1413-14.
368 See, e.g., Dore v. Sellers, 27 Cal. 588, 591 (1865) (describing the typical arrangement).
369 See McAlpin v. Duncan, 16 Cal. 126, 127-28 (1860); Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N.E. 313, 314 (Ohio 1896).
370 III CAL. 1878, supra note 367, at 1394; id. at 1393 (“[T]wo-thirds of the contracts in the City
of San Francisco for the erection of buildings have been taken by the contractor with the intention
of defrauding the workmen who do the work.”); II OHIO 1912, supra note 366, at 1413 (“I doubt if
there is a delegate in the Convention who does not fully appreciate the injury that is done to material
men and mechanics . . . because of unscrupulous and oftentimes dishonest contractors.”). Once a
property owner claimed to have paid the general contractor, a lien on the property was no longer
available and unpaid subcontractors were left to sue the general contractor based on breach of
contract. This was ineﬃcient compared to a lien. Thus, many subcontractors “preferred to lose their
debts rather than endeavor to enforce the law.” III CAL. 1878, supra note 367, at 1393.
371 II IDAHO 1889, supra note 367, at 1389 (constitutional right was important to “make it
obligatory” on legislature).
372 Id. at 1389.
373 III CAL. 1878, supra note 367, at 1418.
374 See id. at 1418 (legislature failed to ﬁx existing lien law even though it was “of no practical
beneﬁt whatever” and tradesman lobbied reform); id. at 1394.
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[the statute] by the Courts, it is not worth the paper it is written on.”375
Importantly, California delegates frequently drew attention to popular
support for reform on this issue and emphasized that resistance came from
wealthy property owners and corporations.376 The convention therefore
adopted a robust lien provision that could “not be overturned . . . by the
decision of any Court in this state.”377
Ohio’s experience with the mechanic’s lien is especially illustrative. In 1896,
the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in Palmer v. Tingle that Ohio’s recently updated
mechanic’s lien law was unconstitutional.378 The new statutory provisions were
designed to protect subcontractors from non-paying general contractors by
directly granting liens on any property for which someone performed labor or
furnished materials.379 The court held that the statute violated the state bill of
rights because it was an unlawful taking of the owner’s property to pay the
contractor’s debts.380 Delegates at Ohio’s 1912 convention targeted Palmer.381
They emphasized that the court’s ruling resulted in “millions” in losses to
hardworking “material men [and] laborers” and that the only beneficiaries of
the ruling were those who “deliberately set out to defeat justice.”382 Because
the court’s ruling was a “bulwark in opposition to” correcting these unpopular
evils, the convention adopted a mechanic’s lien provision for the explicit
purpose of “correct[ing]” the court’s ruling in Palmer.383
The debates regarding rights to compensation for workplace injuries
provide another example. By the mid-1870s, work-related injuries were a major
Id. at 1418.
See id. at 1394 (stating that the adoption of a right to a mechanic’s lien “will be one of the
best arguments in favor of the adoption of this Constitution” by the people); id. at 1417 (“[I]t must be
remembered that wealthy men always have the means of protecting themselves. It is an easy matter
for them to require and obtain security . . . .”); id. at 1394 (noting that the spirit of the convention
was “restriction of corporations,” and the lien proposal would “protect the laboring man and mechanic
from thieving contractors and scoundrelly owners, who connive to swindle the workman out of his
wages. This is the most important provision that has been before the Convention.”).
377 See id. The right adopted by the convention granted workers a lien on any property they
improved. Id. at 1520. The idea was to shift collection costs to the property owner and contractor,
who were “wealthy men [with] the means [to] protect[] themselves.” Id. at 1417; id. at 1394 (“If we
place this responsibility upon the owner, he will take it upon himself to know that the contractors
are responsible parties, and he will see that the mechanics and laboring men are paid as they go
along.”); Hampton v. Christensen, 84 P. 200, 203 (Cal. 1906) (amendment had desired aﬀect).
378 45 N.E. 313, 315-16 (Ohio 1896).
379 Id. at 314.
380 Id. at 315-16.
381 II OHIO 1912, supra note 366, at 1412-13, 1417.
382 Id. at 1413-14.
383 Id. at 1414-18. The provision provided that the legislature could adopt laws ensuring that
workers obtained “their just dues by direct lien upon the property, upon which they have bestowed
labor or for which they have furnished materials.” OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. II, § 33 (adopted
1912). Similar provisions were adopted in response to a court ruling in Minnesota. See DINAN,
supra note 5, at 192.
375
376
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problem. However, courts continued to apply various outmoded common law
doctrines that shielded employers from liability for their injured workers.384
Legislatures could, of course, adjust those rules to assist workers, but they
generally succumbed to pressure from railroads and corporations.385
Legislatures were especially fickle and resistant to change.386 In Virginia, for
example, delegates complained that “at every [legislative] session we have been
met by the attorneys for the railroads insisting that these people should not be
protected in their lives and limbs; holding that the property of the railroad
should be protected in preference to the lives and limbs of our fellow-citizens.”387
Thus, delegates in various states advocated for constitutionalizing workers’
compensation rights as an end-run around corporate influence on legislatures.388
However, even when legislatures did act, state courts posed an existential
threat to those reforms.389 A watershed case was Ives v. South Buﬀalo Ry. Co.,
in which the New York Court of Appeals held that New York’s 1910 workers’
compensation statute was unconstitutional.390 The Court held that the statute
was an unconstitutional taking because it imposed liability without requiring

384 DINAN, supra note 5, at 194 (arguing that amendments modifying contributory negligence,
fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption-of-the-risk doctrine added to the constitution to protect workers).
385 Id. at 195.
386 In Wisconsin, for example, the legislature abolished the fellow-servant doctrine as a bar to
railroad liability, but it revived the doctrine just a few years later. Id. at 195.
387 See II VA. 1901–02, supra note 350, at 2839, 2841 (equating the right to workers’
compensation with traditional property and due process rights); ARIZ. 1910, supra note 201, at 545
(“For twenty-ﬁve years labor has been knocking at the doors of the legislature for an employers’
liability act, and has not gotten it . . . .”); II JOURNAL OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION [1919], at 1687 (1919) (advocating for reform because of corruption in how “the
compensation law is administered” and encouraging “something be put in the Constitution that
would hold it as a club over these fellows”).
388 II VA. 1901–02, supra note 350, at 2839; ARIZ. 1910, supra note 201, at 545 (“[T]his is one
method of impressing it upon [the legislature] that we want [labor protections].”); I ILL. 1869, supra
note 365, at 266 (advocating for new rights to protect injured miners and asserting that existing
constitutional rights were “incomplete” because they “throw[] around the property of the rich a
protection which no Legislature or executive or judiciary can disregard” but “failed to aﬀord to the
operative miner protection in his life [and] limbs”); IV OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF
SEPTEMBER 1890, TO ADOPT, AMEND OR CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
KENTUCKY 4763-64 (Frankfort, Kentucky, E. Polk Johnson 1890) (recounting how the legislature
had failed to address consistent pressure for reform regarding mine conditions and thus
constitutional rights were necessary to address legislative failure); II NEB. 1919, supra note 387, at
1673 (existing statutory scheme is “wrong and insuﬃcient as far as protecting the workman is
concerned” and constitutional rights should be adopted to remedy legislative failure); id. at 1657,
1687 (noting the popularity of labor reforms).
389 DINAN, supra note 5, at 191 (listing state cases striking down workers protection statutes).
390 94 N.E. 431, 448 (N.Y. 1911); see also Thomas Reed Powell, The Workmen’s Compensation
Cases, 32 POL. SCI. Q. 542, 542 (1917) (describing the case’s signiﬁcance).
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a demonstration of fault.391 Popular outcry against the opinion was swift.392
The judge who authored the opinion lost an election in 1913, voters quickly
approved a constitutional amendment to the state bill of rights overturning
the opinion, and the legislature immediately re-enacted a workers’
compensation scheme.393
Ives crystallized broader concerns that state courts might invalidate
workers’ compensation schemes.394 Delegates in Arizona, Ohio, and
Nebraska, for example, advocated for constitutionalizing workers’
compensation rights for the express purpose of controlling and preempting
judicial review. In Arizona, delegates were clear that workers’ compensation
rights should be constitutionalized so that “courts cannot declare [legislative
relief] unconstitutional.”395 In Ohio, delegates wanted to eliminate “any
further fear of a constitutional question being raised again on this matter.”396
And, in Nebraska, delegates argued for constitutionalizing workers’ rights to
preempt the “ﬂowery talks” of “trash [corporate] lawyers,” who “will be sure
and say it is not constitutional.”397
In short, constitutionalizing workers’ rights during the Progressive Era is
a powerful example of how state constitutional rights are designed to operate
as a mechanism for popular control over government.
2. Labor Rights
The Progressive Era also ushered in new state constitutional rights related
to collective bargaining and the so-called “right to work.”398 At first, these
provisions were enacted in response to concerns about corporate influence on
legislatures and voter intimidation.399 In North Dakota, Utah, and Arizona, for
Ives, 94 N.E. at 448.
See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 175-77 (2004) (describing the
critiques of Ives).
393 DINAN, supra note 5, at 196-97; see also N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 17 (stating that laborers
have the right to organize and bargain collectively, no laborer performing public work may work
more than eight hours a day or ﬁve days per week, and no laborer may be paid less than the prevailing
wage in the same trade).
394 DINAN, supra note 5, at 196.
395 ARIZ. 1910, supra note 201, at 545.
396 II OHIO 1912, supra note 366, at 1346.
397 II NEB. 1919, supra note 387, at 1688.
398 Reforms began in the Progressive Era but extended into later portions of the twentieth
century. I address them here because of their temporal, conceptual, and political connection to
Progressive workers’ reforms.
399 See OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FIRST
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF NORTH DAKOTA [1889], at 371 (Bismarck, N.D., Tribune
1889) [hereinafter N.D. 1889] (recounting how corporations implicitly threatened employees for not
voting for corporate candidates); II OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO
391
392
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example, conventions adopted provisions prohibiting employers from
exchanging lists of “troublesome” employees.400 An important reason for those
provisions was to stop the practice of “blacklisting” employees who did not vote
for an employer’s chosen candidate.401 Delegates sought to limit this practice
by crafting new constitutional rights for workers that would restore democratic
processes and undermine the improper influence of special interests.402
These early provisions eventually gave way to new provisions in state bills
of rights protecting the rights of workers to unionize.403 The convention
debates reveal that delegates sought to constitutionalize union rights for three
main reasons. First, there was concern that legislatures might succumb to
corporate inﬂuence and undermine collective bargaining.404 These new rights
were intended to ensure that state government aligned with popular
preferences. Second, delegates again worried that courts might invalidate
collective bargaining legislation as violating existing constitutional rights. By
making collective bargaining rights coordinate with other traditional
constitution rights, delegates intended to preempt hostile court decisions.405

ADOPT A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 1047 (Salt Lake City, Star Printing Co. 1898)
[hereinafter II UTAH 1895] (noting that a provision prohibiting blacklisting protects against the
“political and commercial control” of employers); ARIZ. 1910, supra note 201, at 832-35.
400 See ARIZ. 1910, supra note 201, at 832-33 (“The blacklist is a list exchange between
corporations especially . . . listing a man for violating certain ethics of corporations. . . . It is done
for the purpose of preventing their employment.”); N.D. 1889, supra note 399, at 365-71, 532-37,
626; id. at 367 (blacklists are a “means of punishing men who have banded themselves together for
mutual protection”).
401 N.D. 1889, supra note 399, at 371 (stating that corporations implied employees would be
eliminated from the industry by blacklisting if the employee did not vote for the corporation’s candidate).
402 II UTAH 1895, supra note 399, at 1047 (explaining the “great power” of corporations to
pervert democracy).
403 See N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 17 (“Employees shall have the right to organize and to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.”); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 12
(1944 amended, now § 6, to include: “The right of employees, by and through a labor organization,
to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged.); MO. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 29
(“[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1947,
art. I, ¶ 19 (granting workers in the private sector the right to organize and bargain and allowing
public sector employees to organize and present their grievances to the government); HAW. CONST.
of 1959, art. XII, §§ 1–2 (amended 1968) (same); WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 22 (granting laborers
the right to secure compensation and promote their industrial welfare to the state).
404 II REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK [1938], at 1246 (1938) [hereinafter II N.Y. 1838] (describing the “small minority” of corporate
employers “mobilizing a movement”).
405 IV CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967 DEBATES [MARYLAND] 2307 (1968)
[hereinafter IV MD. 1967] (arguing the importance of having this right in the constitution because
courts are conservative in regards to labor rights); II N.Y. 1938, supra note 404, at 1218 (stating that
without a right in the Constitution, courts do not have a standard). On the general history of these
provisions, see Robert F. Williams, Can State Constitutions Block the Workers’ Compensation Race to the
Bottom?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1081, 1086-1111 (2017).
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Finally, a few delegates argued that modern economic realities meant
that the right to unionize had become “deep seated,” “inalienable,” and
“fundamental” in the same way as traditional constitutional rights.406 It was
therefore proper, they argued, to place it beyond the reach of temporary
reactionary politics.407 The idea was that unions might be unpopular from
time to time, but the right to organize should be secured from temporary
passions.408 This conception of workers’ rights hints at a countermajoritarian justification. And, to be sure, placing these rights in state
constitutions likely provides a higher degree of permanence than ordinary
legislation (although not always).409
However, it is probably a stretch to understand the right to unionize as a
counter-majoritarian measure. For one thing, these amendments have
remained subject to ordinary amendment processes. In at least four states
with these provisions, amendment rules allow for repeal by simple
majorities.410 In Florida, it could be repealed by initiative.411 Although these
states have made multiple adjustments and changes to their bills of rights,
including changes to traditional rights, the right to unionize remains
unchanged. Moreover, while ﬁve states adopted the right to unionize, nine
states have adopted competing right-to-work provisions that limit a union’s
ability to require employees to join or pay union dues.412 The debates show
that a principal reason for supporting the right to work (and opposing a right
to unionize) was popular concern about the growing inﬂuence of unions on
state legislators.413 Thus, the persistence of these rights seems grounded in
406 I S TATE OF N EW J ERSEY C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF 1947, at 323, 327
(1947) [hereinafter I N.J. 1947] (“deep-seated” and “inalienable”); II N.Y. 1938, supra note
404, at 1246 (“fundamental”).
407 I N.J. 1947, supra note 406, at 325 (arguing in support of the labor amendment because it
would guarantee labor rights even if public opinion shifted).
408 The NLRA of 1935 oﬀers some national protections under federal statute. National Labor
Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codiﬁed at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169).
409 See DINAN, supra note 5, at 203-04 (explaining that the 2013 New Jersey minimum wage
constitutional amendment was easier to achieve than ordinary legislation when the legislature was
controlled by Democrats and the governor was Republican).
410 For an overview of current amendment rules in all ﬁfty states, see COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, supra note 72, at 8 tbl.1.4, 10 tbl.1.5; See also id. (listing New Jersey (simple majorities with
successive session); Missouri (simple majority); Hawaii (simple majority with successive session);
New York (simple majority with successive session)).
411 See id. at 10, tbl.1.5; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (amendment by initiative).
412 See DINAN, supra note 5, at 248 (discussing the developmental history of right-to-work
policies); id. at 204-05 (discussing collective bargaining rights over time).
413 See STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD 2871
(Austin C. Knapp & Lynn M. Nethaway eds., 1961) [hereinafter MICH. 1961] (discussing the fear
that compulsory unionization removes workers’ choices and exerts disproportionate inﬂuence on
lawmakers); II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII 1950, at 67879 (1961) [hereinafter II HAW. 1950] (labor might “become[] [so] harmful to the public as the public
has decreed such monopolies to be harmful when held entirely by industry”).
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popular perceptions (which vary between states) about which special interest
poses the greatest concern to the political process at any particular time. This,
of course, is perfectly consistent with the state approach to constitutional
rights as mechanisms of popular control over government.
D. Twentieth Century Rights Issues
Conventional accounts of American constitutional rights point to the
twentieth century as the period when constitutional rights came to fruition
because only then did the Supreme Court begin to apply the Federal Bill of
Rights to the states and expand individual protections.414 I have argued above
that notwithstanding those accounts, the states remained actively engaged in
rights development since Founding through popular political processes.
Here, I show that this continued into the twentieth century as state bills of
rights were at the center of evolving popular demands from government. Two
trends in the debates are especially illustrative. First, states adopted various
positive rights as a strategy for prodding government toward a more activist
approach to regulation. Second, some states used their bills of rights to
formalize equality and anti-discrimination norms and push government to
realize those norms. In both instances, states continued to use their bills of
rights to realign government with popular expectations and preferences.415
1. Positive Economic and Environmental Rights
The Supreme Court has been clear that the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights “confer no aﬃrmative right” to governmental aid or
intervention “even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property.”416 Federal rights are solely a “limitation on the State’s power to
414 See Rutland, supra note 56, at 12 (oﬀering this account and referencing Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931), as emblematic of the beginning of the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the
bill of rights against the states).
415 An anecdotal illustration of this theme is New Jersey’s 1947 Bill of Rights, which was
celebrated for including several updates such as an Equal Rights Amendment prohibiting gender
discrimination, a collective bargaining right, and a ban on segregation in public schools. See generally
Bernard K. Freamon, The Origins of the Anti-Segregation Clause in the New Jersey Constitution, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1267 (2004) (describing the anti-segregation provision); Richard A. Goldberg &
Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers’ Organizational and Collective Bargaining Rights in New Jersey:
Implementing Self-Executing State Constitutional Rights, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 729 (1987) (describing the
union right for farmworkers); Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating
Their Eﬀectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1202 n.6
(2005) (describing New Jersey’s groundbreaking gender-discrimination provision). Commenting on
those rights provisions, Governor Driscoll described the new bill of rights as expressing the “social,
political, and economic ideals of the present day.” ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE
CONSTITUTION 47 (1997).
416 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
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act.”417 Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected a federal due process or equal
protection right to minimum levels of aﬃrmative ﬁnancial assistance418 and a
fundamental right to adequately funded public education.419
State electorates have taken a very diﬀerent approach.420 During the
twentieth century, states debated and adopted various positive rights,
including rights to minimal economic security (including healthcare) and
rights to a clean and healthful environment.421 The conventions where these
rights were forged reveal that they are more than a novelty; the debates reﬂect
a nuanced understanding that popular expectations for government had
evolved because of new economic and social conditions.422 Delegates were
concerned that government was failing to address contemporary realities and
drifting further from the people.423 Thus, delegates looked to state bills of
rights to memorialize those expectations and re-direct oﬃcials towards more
active governance.424
The debates regarding positive economic rights illustrate this. A principal
argument in favor of new economic security rights was that negative rights
were no longer suﬃcient to provide citizens with real opportunities to enjoy
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”425 Delegates argued that in prior
Id. at 195.
See Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1970) (holding that setting family caps on
financial aid did not violate larger families’ Due Process or Equal Protection rights under the
federal Constitution).
419 San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973) (holding that diﬀerences
in school funding across districts based on diﬀerent property taxes did not violate the Due Process
or Equal Protection rights of students in worse-funded districts in part because students did not
have a federal right to a funded-public education).
420 See ZACKIN, supra note 125; DINAN, supra note 134, at 184-221 (describing various historical
eﬀorts to secure social, political, and economic rights on both federal and state levels).
421 See DINAN, supra note 134, at 220 (broadly describing the passing of and diﬀerences
between various state environmental rights provisions).
422 See also IV MD. 1967, supra note 405, at 2434 (noting that a “constitution is an instrument
of government” and it should include expressions of the people’s social aspirations in addition to
legal conditions); II HAW. 1950, supra note 413, at 549 (claiming that American constitutions have
historically captured “the philosophy and thinking of the people” in that time and place).
423 The 1950 Hawaii debate is a powerful example. See II HAW. 1950, supra note 413, at 549. A
delegate argued that the legislature was non-responsive to popular support for greater government
intervention regarding healthcare because that would require the legislature to act in a manner that
was fundamentally diﬀerent from how it understood its restrained role under prior constitutions.
Id. According to the delegate, the legislature had failed to deliver on the people’s demands because
“there was no path of philosophy along which the legislature could provide legislation.” Id. The idea
seems to be that the people wanted government to reconstitute itself around a new set of
expectations and functions, but this gigantic shift required an aﬃrmative declaration from the people
of the rights that they expected from government.
424 See, e.g., II CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967 DEBATES [MARYLAND] 1206 (1967)
[hereinafter II MD. 1967].
425 See II PROCEEDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968, at 41
(1972) [hereinafter II HAW. 1968] (referring to positive economic rights as part of the “enjoyment
417
418
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eras, where economies and commodity production were simpler, citizens
could ﬂourish so long as the constitution provided for political freedom.426
But in a complex industrial society, most citizens needed both the absence of
despotism and the aﬃrmative help of the community to succeed.427 Thus,
delegates emphasized that real opportunities for liberty required government
to provide some minimal ﬁnancial entitlements.428
Importantly, delegates also emphasized that the people wanted and
needed this type of government.429 A 1967 Maryland delegate argued that the
people wanted government to provide ﬁnancial security because “[t]here is
no freedom without economic freedom[; t]here is no liberty without
economic freedom, and there is no life, real life, without economic
security.”430 Another delegate at the same convention argued that positive
economic rights were critical because “people throughout the State of
Maryland” want rights that “they can see and . . . can really put their teeth
into.”431 At Hawaii’s 1968 convention, a delegate argued that it was important
to include economic rights as “a strong expression of the people of Hawaii as
to the kind of economic right we believe that each and every one of us in the
State of Hawaii is entitled to.”432 And a delegate at an earlier Hawaii
convention explained that the responsibility of the state was to conform to
the “philosophy and thinking of the people,” which now demanded certain
aﬃrmative protections.433
Relatedly, delegates also anticipated that courts might strike down
legislation seeking to deliver economic entitlements. Thus, they were clear
that a pragmatic reason for adopting strong economic rights was to prevent
courts from undoing progressive economic legislation.434 A 1938 New York
delegate asserted, for example, that economic rights were important to “set

of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”); II MD. 1967, supra note 424, at 1206 (“[O]ur times
and those ahead of us require us to establish economic securities. If man cannot be free economically
from want, of what avail is the ballot?”).
426 See II MD. 1967, supra note 424, at 1206 (describing the historical shift in priorities from
political freedom to vote and partake in government to economic freedom and protection of
individuals and the economy at large through regulation).
427 Id.
428 See IV MD. 1967, supra note 405, at 2908 (failure to include economic rights “gut[ted]” the
constitution because “people cannot eat political rights”).
429 See II HAW. 1950, supra note 413, at 549; II HAW. 1968, supra note 425, at 41.
430 IV MD. 1967, supra note 405, at 2439.
431 Id. at 2908.
432 II HAW. 1968, supra note 425, at 41.
433 II HAW. 1950, supra note 413, at 549.
434 See II N.Y. 1938, supra note 404, at 2144 (recounting the unanimous decision to adopt social
welfare policies); id. at 2126 (expressing the desire to maintain New York’s good reputation for
helping its neediest citizens); id. at 2155 (discussing measures taken to ensure that future medical
insurance measures would be constitutional).
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forth a deﬁnite policy of government, a concrete social obligation which no
court may ever misread.”435 Ultimately, economic rights were about aligning
government with new popular expectations by reconstituting legislative
polestars to secure more interventionist policies.436
The debates regarding environmental rights are also illustrative.
Proponents of environment rights argued that the industrial revolution
created new popular concerns about the environment at the very core of
individual liberty.437 Delegates emphasized that a healthy environment is a
pre-condition to traditional rights, and, therefore, government would fail at
its most basic obligations if it did not expand its regulatory horizon to include
environmental issues.438
Here again, delegates were aware that a shift to more activists and
interventionist policies would likely require affirmative guidance and
declarations from the people.439 This was especially true because
environmental policy presented unique externalities and collective action
problems and had the potential to restructure property rights.440 Thus,
delegates emphasized that clear, bold environmental rights were important for
reorganizing government around new popular values and expectations.441 A
1969 Illinois delegate emphasized that environmental rights were important

Id. at 2126.
Illinois’s provisions guaranteeing a right to state pension and retirement beneﬁts is another
example. See ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the
State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall
be an enforceable contractual relationship, the beneﬁts of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.”). That provision was debated by the 1969 convention and the debates reveal that it was
intended to ensure that legislatures did not treat state retirement funds as “bounties which could be
changed or even recalled as a matter of complete legislative discretion.” RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION [1969], at 2925 (1970) [hereinafter ILL. 1969].
The provision was also intended to ensure that courts did not allow legislatures to undermine
retirement systems. Id. The provision was about responding to a particular government failure.
437 See VI RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973, at 125355 (1977) [hereinafter VI LA. 1973] (discussing concerns about the impact of polluting industries on
statewide health); V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971–1972, at 1258-59 (1981)
[hereinafter V MONT. 1971] (highlighting a debate among delegates about whether liberty requires
safeguarding the environment and avoiding pollution); id. at 1260 (equating environment with
traditional liberty).
438 See II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK [1967], at 941 (1967) (stating the imperative to preserve the environment since key parts of
New York State are islands and subject to coastal erosion and other environmental issues); ILL. 1969,
supra note 436, at 2991 (discussing the belief in the fundamental right to a “healthful environment”).
439 See V MONT. 1971, supra note 437, at 1257-58 (outlining that the constitutional convention
is tasked with voicing citizens’ concerns).
440 See id. at 1260-62 (discussing the legal complexities of enforcing environmental regulations
with negative externalities over private property rights).
441 See MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 2611 (emphasizing that clear language addressing the
convergence of health and environmental concerns is essential in crafting eﬀective policy).
435
436
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because they expressed “hopes and aspirations of the people.”442 Similarly, a
1961 Michigan delegate argued that constitutional rights reveal “an ordering of
values” and it was therefore important to add new environmental rights to
“proclaim by this constitution a high value on these matters.”443
2. Equal Protection and Antidiscrimination Norms
A striking feature of contemporary state constitutions is that only ﬁfteen
states have an equal protection guarantee and eleven of those were added after
1960.444 Indeed, before 1900, most activity regarding equal protection
involved the removal of provisions during disfranchisement in protest of
Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination norms.445 To be sure, state
constitutions contain other long-standing provisions that touch on equality,446
but those provisions have very diﬀerent origins. Jacksonian Equality
provisions, for example, targeted government corruption by prohibiting
favoritism for corporations and elites.447 And Lockean equality provisions
were a rejection of parliamentary sovereignty and hereditary right in favor of
popular sovereignty and majority rule.448 Nor were courts any help in this

ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 3020 (statements of Delegate Orlando Tomei).
MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 2611. For a discussion of the non-convention history of other
environmental rights provisions in state constitutions, see Erin Daly & James R. May, Robinson
Township v. Pennsylvania: A Model for Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 151,
151-52 (2015); John C. Dernbach & Edmund J. Sonnenberg, A Legislative History of Article I, Section
27 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 24 WIDENER L.J. 181, 184-86 (2015); and
John C. Dernbach, Kenneth T. Kristl & James R. May, Recognition of Environmental Rights for
Pennsylvania Citizens: Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 70 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (2018).
444 See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (2008) (noting that eight of fifteen current state constitutions with equal
protection classes were adopted after 1970). Michigan added its provision in 1962. Connecticut
adopted its provision in 1965. Maine adopted its equal protection clause in 1963. States also adopted
antidiscrimination norms in their civil service provisions. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (“No
appointments, promotions, demotions or removals in the classified service shall be made for religious,
racial or partisan considerations.”); MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 741 (explaining that the
antidiscrimination clause regarding civil service was added to the constitution in 1940). States also
adopted equal rights amendments. See Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights
Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 144, 144 (1984); V MONT. 1971, supra note 437, at 1642
(discussing the adoption of an amendment guaranteeing equal protection based on gender); ILL. 1969,
supra note 437, at 325 (discussing language to be included in a proposed equal rights amendment).
445 See HERRON, supra note 92, at 216. For example, Georgia adopted its provision in 1868 (during
Reconstruction), removed it 1877 (during disenfranchisement), and re-adopted it in 1983. Robert N.
Katz, The History of the Georgia Bill of Rights, 3 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 83, 112-13 [verified] (1986).
446 See generally Williams, supra note 252 (tracing such state constitutional provisions over time).
447 Supra subsection III.A.1.
448 See Williams, supra note 252, at 1198-1200 (showing how early state constitutional equality
provisions were intended as rejections of British colonial rule and royal privileges).
442
443
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regard. There was essentially no state civil liberties jurisprudence before the
twentieth century, especially regarding anti-discrimination.449
So why did some states adopt broad-based equality guarantees during the
twentieth century? And what do these new provisions indicate about the
nature of state constitutional rights? If viewed through the lens of federal
constitutional rights jurisprudence, we might expect them to indicate a
change in approach to state constitutional rights. After all, Fourteenth
Amendment equal-protection jurisprudence provides marque examples of
rights as entrenched limits on democratic majorities.450 And the debates make
clear that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, these provisions were intended
to introduce anti-discrimination norms into state constitutionalism.
However, the debates suggest a wholly different approach to
constitutionalizing equal protection. First, it is clear that these provisions were
intended to signal contemporary popular preferences regarding equality and
anti-discrimination.451 Delegates felt that it was important to constitutionalize
equal protection, not to bind future majorities, but to solemnly express the
values of the current electorate.452 Indeed, delegates often suggested (quite
audaciously) that their state should celebrate its record on equality by

449 See TARR, supra note 17, at 163 (“[P]rior to the 1930s state courts failed to develop a coherent
body of law relating to . . . civil liberties concerns.”). Indeed, a recurring reason for adopting equal
protection clauses in the twentieth century was their conspicuous absence. See II N.Y. 1938, supra
note 404, at 1065-66 (explaining the convention took on the task of adopting an equal protection
provision because the state constitution was then “barren” of any such protection); MICH. 1961, supra
note 413, at 741 (noting that it was not until 1940 that Michigan adopted any anti-discrimination
provision); ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 1499 (“Our constitution in Illinois has not had that type of
provision heretofore.”); id. at 1596 (“This is a new right. It . . . is a departure from what has been
historic and what has been traditional.”); VI LA. 1973, supra note 437, at 1022 (asserting antidiscrimination “nowhere” in old constitution).
450 DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 226-27 (explaining that Fourteenth Amendment equality rights
trump otherwise legitimate democratic policies).
451 See ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 1593 (“The testimony was almost . . . uniformly in favor of
some kind of antidiscrimination clause. . . . It seems to us that in the year 1970 that the right to be
free from discrimination because you have a diﬀerent color or a diﬀerent religion or a diﬀerent
national ancestry are very, very basic rights and are eminently properly included in the
constitution.”); MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 742-43 (“[T]his . . . would be in keeping with the most
modern and authoritative statement of our purpose and objectives as a nation.”); PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT [1965], at 69192 (1965) [hereinafter CONN. 1965] (characterizing an anti-discrimination constitutional provision
as “symbolic language” to indicate the state “unequivocally oppose[s] the philosophy and the practice
of segregation”); VI LA. 1973, supra note 437, at 1016 (arguing that provision should be adopted to
“lead our own citizens to a body politic in which we recognize the sacredness of the individual”); V
MONT. 1971, supra note 437, at 1642-43 (noting that provision reﬂected “considerable support . . .
and lack of opposition”).
452 See, e.g., V MONT. 1971, supra note 437, at 1636-37 (noting that rights changes were the result
of issues raised by considerable testimony from the public regarding issues of contemporary concern
that the legislature had failed to address, in this instance, “the genuine needs of low-income people”).
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announcing equal protection in the constitution.453 There was essentially no
discussion of constitutionalizing these rights as a form of pre-commitment. To
the contrary, delegates focused on ensuring that the constitutional language
accurately captured popular sentiment and did not overstep what the public
was likely to endorse.454 Moreover, there was no discussion of excluding these
provisions from future amendment or subjecting them to higher amendment
thresholds. The debates presumed that future generations might adjust or
change these guarantees as necessary or desirable to them.455 Thus, Robert
Williams has aptly concluded that these provisions “did not direct, but merely
recorded, the currents of social change.”456
Second, delegates also argued that constitutionalizing equal protection was
important for purposes of aligning government with popular preferences.457
For example, Illinois delegates amended the state’s antidiscrimination
provision to declare that “these rights are enforceable without action by the
General Assembly.”458 This was added because of fear that state courts might
not enforce the constitutional provision without enabling legislation, and the
related fear that the legislature would continue to ignore popular pressure for
anti-discrimination legislation.459 Similarly, delegates in various states argued
that their constitutions should list specific protected classes that the Supreme
453 See CONN. 1965, supra note 451, at 695-96 (lauding Connecticut’s record of civil rights
protections and claiming “there is no state in the entire union that has more comprehensive and
more liberal legislation with reference to the exercise of political and civil rights, than does the little
sovereign State of Connecticut”); MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 744-46 (arguing an equal protection
provision should capture “rights that we presently are enjoying”).
454 In Illinois, for example, the debate was consumed by whether equal protection should be
clariﬁed to include “the unborn.” ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 1499, 1522, 1595 (“[W]e also had in
mind . . . the salability of this product to the people of the state of Illinois . . . .”). Other states
debated popular support for extending non-discrimination norms to private actors since the
Supreme Court limited the Fourteenth Amendment to state action. MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at
741; accord MONT. 1971, supra note 437, at 1642-43 (arguing anti-discrimination limitations should be
placed upon private agencies to “remove the apparent type of discrimination that all of us object to
with respect to employment, to rental practices, to actual associationship in matters that are public
or matters that tend to be somewhat quasi-public”).
455 Indeed, the conventions that first introduced equal protection and anti-discrimination norms
also adopted some of the most liberal amendment procedures. DINAN, supra note 134, at 56 nn.106-07.
456 WILLIAMS, supra note 252, at 1211 (quoting JAMES HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 246 (1950)). For an in-depth analysis of Pennsylvania’s 1967 equality
guarantee as directed towards recalcitrant state government and an outdated negative conception of
equality, see Robert F. Williams, A Row of Shadows: Pennsylvania’s Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its
State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343, 365-66 (1993).
457 See, e.g., MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 740-42 (arguing the “encroachment of the corporate
structure of the state” is a danger to equal protection).
458 ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 1596.
459 Id. at 1596-98 (“[T]his was an attempt to override the nonaction of the Illinois
legislature . . . .”); MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 743 (“We don’t want any kind of ‘let George do it,
leave it to the legislature, pass the buck.’ We want it spelled out in the constitution.”); MONT. 1971,
supra note 437, at 1645 (asserting a constitutional provision should be “self-executing”).
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Court did not recognize under the Fourteenth Amendment.460 The
implication being that although the Fourteenth Amendment would permit
state government to target certain groups, the people of the state did not want
their government to exercise that liberty.
Third, delegates also emphasized that equal protection guarantees were
intended to demand a more activist approach to equality by state
government.461 These arguments were analogous to those oﬀered in support
of positive economic and environmental rights.462 Delegates emphasized that
the people wanted government to ensure “the speciﬁc means of equality . . .
by stating simply, clearly, and enforceably [sic] the right to equal opportunity
of each to be educated, to get a job, to buy a home.”463 Constitutionalizing
equal protection was about imposing a new aﬃrmative obligation on state
government and not simply prohibiting certain classiﬁcations.464 In this
460 See VI LA. 1973, supra note 437, at 1021 (debating “gender” or “sex” as protected classes);
MONT. 1971, supra note 437, at 1642-43 (“Considerable testimony was heard concerning the need to
include sex in any equal protection or freedom from discrimination provisions.”); see also MICH.
1961, supra note 413, at 742 (debating whether to list categories of “race, color, religion, national origin
or ancestry” and prohibit private discrimination).
461 See ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 1586 (claiming the goal of equal protection was “to
eliminate . . . poverty and to eliminate inequality”); MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 743 (asserting that
equal protection is the “right to equal opportunity of each to be educated, to get a job, to buy a home”).
462 Indeed, the debates sometimes read as if equal protection was understood as a positive
right. See, e.g., MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 741 (“Employment, housing, public accommodations
and education are fundamental rights in our complex society. Without equal access to the enjoyment
of these rights the individual is deprived of his full stature as a man and is deprived of his right of
full equality as a citizen.”).
463 MICH. 1961, supra note 413, at 743.
464 See ILL. 1969, supra note 436, at 1586 (stating equal-protection proposal was a “more positive
stand” to “eliminate . . . poverty and . . . inequality”). Beyond the generic equal protection
provisions, states have adopted a variety of other equality guarantees and antidiscrimination
provisions. A good example is the adoption of state Equal Rights Amendments prohibiting forms
of gender discrimination. See generally DINAN, supra note 5, at 81-84 (outlining the history of statelevel adoption of such constitutional provisions); see also Wharton, supra note 415, at 1288-93 (listing
all ERAs with date of adoption). Many of these provisions were adopted outside of constitutional
conventions, but several were adopted by conventions (California, 1879; Hawaii 1978; Illinois 1971,
Louisiana 1974; Montana 1978; New Hampshire 1974; New Jersey 1947; Rhode Island 1986; Utah
1896; Wyoming 1890). See also DINAN, supra note 134, at 8, tbl.1-1 (cross-referencing Dinan’s list of
conventions with Wharton’s dates-of-adoption for ERA amendments reveals which amendments
were adopted outside and within conventions). The debates reﬂect themes similar to the states’
experience with equal protection: support for the ERAs was driven by the delegates’ belief that state
populations supported these provisions (especially in the face of limited gender protections oﬀered
by the Supreme Court and an uncertain outcome regarding the federal Equal Rights Amendment).
See, e.g., IV MONTANA 1971, supra note 437, at 1642 (“The committee felt that such inclusion was
eminently proper and saw no reason for the state to wait for the adoption of the federal equal rights
amendment or any amendment which would not explicitly provide as much protection as this
provision.”); ILLINOIS 1969, supra note 436, at 3668-78 (detailing debates regarding ERA).
Moreover, it is notable that a variety of these eﬀorts failed at referenda along similar lines to the
ratiﬁcation votes for the Federal ERA. See DINAN, supra note 5, at 83 (“Voters rejected a number of
state ERAs that appeared on the ballot from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s.”).

926

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 853

sense, constitutionalizing equal protection was about re-constituting state
government around a more activist and interventionist approach to equality.
Thus, these provisions are best understood as another effort by state
electorates to align government policies and priorities with popular preferences.
They were primarily about ensuring that a momentous change in social policy
was delivered by government consistent with popular expectations.465
IV. UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
My primary purpose in this Article is to resurrect the state approach to
constitutional rights. I have argued that state constitutional rights are structured
to prioritize and facilitate popular control over government rather than constrain
democratic majorities. This finding has important implications for how we
assess contemporary state constitutional rights, how constitutional rights
operate in our federal system, and how courts should approach constitutional
rights. I plan to explore these implications as part of a long-term research
agenda, but I conclude this Article with a few preliminary implications.
A. Twenty-First Century State Constitutional Rights
My ﬁndings both clarify and complicate our understanding of
contemporary state constitutional rights. On the one hand, they might help
move past misguided critiques of state constitutional rights and arrive at a
more authentic and accurate understanding. On the other hand, if we accept
state constitutional rights as instruments of popular control over government,
we must tackle a variety of diﬀerent practical and normative questions
regarding their design and operation.
If state constitutional rights are primarily about enhancing popular
control over government, then the amendomania that characterizes
contemporary state constitutional politics might be a natural continuation of
465 To be clear, I am not arguing that state bills of rights were never intended to protect
minorities. In fact, as I explain above, the states have adopted various minority-oriented provisions,
including protections against imprisonment for debt and equal protection. Rather, my point is that
minority protection means something diﬀerent in state constitutional thinking than under the
Federal Constitution. With the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Supreme
Court’s incorporation of rights against the states, minority protection under the Federal
Constitution focused on setting certain topics out of bounds for majorities to protect minorities and
individual liberty. In the state tradition, minority-oriented provisions are often the result of a
divergence between popular majorities who wish to provide greater minority protections and
government institutions and oﬃcials who are not responding to those preferences. In this way, state
minority protections are actually advancing the preferences of “benevolent majorities.” There is very
little evidence in the debates that state minority provisions were intended to be deeply entrenched
beyond the reach of future popular majorities. Indeed, this perspective on state constitutional rights
misunderstands their deepest normative commitment and core structure, which prioritizes popular
control over government above all else.
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state constitutional design. Rather than indicating dysfunction, it might
indicate that state constitutional rights are functioning exactly as designed.
The pre-Obergefell marriage amendments, for example, were eﬀorts by
intrastate political majorities to override or pre-empt state court rulings that
would invalidate existing marriage laws. In this sense, the amendments were
consistent with the state tradition of using constitutional rights to align
government policy with popular preferences. The recent wave of right-tohunt-and-ﬁsh amendments could be similarly explained. Jeﬀery Usman has
shown, for example, that the right to hunt-and-ﬁsh was added to the
Tennessee Constitution primarily because of a popular fear that animal and
environmental advocates would secure more restrictive regulation.466 The
state approach to rights might also explain why state courts habitably refrain
from expanding counter-majoritarian protections beyond the federal
minimum. Although very few courts express a sensitivity to popular reprisal
by amendment,467 some judges surely wish to avoid being overruled (even by
amendment).468 Finally, the increasing length and statutory-like detail of
state bill of rights is not out of place or inappropriate if we understand the
bill of rights to be “an ordinance of the people” designed to align government
with popular preferences by limiting government discretion.469
Thus, the amendomania that characterizes contemporary state
constitutional rights might be nothing more than the natural continuation of
state constitutional design. The frequent amendment of constitutional rights
reﬂects popular vigilance in monitoring and correcting government. By
overruling errant court opinions, chilling judicial activism, prodding reluctant
legislatures, and undoing the spoils of special interest inﬂuence, the people
are doing nothing more than exercising their right to alter and reform
government to counteract recalcitrance and capture.
Importantly, rights amendomania may also explain instances where state
courts push back on popular policies without any responsive amendments.470
When those rulings persist, it is not because constitutional rights are working to
466 See Jeﬀery Usman, The Game Is Afoot: Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the
Tennessee Constitution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 57, 83 (2009) (characterizing the amendment as a “preemptive strike” to ensure new regulation triggered popular referendum).
467 One of the few cases addressing this issue is Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 69294 (Mass. 1975), which spars over whether, in deciding the constitutionality of the death penalty, it
was appropriate to consider likelihood of responsive constitutional amendment.
468 See Jonathan L. Marshﬁeld, The Amendment Eﬀect, 98 B.U. L. REV. 55, 73-97 (2018)
(theorizing how ease of amendment might impact judicial decision-making).
469 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 16, 660-61 (theorizing scope and detail in constitutional
text as indicative of eﬀorts to limit agency costs).
470 Education ﬁnance is a good example. See Michael J. Guard & Jean A. LaMaita, Financing
Public Educational Facilities in New Jersey after the Freehold Decision, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 195,
205-09 (1982) (discussing New Jersey courts’ zealous protection of the state constitutional right to a
thorough and eﬃcient education despite voters’ repeated refusal to authorize school repairs).
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remove an issue from the “vicissitudes of political controversy.”471 In the states,
political controversy on any issue is only one referendum or initiative away. A
better view is that the electorate has allowed the ruling to stand; either because
it is agreeable on the merits or because it is a low priority not worth a response.
In other words, inaction by amendment may indicate tacit popular
endorsement.472 Thus, even when state courts invoke rights to invalidate popular
policies, state constitutional rights are, at best, operating as “speedbumps” that
cause democratic majorities to think twice before proceeding.473
On the other hand, the situation is surely more complex than this. For one
thing, there is good reason to doubt that contemporary amendment processes
are reliable indicators of fully formed popular preferences. There is a
qualitative difference between amendments originating in a convention and
amendments proposed by state legislatures or private citizens. The
convention, which solicits direct public input at three distinct phases and
limits input from existing government institutions, is the gold standard for
meaningful popular involvement in constitution making.474 But virtually all
amendments now occur by the initiative or legislative referral to voters.475 The
legislature’s role is especially problematic because it is a principal object of
regulation under the state approach to constitutional rights. One might be
concerned, for example, that legislative campaigns to amend rights reflect an
effort to reduce checks and balances and expand “legislative tyranny” rather
than enhance popular control. Indeed, in many states, gerrymandering and
other tactics have resulted in legislatures being the “least majoritarian” branch
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942).
Of course, resources for amendment are limited. Even with low barriers, politicians and
citizens must prioritize issues. But the many amendments on myriad speciﬁc issues suggests that
electorates are willing to act when they believe an issue needs to be addressed.
473 In a new book, Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg explore how rights truly function under
constitutions around the world. See ADAM CHILTON & MILA VERSTEEG, HOW CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS MATTER (2020). They conclude that the metaphor of pre-commitment is not a good
description of how rights operate. Rather, it is best to understand rights as “speedbumps” that can
“slow down governments that seek to transgress their powers.” Id. at 11-12. The authors do not
speciﬁcally consider state constitutions, but their ﬁndings ring true with my ﬁndings here.
474 Conventions generally involve a referendum to convene, a special election for delegates,
and referenda on convention proposals. See G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting
From Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform,
36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1078-82; see also Jonathan L. Marshﬁeld, Forgotten Limits on the Power to
Amend State Constitutions, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 101 (2019) (“Ultimately, the weight of historical
authority supports the idea that state constitutions are most properly created by a convention of
specially elected delegates.”); JAMES DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
258 (1915) (arguing that the convention is the “great agency” through which “popular rights may be
secured in the constitution, legislative tyranny restrained, and powerful interests subordinated to
the general welfare”).
475 See Marshﬁeld, supra note 97, at 484-90 (ﬁnding that 99.5 percent of amendments adopted
between 2006 to 2016 occurred by legislative referral or citizen initiative).
471
472
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of state government.476 Likewise there is voluminous literature suggesting that
the initiative process is vulnerable to manipulation by well-financed special
interests.477 All of this suggests that contemporary amendment processes
might be ill-equipped to enable popular control over recalcitrant government.
What worked well when conventions were the dominant amendment
mechanisms may not work for extra-conventional amendment processes.
Thus, state constitutionalism might have its own internal crisis of
dysfunction. It is important to note, however, that this is a very diﬀerent
problem from where we began. The complications that I raise here suggest
that state constitutional amendment processes may not be majoritarian enough
to realize the objectives of state constitutional rights. This is a very diﬀerent
critique than the dominant approach, which derides state constitutional rights
as too responsive to popular majorities.
We might also conclude that the state approach is normatively misguided
because, like Madison, we are more fearful of abusive majorities than
recalcitrant government. Indeed, my ﬁndings highlight how abusive
majorities have leveraged state constitutional rights in harmful and abusive
ways. However, even this assessment is complicated by my ﬁndings. The state
approach to constitutional rights must be examined within the broader
federal context. It is not enough to simply dismiss the states’ populist
approach to constitutional rights. Critics must also explain why it is
undesirable within a constitutional system where national government
provides a robust set of entrenched and judicially enforced rights against the
states. If, under those conditions, we want to encourage experimentation
between states on unanswered questions of public law, perhaps an approach
to rights that includes direct popular input is beneﬁcial. I do not purport to
resolve these issues here. My more modest point is that approaching state
constitutions on their own terms can illuminate more sophisticated inquiries
about how constitutional rights function within our federal system as a whole
and move us past tropes and truisms about the nature and function of
constitutional rights writ large; as if all ﬁfty-one American constitutions
approach rights from the same perspective.
B. Implications for State Rights Jurisprudence
This alternative understanding of state constitutional rights likely has
important implications for how state courts construe state constitutional
rights. This is surely a large and complex inquiry that I leave to future work.
Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1755-56 (2021).
See, e.g., DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED 243 (2000); Susanne Lohmann, An
Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809, 809-27 (1998).
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My modest suggestion here is that my ﬁndings likely impact how state courts
use existing modalities of constitutional construction.
Consider arguments based on the underlying purpose of a bill of rights.
As noted above, the Supreme Court often draws on the notion that federal
constitutional rights are intended to remove issues from the political realm
by entrusting them to judicial construction and enforcement. In West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, for example, the issue was whether the First
Amendment prohibited a state from requiring students to salute the
American ﬂag and recite the pledge.478 In rejecting arguments that the Court
should defer to legislative processes regarding the best means for promoting
patriotism, the Court reasoned that searching judicial review was appropriate
because “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and oﬃcials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts.”479 The Court further concluded that deference
to democratic processes regarding rights was fundamentally ﬂawed because
“[o]ne’s right[s] . . . may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.”480
Remarkably, state courts frequently replicate Justice Jackson’s reasoning
when interpreting their own bills of rights, sometimes with astounding
irony.481 For example, in In re Marriage Cases, the California Supreme Court
held that a statute limiting marriage to heterosexual couples violated
California’s equal protection clause.482 In rejecting arguments that the court
should defer to the statutory deﬁnition of marriage, the court recited Justice
Jackson’s homily to the Federal bill of rights; including that equal protection
“may not be submitted to vote” and “depend[s] on the outcome of no
elections.”483 The irony, of course, was that the precise issue before the court
was submitted to voters six months later as Proposition 8.484
My point is this: if state bills of rights serve a different purpose, then state
courts should avoid blindly reciting tropes tailored to federal constitutional
rights and instead allow the unique structure and design of state constitutional
rights to inform their construction. I do not mean to suggest that this is an
easy task. In the Marriage Cases, for example, the California Supreme Court
surely had an obligation to review the marriage statute for constitutional
319 U.S. 624, 626-30 (1943).
Id. at 638.
Id.
See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 54 n.87 (Conn. 2015) (citing Supreme Court opinions
for the “fundamental principle” that “guarantees of the Bill of Rights, may not be submitted to vote”).
482 183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008).
483 Id. at 450.
484 Miller, supra note 4, at 2090.
478
479
480
481
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compliance. It cannot be that statutes are constitutional just because the court
somehow divines broad popular support for the statute at the time of review.
But judicial review can take various forms.485 My point is simply that the
nature of judicial review might look very different when a court is constructing
an easily amended legal instrument designed to empower popular control over
government than if it is constructing a deeply entrenched instrument designed
to constrain or limit popular control over government.
Moreover, my ﬁndings may be salient for judges of all persuasions. On
the one hand, proponents of judicial restraint might infer from my ﬁndings
that state courts should be more restrained and deferential to democratic
outputs; intervening only when there is a clear conﬂict between the
constitution and state action. This approach would respect the notion that the
people can easily adjust government behavior through amendment and do not
need courts to interfere or update constitutional norms. On the other hand,
if state constitutional rights are instruments of popular control over
government, courts might feel especially emboldened to actively monitor
government on the people’s behalf; working to eﬀectuate the spirit and
purpose of state constitutional rights to protect the people from government
recalcitrance. This approach might be further buoyed by the reality that the
people can easily correct errant judicial opinions through amendment. In this
sense, an activist state judiciary is working to realize the popular will rather
than constrain it, and, as such, is welcoming of clarifying amendments and
popular interventions.
These implications deserve more focused investigation than I can undertake
here. My immediate goal is to substantiate the state’s alternative conception of
constitutional rights and point our attention towards important implications.
C. Implications for Federal Rights Jurisprudence
A critical implication from my ﬁndings is their corollary: federal
constitutional rights are uniquely important for constraining intrastate
majorities and protecting political minorities. State constitutional rights are
not built to carry that weight. To be sure, state constitutions have been used
to adopt minority-oriented protections, but those rights must be understood
within the broader design of state bills of rights. They are best understood as
privileges bestowed by benevolent majorities and not entrenched constraints
that could withstand focused majoritarian opposition (even ﬂeeting
opposition). Indeed, myriad examples show that when these rights inhibit
485 See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple Levels of
Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 386-401 (2018) (giving a brief history of the
tiers of scrutiny).
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popular priorities, they are quickly changed. Thus, my ﬁndings draw
attention to the unique importance of federal rights for imposing sideconstraints on democratic decision-making, especially within the states.
What might this mean for the Supreme Court’s federal rights
jurisprudence? I oﬀer two preliminary thoughts. First, it has the potential to
complicate or even destabilize a series of structural arguments advanced by
various justices that project a false equivalency between state constitutional
rights and federal rights. This fallacy was most famously developed and
advocated by Justice Brennan, who understood state constitutional rights to
provide a “double source” of protection for individual rights.486 On this view,
the “genius” of American federalism is that when one set of courts fails to
advance rights, the other set of courts can operate as a fail-safe and counteract
that failure.487 Crucial to this view is the notion that courts are the ﬁnal (or
at least most meaningful) arbiters of rights.488 The idea is that both sets of
courts are independently pushing back on majoritarian abuses; if one becomes
too permissive, the other will hopefully step in.
The fallacy, of course, is that while this description may ﬁt the Supreme
Court’s role when applying the Federal Bill of Rights, it does not accurately
capture state constitutional rights. When the Supreme Court declines to
extend a national right, it does not leave the issue to ﬁfty independent state
judiciaries. Instead, it leaves the issue to the ultimate control of state popular
majorities, who can weigh in almost instantaneously if they wish. In other
words, the Supreme Court is unique in its position to monitor and constrain
intrastate majorities, and we should be skeptical of arguments suggesting that
state constitutional rights can operate as equivalent substitutes.
To be sure, Justice Brennan advanced this conception of “judicial
federalism” to encourage state courts to develop independent rights
jurisprudence, but his ideas have been more recently used to inform the
proper scope of federal rights jurisprudence.489 Justice Ginsburg argued, for
486 See Brennan, supra note 109, at 491, 503; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In light of today’s erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of federal
constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from
adhering to higher standards under state law.”).
487 Brennan, supra note 109, at 491.
488 Id. at 503 (“[H]ow much more strongly should we trust state courts whose manifest purpose
is to expand constitutional protections. With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond
by increasing their own.”).
489 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brennan’s
understanding of state constitutional rights as the “primary constraints on state action”); Kansas v.
Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 127, 129 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brennan for the proposition
that the Court should defer to state experimentation with how to best guarantee a fair trial to
criminal defendants); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 707 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[S]tate constitutions have their own unique origins, history, language, and structure—all of which
warrant independent attention and elucidation.”).
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example, that the Supreme Court should reconsider the presumption created
by Michigan v. Long because it inhibited the ability of state courts to
experiment with their own constitutional rights.490 According to Justice
Ginsburg, the Supreme Court should be more restrictive in accepting cases
for review because “[s]tate courts interpreting state law remain particularly
well situated to enforce individual rights against the States.”491 More recently,
a majority of the current Court reasoned that it should assume a “limited
role” when considering new Eighth Amendment protections because states
can broaden their own criminal procedure guarantees.492 The Court hinted
strongly at notions of rights federalism and referenced authorities dedicated
principally to empowering state courts as independent civil rights leaders.493
Thus, as the current Court reevaluates the breadth of certain federal
protections, it seems likely that it may invoke notions of rights federalism to
justify narrowing the scope of federal rights.
But here again my ﬁndings complicate matters. State courts may be well
situated to apply state law to state government, but state constitutional rights
are not well situated to do what federal constitutional rights do. They are, in
many respects, the antithesis of federal constitutional rights. Thus, to the
extent the Supreme Court might be faced with a diﬃcult decision on whether
to leave a particular issue to the states for further experimentation, my
ﬁndings emphasize that state constitutional rights are not designed to operate
as a parallel corpus of countermajoritarian protections. Leaving a rights issue
to the states means leaving its fate with intrastate popular majorities. This is
the deep structure and explicit purpose of state constitutional rights. To the
extent that the current Court believes that the scope of federal protections
should be informed by a sense of comity to state courts and their construction
of state constitutional rights, my ﬁndings caution that state and federal rights
are not like-kind substitutes.
CONCLUSION
State constitutional rights are often misunderstood. The core
misunderstanding stems from the assumption that they are directed to the
same problems and intended to operate in the same way as the Federal Bill
of Rights as it was conceptualized by the Supreme Court during the civil
rights revolution of the twentieth century. My core claim in this Article is
Evans, 514 U.S. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 30. To be clear, Justice Ginsburg framed this issue in response to Court majorities
limiting federal rights. She was advocating for greater space for state courts to provide extra protections.
492 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1322-23 (2021).
493 Id. at 1323 (citing JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018)).
490
491
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that state constitutional rights are diﬀerent. They are deeply tied to popular
sovereignty and the fear that government oﬃcials and institutions are likely
to succumb to their own self-interest and betray the preferences of the people.
This is the polestar that deﬁnes and decodes state constitutional rights.
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APPENDIX A: CONVENTION DEBATES ADDRESSING
STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS

STATE

CONVENTION
YEAR(S)

Alabama

1861, 1901

Missouri

1861, 1875

Alaska

1955

Montana

1889, 1971

Arizona

1910

Nebraska

1871, 1919

Arkansas

1868

Nevada

1864

California

1849, 1878

New Hampshire

Connecticut

1818, 1965

New Jersey

1876, 1889, 1902,
1912, 1918, 1930,
1938, 1948, 1956,
1964, 1974, 1984
1844, 1947

Delaware

1831, 1852, 1852

New York

Georgia

1877

North Carolina

1821, 1846, 1867,
1894, 1915, 1938,
1967
1835

Hawaii

1950, 1968, 1978

North Dakota

1889, 1972

Idaho

1889

Ohio

1850, 1873, 1912

Illinois

Oregon

1857

Indiana

1847, 1869, 1920,
1969
1850

Pennsylvania

1837, 1872

Iowa

1844, 1857

Rhode Island

Kansas

1859

South Carolina

1842, 1951, 1955,
1964, 1973
1868

STATE

CONVENTION
YEAR(S)

Kentucky

1849, 1890

South Dakota

1885, 1889

Louisiana

1845, 1864, 1973

Tennessee

1977

Maine

1819

Texas

1845, 1875, 1974

Maryland

1851, 1864, 1867,
1967
1820, 1853, 1917

Utah

1895

Virginia

Massachusetts

West Virginia

Minnesota

1835, 1850, 1867,
1907, 1961
1857, 1857

1829, 1850, 1861,
1867, 1901
1861

Wisconsin

1846, 1847

Mississippi

1865

Wyoming

1889

Michigan
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APPENDIX B: TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEBATES ADDRESSING
STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS (1818–1894)

APPENDIX C: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF DEBATES

